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CHAPTER-1 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem: 
In recent years many countries have adopted economic programs aimed at 
adjusting their economies because of the large macroeconomic disequilibria 
chai-acterized by inflation, balance of payments difficulties, and increasing debt 
obligations. By and large, adjustment has aimed at reducing the rate of inflation, 
improving the balance of payments, and promoting economic growth. Adjustment 
requires many policy changes, including devaluation, opening of the economy, 
financial reforms, reduction of excessive regulations and removal of price controls. All 
these adjustment programs adopted by countries (whether supported by the IMF or the 
World Bank or undertaken without outside support) have required that substantial 
attention be paid to the fiscal situation. The reason for this is obvious. In countries 
facing major macro-economic difficulties, the public finances are often in substantial 
disequilibrium. A reduction of the disequilibrium becomes a necessary condition for 
improving the macroeconomic situation. The need for fiscal reform is now widely 
recognized but at the same time it has been experienced that the fiscal reform is very 
difficult. Infact, it has been found to be the most difficuh of the various policy changes 
required in adjustment programs. The difficulties are partly political, partly 
institutional, and partly conceptual. Dealing with fiscal deficits remains today one of 
the most difficult problem for the majority of developing countries. For many, growing 
fiscal deficits led to money creation as the main source of financing followed by 
increasing inflation, an erosion of the tax base, and even larger fiscal imbalances. Even 
counties that contained their fiscal deficits usually did so at great costs mainly by 
indiscriminate expenditure cutting. 
According to the World Bank, Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) on 
India, economic crisis which triggered the reform process in 1991 itself was diagnosed 
as the consequence of the severe fiscal imbalance that afflicted the economy 
thrciughout the 1980s, a detailed review of achievements and challenges of fiscal 
adjustment efforts is opportune. Fiscal reforms must therefore be analyzed from the 
perspective of whether and to what extent they have helped to achieve economic 
gro'vvth. 
The Indian economy has undergone a gradual transformation during the post-
independence period. The pace of such transformation, however,being relatively rapid 
since the last decade. The structural transformation that occurs in the Indian economy 
over the decade is the consequence of the development process witnessed since the 
beginning of planning in 1951. This is reflected in the growth rate and in the changing 
sectoral composition of the GDP. With the Indian economy shifting to a high growth 
path during the 1980s it was evident that the economy has emerged from a phase of 
stagnation, which has set in since the mid-1960s. However, the impressive growth 
performance of the 1980s was also associated with steady deterioration in a number of 
macroeconomic indicators. 
In the early 1991, a major economic crisis surfaced in India. Most economists 
are now conceived that the crisis in the economy was the worst that this county had 
experienced since independence. However, the situation is much less unstable than it 
was two decades ago. Over the past two decades, the Government has followed a 
policy of macroeconomic stabilization and has introduced certain structural reforms. 
So far these policy measures have not shown any spectacular results and whether in 
future these neo-liberalization measures will ensure economic growth with equity 
carmot be said a priori. 
The problems of the economy which assumed crisis proportions in 1991 did not 
de\'elop suddenly. The origin of the crisis is directly attributable to the careless macro-
management of the economy during the 1980s which led to large and persistent 
macroeconomic imbalances. The strategy of development, notwithstanding its 
limitations, cannot be blamed for this crisis. The widening gap between the revenue 
and expenditure of the Government resulted in growing fiscal deficits which had to be 
met by borrowings at home. Further, the steadily growing difference between the 
income and expenditure of the economy as a whole resulted in large current account 
deficits in the balance of payments which were financed by borrowings from the 
abroad. The internal imbalance in the fiscal situation and the external imbalance in the 
payments situation were closely related, through the absence of carefulness in the 
masro-management of the economy. The fiscal situation, which had been under 
mounting pressure throughout 1980s, assumed crisis proportions by the beginning of 
the 1991-92. The twin crises were reflected through an unmanageable balance of 
payments crisis and a socially intolerably high rate of inflation that were building up in 
the 1980s and climaxed in 1990-91. The Gulf crisis in the late 1990s sharply 
accentuated macroeconomic problems. There was also political instability in the 
country at this juncture. All these developments together eroded international 
confidence in the Indian economy and as a result, this country's credit rating in the 
int(imational capital market declined steeply. However, it has to be recognized that the 
problems of the economy did not assume crisis proportions abruptly. These problems, 
in jiact, were very much there for years destroying the capacity of the economy to cope 
with any internal or external shocks. The two OPEC shocks of 1973 and 1979 hurt, but 
did not have a sustained impact on the economy. The external shocks administered by 
the loss of remittances and the expenditures incurred to rescue workers in the aftermath 
of the im'asion of Kuwait in August 1990 certainly accentuated the fiscal crisis at the 
end. But the crises was certainly 'home made'. 
This was the context in which a newly elected Government took office in June 
1991 and set about the difficuh task of launching a programme of economic reforms. 
Thi2 Government initiated a programme of macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
adjustment with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. To some extent the 
urgency was derived from the gravity of the crisis because the day of reckoning could 
not be postponed any further. There was also the performance record of the 1980s 
which clearly pointed towards speeding up the pace of structural reforms while setting 
the fiscal house in order without any loss of time. Fiscal stabilization was begun with a 
view to bringing about macroeconomic stabilization. The regular budget for 1991-92 
took a bold step in the direction of correcting the fiscal imbalance. It envisaged a 
reduction in the fiscal deficit by nearly two percentage points of GDP. This magnitude 
of fiscal correction can be considered unprecedented in as much as only eight months 
of the current fiscal year remained to accomplish the task. The budget laid stress on 
fiscal stabilization being supported by essential reforms in economic policy and 
management. While it contained proposals for raising additional revenue, most of the 
reduction in fiscal deficit was sought to be achieved through reduction in non-plan 
expenditure. 
The reform process was comprehensive. The initial reforms focused on fiscal 
reforms, policy paradigm shift from physical control regime to the one relying more on 
market forces and trade related reforms. Subsequently reforms were extended to cover 
fin;mcial sector and to put in place law and regulatory framework compatible with a 
market system. The full impact of the reform measures edges into view over a long 
span of time (Sarma,A. & Gupta,M.,2002)'. In India, over the last several years, public 
debate with respect to fiscal policy reforms has proceeded at three distinct levels: 
• at the microeconomic level, where discussion has centered on the base and 
stmcture of tax rates and the distribution of Government expenditures across 
alternative end uses, 
• at the administrative level, where concern has been expressed with respect to 
the quality of Government expenditures, the delivery of its services and the 
inefficiencies inherent within its tax collecting bureaucracies, and 
• at the macroeconomic level, where attention has focused on the size of the 
Government's fiscal deficits (and its various counterparts) and the implications 
this carries for real interest rates, inflation, investment and 
growth(Mishra,V.,2001)^. 
Fiscal Reforms at the Centre Covered: 
I. Tax Reforms, 
II, Expenditure Reforms, 
III. Restructuring of PSUs, 
IV, Coordination between Monetary and Fiscal Policies, and 
V, Institutional Measures. 
The structuring of the tax system constitute a major components of fiscal 
reforms with the aim of augmenting revenues and removing anomalies in the tax 
structure. The main focus of the reform was of simplification and rationalization of 
botia direct and indirect taxes drawing mainly from the recommendation of the Tax 
Reform Committee headed by R.J Chelliah in 1991. Since the rates were very high and 
structure of indirect taxes was highly complex, it was considered undesirable to 
augment revenues merely by raising tax rates. The Committee had recommended 
adoption of a small number of simple broad-based taxes with moderate and limited 
number of rates and with very few exemptions and reductions. Accordingly, the tax 
rates were significantly rationalized and progressively brought down to the levels 
comparable to some of the developed economies. The concern with tax rationalization 
has been reflected in the appointment of a number of Committees to review the tax 
system in the last few years. 
Since 1991 several efforts have been made through the armual budget process 
to achieve tax reforms. These have focused on : expanding the tax base by including 
services (not previously taxed); reducing rates of direct taxes for individuals and 
corporations; abolishing most export subsidies; lowering import duties (covered below 
by us under structural reforms relating to trade policies/external sectors); rationalizing 
sales tax and reducing the cascading effect of central indirect taxes by introducing a 
mcdified value-added tax (MODVAT) and later on value-added tax (VAT); 
rationalizing both direct and indirect taxes by removing unnecessary exemptions; 
providing for tax incentives for infrastructure and export-oriented sectors, including 
setting up special economic zones; and simplification of procedures and efforts for 
im]3roving the efficiency of the tax administration system specially through 
computerization. 
The Central Government has included a lot of measures to curb built-in growth 
in expenditure and to bring about structural changes in the composition of expenditure 
in successive budgets during 1990s. These included subjecting all ongoing schemes to 
zero-based budgeting and assessment of manpower requirements of government 
dej)artments. These measures, by and large, focused on downsizing government and 
reducing its role and administrative expenditure. The process also involved review of 
all subsidies with the view to introducing cost-based user charges wherever feasible, 
review of budgetary support to autonomous institutions and encouragement to PSUs to 
maximize generation of internal resources. Further, as an institutional arrangement, the 
Government also constituted an Expenditure Reforms Commission (ERC) to look into 
areas of expenditure correction. The ERC constituted to suggest measures for 
rationalizing public expenditure and made the following important recommendations 
which are at different stages of implementation: 
i. Food subsidy should be reduced and should be allowed only to population 
below the poverty line. For this purpose, the State Governments should identify 
below poverty line population, 
ii. Fertilizer subsidies which have grown over the years should be withdrawn in a 
phased manner. This will require dismantling of the control system over time to 
make fertilizer industry completely decontrolled. 
Since there is excess staff in the Government, for optimizing the Government staff 
strength, a cut of 10 percent on the staff strength as on January 1, 2000 should be 
carried out by the year 2004-05. There should be complete ban on creation of new 
posts for two years. 
The public sector was originally intended to be the engine of self-sustain 
economic growth. It was also conceived to hold the commanding heights of the 
economy. In order to fulfill these roles, it was necessary for the public sector to 
generate adequate investible surpluses. No doubt public sector contributed 
significantly to the expansion of the industrial base. However, it has failed to generate 
sufficient internal resources for its further expansion and, as a result, has now become 
major constraint on economic growth. Under structural reforms the Government has 
decided to give greater managerial autonomy to public enterprises to enable them to 
work efficiently. On careful consideration it becomes clear that managerial autonomy 
is of great importance to improve the performance of the public enterprise. During the 
reform period there has been a distinct change in the public perceptions in favour of 
reducing the size of public sector and improving private participation. Hence, a two -
pronged strategy was adopted by the Central Government-reduction in budgetary 
support to the PSUs and privatization of PSUs. 
Another objective of the reform process has been to improve fiscal-monetary 
coordination. This involved steps to ensure wider participations in the Government 
securities market so as to facilitate elimination of automatic monetization and pre-
emption of institutional resources by the Government. During the 1990s, the RBI 
undertook a series of steps towards widening Government securities market. 
In the second half of the 1980s, when the Government had pursued 
expansionary fiscal policies to support growth from the deficits contributed to the 
foreign exchange crisis in 1991 which then prompted the far-reaching economic 
ref(3rms. The combined deficit then declined until 1996-97, but increased again in the 
following years. Net dis-savings of general Government peaked in 2001. The 
Government was then absorbing almost half of the nation's saving in order to finance 
its own consumption outlays. In addition, the Government was borrowing to finance its 
investment, capital transfers and loans to state-owned enterprises. As a result, the 
borrowing requirement (fiscal deficit) of State and local Governments had reached 
nearly 10 percent of GDP by 2001 and public debt was rising significantly. In order to 
end this unsustainable situation, the Central Government enacted legislation to 
improve fiscal discipline. After close to three years discussion, the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act was adopted in August 2003. 
This Act sets a medium-term target of achieving a balance between current revenue 
and current spending (i.e a zero-revenue deficit) by 2008 and limits the overall fiscal 
deficit for the Central Government to 3 percent of GDP. By 2006 the Central revenue 
del^ icit had only been reduced to 2 percent of GDP, but the fiscal deficit has been 
reduced by 3.5 percent of GDP. The 2007 budget confirms the faster adjustment of 
fiscal deficit, which is only slightly greater than the target for 2008 incorporated in the 
FRBM Act. However, the revenue deficit is expected to be 1.5 percent of GDP, 
indicating that a very sharp reduction would be necessary to meet the target of the 
FRBM for this balance. In effect, the Central Government has not been able to stem 
the; increase in current expenditure as much as had been plarmed and, consequently, the 
hope - for increase in the extent of investment, which would have raised the fiscal 
deficit relative to the current deficit, has not materialized. The FRBM Act also 
improved the transparency of budgetary policy. The Act provides that the Government 
has to lay three documents before parliament every year: one with an assessment of 
economic prospects, another with its strategy with regard to taxation and expenditure, 
and the final one giving a three-year rolling target for the revenue balance and the 
ov(2rall balance. 
Fiscal reforms were the integral and perhaps the most critical part of the 
macroeconomic stabilization and reforms initiative taken by the Government after the 
1991 economic crisis. The fiscal consolidation measures taken immediately after the 
crisis situation yielded significantly positive results in terms of reduction in fiscal 
deficit, control in expenditure and marked changes in the fiscal system particularly in 
the financing pattern of the deficits through reduction in monetization. However, the 
continued structural imbalances in terms of falling tax buoyancy, nature of fiscal 
correction in terms of reduction in investment expenditure, increased interest burden 
owing to borrowing at market related rates, impact of enhanced salary of Government 
employees, compulsions of increased defence expenditure etc. were some of the major 
factors which reversed the situation such that at the end of the decade the combine 
fisc^ al deficit of Centre and States was almost at the same level as was at the beginning 
of the reform measures. The emerging situation has led economists to suggest that the 
second generation of reforms should constitute a program of action aimed at 
preventing another major economic crisis and should stimulate rapid economic growth 
in the country during the new century. Infact, in the strategy outlined by the Finance 
Minister in his budget speech in February, 2000, declaring the next 10 years as 'India's 
decade of development' one of the elements is to establish a credible framework of 
fiscal discipline. Many economists in their surveys have even warned that unless 
7 
substantial fiscal consolidation is achieved continued fiscal deficits pose India's 
greatest risk to future destabilization (Deshmukh, H., Chaudhari,K., Powar,Y., 
Parhar,A & Shejwal,A-,2006)1 
1.2 Review of Literature: 
Tripathi,R.N (1966)'*in his study of tax structure in developing countries shows 
that the high rates of taxes on commodities with a high income elasticity of demand are 
quite effective in siphoning a substantial proportion of increase in output into the 
resources of the public sector needed for development financing and a stiff rate of 
commodity taxes on luxury articles tends to introduce an element of progressiveness in 
an otherwise predominantly regressive tax structure in developing countries. 
Chelliah,R.J (1969) in his study of fiscal policy attempted to analyze the 
fundamental problems of fiscal policy in less developed countries, the basic structure 
of public finance with emphasis on tax structure and fiscal policies, against the 
bac;kground of planned economic development. The greater part of his work is carried 
on with special reference to India. He has also observed that the fiscal policy 
appropriate for a country will depend, apart from many other factors, on the stage of its 
de\'elopment and on the social grounds. 
Jain,M.M (1969) is of the view that the Indian tax structure was found to be highly 
buoyant with respect to income .Analysing the tax yields through log linear fimctions for the 
period 1955-56 to 1965-66, he found that while the buoyancy co-efficients were greater than 
unity for both direct and indirect taxes, indirect taxes had a much higher co-efficient than 
direct taxes, reflecting the tax efforts which were largely in the form of commodity taxes or 
tax(js on transactions. However, a tax-wise analysis showed corporation tax to have the 
highest co-efficient of buoyancy. The built-in flexibility of the tax system was also found to be 
higli which is attributed to the additional taxes imposed during the Second and Third Five-
Year Plans. 
Musgrave,R.A (1969)'' in his study of fiscal policy has examined the essential 
characteristics of fiscal system in the content of certain key features of economic life. 
His study deals with the adoption of fiscal systems to the requirement of centrally 
planned and decentralized market economy. He also examined the interaction between 
fiscal systems and economic development and compared the tax structure of a number 
of highly developed countries. In his study he also raised the issues like fiscal 
cenitralization versus decentralization, the formulation of a budget plan, the impact of 
go^^emment forms on fiscal behaviour, social security and transfer systems, and the 
stnicture and management of public debt. 
Shaws,G.K (1981) in his study of the concept of fiscal policy in developing 
countries suggested a relatively homogeneous body of fiscal instruments applicable to 
such countries and perhaps more important that public finance and fiscal policy in 
de\'eloping economies constitute an academic discipline distinct from its counterpart in 
the more advanced economy. Both notions are certainly false, the former being 
contradicted by the greater diversity in conditions pertaining to third world countries 
when compared with the more integrated advanced economies, whilst the latter 
encounters the objection that policy objectives, fiscal instruments and both political 
and administrative constraints are in principal the same. 
Gowda,K.V (1987) in his work has criticized the long term fiscal policy 
(LTFP) that it has placed exclusive reliance not on fiscal policy with all its various 
seg;ments. It does not touch on expenditure policy, monetary policy, debt management 
and international economic policy but on tax policy. In his study he explains how fiscal 
policy instruments are to be integrated with all other instruments of macro-economic 
policy in order to realize the desired results and underlines the complications of 
pursuing fiscal policy in isolation. 
On the issue of tax elasticity, Shome (1988)'^ found the tax system to be lacking 
the design that would automatically yield higher tax revenue with growth in gross 
domestic product. He felt that in the event of low tax elasticity, even the discretionary 
measures may fail to evoke the desired response in the form of improvement in tax-GDP 
ratio. According to him, the improvement in tax elasticity would call for expansion of 
co '^erage, a regulai" adjustment in rates on inflation and reasonable progressivity in the 
system as a whole. Removal of various exemptions in income tax would be critical for 
improving elasticity. For tax on goods and services, a broad-based general sales tax or 
value added tax would yield a higher elasticity. 
Singh,S.K (1988)"has examined the nature of the fiscal crisis in India and 
evaluated long term fiscal policy (LTFP) as a response to this crisis. The study 
explains that since 1975-76, the tax ratio has kept pace with the expenditure ratio 
resulting in the long run imbalance between Government revenues and expenditures. 
Thi s gap which widened during the Sixth Plan became much larger during the Seventh 
Plan. Thus, the Central Government has to borrow even to meet its current 
expenditure. His analysis indicates that the LTFP, as a response to the challenging 
problem of fiscal crisis, has failed to offer any clear direction in two vital areas, 
namely,(i) how to restrain the increase in non-plan expenditure on revenue account, 
and (ii) how to augment the surpluses of PSUs. Finally, he has warned that without 
proper advance in these areas the fiscal crisis will persist. 
Rakshit,M (1991)'^ in his work has studied the fiscal roots of macroeconomic 
imbalance in India, and found that during 1980, fiscal imbalance assumed alarming 
proportions due to widening gap between revenue and expenditure. In his work he has 
discussed macro-economic adjustment programme introduced by the government to 
resolve the fiscal crisis. Finally, he raises a number of important issues regarding 
viability of fiscal management. 
Buiter & Patel (1992)'^ found the state of Indian public finance to be perilous. 
Th(jy observed the rising trend in public debt as ratio to GNP and also in monetized 
deficit. This disturbing trend, as they find, started in 1970s but accelerated significantly 
in ].980s. They also make it clear that this deterioration cannot be explained in terms of 
some external shocks like OPEC I and OPEC II (when oil prices were increased 
substantially in early 1970s and late 1970s) and 1990 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and 
subsequent war. They blame public sector for the crises. Far from being a channel for 
mobilizing national saving and stimulating domestic capital formation, the public 
sector has become a drain on nation's investable resources. Public consumption growth 
has steadily out paced the growth of current revenue. 
Mundle & Rao (1992)'"^ have analyzed the nature of fiscal crisis in India in 
1990 and related issues in the growth and composition of public expenditure, the tax 
system and mobilization of tax revenues and non-tax revenues. They have shown that 
the fiscal imbalance was mainly a reflection of the increasing gap between revenue 
reci^ ipts and revenue expenditure. There was a spurt in spending mainly on account of 
inteirest payments, subsidies, plan and non-plan grants to State Governments, defence 
and failure of public sector undertakings etc. on the other hand, the growth of tax and 
nori-tax revenues was stagnated. Finally, they have endorses the fiscal stabilization 
measures initiated in 1991. 
Buiter & Patel (1993)'^ basically updated their earlier analysis (Buiter and Patel 
1992) and extends the period of it upto 1992-93. They concluded that considering the 
magnitude of the crises the fiscal correction measures were insufficient. Debt-GDP 
ratio would continue to rise. They calculate that a permanent increase of primary 
10 
surplus to about 4.5 percent of GDP is required for the stabilization of debt-GDP ratio, 
which demands both revenue enhancement and expenditure control. To achieve this, it 
recommends the widening of tax base for both direct and indirect tax. On expenditure 
side they emphasized the pruning of Government wage bill, food and fertilizer 
subsidies and subsidies to public sector enterprises. They opine that currently 
implemented food subsidies normally benefit other than those who are subject to 
malnutrition or under- nourishment. Therefore, target-oriented subsidies should be 
used as anti-poverty instrument. 
Chhibber & Mansoor Dailama (1993)'^ argue for a need for a broader approach 
to the relationship between fiscal policy and private investment in developing 
countries. Such an approach needs to emphasize the role of fiscal policy and 
stabilization, the competitiveness between public and private investment and the 
taxation of income from capital. While these issues have long been recognized in the 
literature in the context of both developed and developing countries, they have 
assumed particular urgency and importance in the context of the ongoing liberalisation 
and privatization trends evident in most developing countries. 
1 7 
Comia & Stewart (1993) reviewed changes in the fiscal policy of developing 
countries undergoing economic adjustment during 1980s.Macro choices in the areas of 
ov(jrall taxation, government expenditure and fiscal deficit are first examined. It 
api)ears that although a few countries managed to combine raising government 
expenditure per head and a falling budget deficit thanks to increase in the ratio and/or 
to overall growth, in the majority of the countries analyzed, traditional fiscal policy 
emphasizing rapid reductions in budget deficit through expenditure reductions 
compounded the negative effects of falling incomes on the welfare of the poor. Finally, 
they concluded that the main elements of fiscal policy approach are aiming at 
protecting the poor during adjustment. 
1 O 
De Melo Martha (1993) has proposed the use of a sustainable deficit concept 
to estimate the minimum fiscal adjustment required in a high debt country. The 
sustainable deficit is defined to be compatible with a sustainable debt, which the 
boiTower is willing and able to service. His work provides empirical estimates of the 
need for fiscal adjustment in a small group of high debt countries in the mid 1980s. 
Tht;ir experience is compared to that of small group of low debt countries to 
distinguish the differences in the adjustment required and its determinants during this 
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period. The results illustrate the extent to which the appropriate size of fiscal deficit 
depends on the macro-economic content. 
Faini, R. & Jaime (1993)'^  take a look at the evidence of fiscal adjustment in 
developing countries. They found that, while on an average, developing countries were 
successful after 1985 in cutting their primary deficits, rising interest costs and stagnant 
fiscal revenues implied limited progress towards reducing fiscal imbalances. Most of 
the improvement on the fiscal front was achieved by cut in capital expenditures. Then 
they have focused on issues such as the size of fiscal adjustment, the macroeconomic 
im]3act of deficit reduction and choice between expenditure cut and tax increases. 
Of) 
Gulati (1993) has dealt with some questions concerning the growing burden 
of internal public debt in India. These questions that have lately been raised with a 
stridency not noticed before focus on reducing the fiscal deficit, a term that hardly ever 
figured in the lexicon of fiscal policy in India. 
Kapila, U (1993) in her analysis of public finances of India has shown that the 
fis(;al policy situation which was under strain throughout the 1980s, reached a critical 
situation in 1990-91. Throughout the 1980s, all the indicators of fiscal imbalances 
were on the rise. The unabated growths of non-plan expenditure and poor returns from 
investments made in the public sector have been the main contributory factor in the 
fiscal crisis. Government initiated the fiscal stabilization and intended to continue it. 
Sh(j has also suggested that for the realization of the fiscal stabilization, it is imperative 
to restrain the rise of expenditures. Fiscal discipline is also necessary on the part of 
PSEs to hasten the process of fiscal correction. 
Mookherjee, D (1993) has analyzed the fiscal stabilization reforms in the 
Indian economy. In this work he has highlighted that at the term of the eighties into the 
nineties, serious action on the fiscal front was urgently needed to correct the macro-
economic imbalances. The principal instruments of fiscal stabilization in 1991-92 were 
plan expenditure and subsidies on exports and fertilizers. Disinvestment of equity 
holding in central public sector enterprises also provided a cushion. Initially 
go '^emment succeeded in its determined effort at fiscal stabilization and brought the 
fiscal deficit down. 
Mundle & Hiranya Mukhopadhyay (1993) in their study have analyzed the 
impact of alternative fiscal policies on macro-economic performance of the Indian 
economy. The most important lesson emerged from their work is that in reducing the 
deficit, greater revenue mobilization would be preferable to expenditure compression. 
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This should be attempted through tax reform rather than raising rates. There are, 
however, Umits to how far tax reforms can raise the buoyancy of tax revenue. Hence, 
fiscal correction will have to depend in part on public expenditure compression. They 
have shown that in the post reform period expenditure on almost all items except 
inti^ rest payments have been cut in real terms. However, the sharpest cuts have fallen 
on those items of expenditure which ought to be protected. 
Tanzi,V (1993) ^ has observed that fiscal reform has proven difficuh to 
imjDlement for political, institutional and conceptual reasons. In his work he has 
discussed the determination of the correct size of the fiscal adjustment needed, the 
prciblems in measuring fiscal disequilibrium, the desired fiscal measures and the 
sequencing of the required fiscal reforms. Finally, he argues that fiscal reform require 
time to be successful. 
Taylor,L (1993) has attempted to study fiscal policy issues that arise during 
macroeconomic stabilization in developing countries. His work is based on the study 
of stabilization episodes in eighteen countries. He has observed that the effects of 
fiscal stabilization and adjustment on income distribution are less clear cut and 
stal^ilization programme should take into account specific country conditions. 
Thirsk,W.R (1993)^^ has observed that many countries have overhauled their 
tax systems during the past decade. His work reviews the profile of a typical 
dcN'eloping country tax system prior to recent wave of reforms. A detailed description 
of tax reforms in several developing countries is presented. Comparisons across 
countries indicate an emerging consensus on the desirable characteristic of a tax 
system: neutrality and the adoption of a more uniform system of taxation, the 
progressive abandonment of special tax distinctions and exemption and simple tax 
design. 
97 
Bagchi & Stem (1994) noted that the early results of fiscal policy were quite 
striking. Breaking out of the stagnation of the preceding fifty years Indian economy 
grew about 4 percent per annum in the first two plan periods. Per capita income grew 
at 1.8 to 2 percent. But this momentum was not maintained. What was more, financing 
of ]3ublic sector proved increasingly difficult, leading to larger and larger recourse to 
market borrowing and deficit financing (borrowings from the central bank) with all 
their attendant consequences. Before the decade of 1980s had drawn to a close it was 
evident that the Government budgeting in India was in a crisis. Apparent reason for the 
imbialance in Indian public finances was not other than the faster growth of 
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Government expenditure than the revenues. Thus, a fiscal correction was inevitable. 
Although the move towards fiscal adjustment in India was discernible in the 
pronouncements made as part of long term fiscal policy announced in the mid 1980s, a 
comprehensive fiscal reforms programme at the Central Government level was 
initiated only at the beginning of the 1990s as part of the economic adjustment 
programe initiated in 1991-92. The fiscal reforms were aimed to achieve a reduction in 
the size of fiscal deficit and debt in relation to GDP and were affected through 
rationalization of tax structure expenditure pruning, restructuring of PSUs and better 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. 
Shand Ric & Kalirajan (1994)^ ^ in their study indicated that the reforms 
implemented in India since 1991-92 have been yielding the anticipated positive results. 
Though the reform process has been gradual, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
sustainability is not in question. The study concludes that Indian economy may be 
evolving a new paradigm of growth which could be relevant to other developing 
countries with similar structural linkages. 
Bhattacharya (1995)^ ^ in his work has evaluated the factors responsible for 
fiscal imbalance in 1990 and analyzed the performance of fiscal stabilization measures. 
He has shown that the basic problem of the fiscal stabilization in India was that the 
go '^emment expenditure was rising faster than the government income. As a result all 
the measures of deficit such as fiscal deficit, revenue deficit, primary deficit, etc. have 
rising trends. Finally, he suggested that the fiscal deficit should be reduced by slowing 
do\vn growth of non-plan and wasteful expenditures on the one hand and improving 
dir(ict tax revenue and surplus of public enterprises on the other. 
Ghosh & Sen (1995) have observed in their study that during 1980s not only 
the revenue receipt have been rather inelastic but the expenditure accounts particularly 
of the non-plan outlays have also gone up quite rapidly. This has been termed by them 
as the main cause of the fiscal imbalance. They have also suggested that it requires to 
be iattended with policies to reduce the non-plan expenditure drastically. 
Rao, Sen & Ghosh (1995)^ ^ have analyzed in their study that after 1980-81, 
expenditure growth was higher than that of revenue receipt. Within total expenditure, 
revenue expenditure grew at rates higher than that of capital expenditure. Growth of 
revenue expenditure was particularly sharp in the case of interest payments, subsidies, 
wages and salaries, while those on maintenance of capital assets lagged behind. So 
fiscal imbalance becomes inevitable by the end of 1980s. The analysis also points 
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to\ '^ards the difficulty in achieving fiscal equilibrium in the short and medium term 
context. So long as the interest groups succeed in securing a large and increasing share 
of expenditures on categories beneficial to them compression of fiscal deficit become 
difficult. 
Nayak (1995) m his work has revealed that m the fiscal sector, government 
expenditure had been far outpacing revenues for more than a decade, leading the 
go\'emment to resort to substantial borrowings, both internal and external. As a result 
interest payments become largest expenditure head of the Central Government budget. 
Noil- essential expenditure continues to grow unabated. He has also observed that the 
tax to GDP ratio is already reasonably high and the prospect of increasing it further 
appears to be limited at least in the short run. So, there is not much choice left and 
expienditures have to be cut in several vital areas. 
• I T 
Mc dermott, John & Wescott (1996) in their study tried to use the fiscal 
expansion and consolidation experiences of the industrial countries over the period 
1970 to 1995 to examine the interplay between fiscal adjustments and economic 
performance. A key finding is that fiscal consolidation need not trigger an economic 
slowdown, especially over the medium term. Fiscal consolidation that concentrates on 
the expenditure sides, especially transfers and government wages, is more likely to 
succeed in reducing the public debt ratio than tax-based consolidation. Also, the 
greater the magnitude of the fiscal consolidation, the more likely it is to succeed in 
reducing the debt ratio. 
Chakraborty (1997)^ '* has attempted to examine whether lowering the rates of 
direct and indirect taxes in recent years has resulted in higher tax mobilization. The 
study concludes that compared to indirect taxes, direct taxes were more buoyant during 
the post- reform period. It has been observed by the author that generally reduction in 
tax rate cannot make a tax more buoyant instantly. There is a time lag involved. 
Shome (1997) attempts to assess the state of fiscal stabilization in the post-
reform period. He has shown that after an initial improvement in the fiscal deficit, the 
government faced difficulty in controlling the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio. The tax-GDP 
ratio also declined and the Central Government passed dovm certain expenditure 
responsibilities to State governments, thereby managing to reduce the expenditure-
GDP ratio to some extent. His work focuses on the performance of the fiscal sector and 
the direction for future policy imperatives. 
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Mohan (2000)^^ has analyzed trends in State and Central Government revenues 
and. expenditures and suggested ways to climb out of debt trap. He has observed that 
rapid economic growth is the only solution to the problem of poverty and such growth 
is not possible without significant fiscal correction. The key objective of fiscal reform 
has to be a reduction in public debt service payments. 
Rao,M.Govinda (2000)^^ advocated that there have been major changes in tax 
systems in several countries over the last two decades for a variety of reasons. The 
objective of his study is to analyze the evolution of the tax system in India since the 
early 1990s.He describes and assesses the introduction of new forms of direct and 
indirect taxes, their revenue and equity implications and the successes achieved in their 
implementation. He concludes that after eight years of reforms, improving the tax 
system remains a major challenge in India. 
TO 
Rakshit (2000) is a critique of the whole approach of fiscal policy pursued 
during 1990s. He points out that adverse effects of h could be found in many 
macroeconomic variable like declining aggregate capital formation and stagnant 
saving, low agricultural growth alongside sharp fluctuations in food output, 
deceleration of industrial growth during second half of 1990s and ultimately the rise in 
fiscal deficit itself He also argued that not only deficits, but revenue and expenditure 
also need to be redefined for the specific purposes as they generate different effects on 
difi'erent macro variables. For example, he favors the expenditure and health to be 
tak(2n out from revenue expenditure and receipts from disinvestments cannot be 
equated with tax revenue as former reduces the future non-tax receipts. He thus argues 
that 'Fiscal Gap' rather than fiscal deficit is the better measure for measuring 
sustainability of public debt. It is also critical of the shift in financing the deficit 
tov '^ards high interest borrowing instruments. 
Kopits,G (2001) assesses the potential usefulness of fiscal policy rules for 
India in the light of rapidly growing international experience in this area. As part of his 
assessment, he explores various design options and institutional arrangements that 
seem relevant for India in the context of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management Bill. He also outlines preparatory step for successful implementation. 
Kamik,A (2002)""^  has addressed the question that can fiscal policy play a key 
role in the revival of the economy? He argued that the problem is that this question has 
had to be posed in the context of deteriorating fiscal balances of the Centre and the 
States, whose combined deficit is today slightly worse after 10 years of reform. The 
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States' gross fiscal deficit has deteriorated significantly. It is absolutely necessary, 
therefore, for the Centre to be fiscally prudent, which will be a signal to the states of 
the Centre's seriousness in regard to fiscal management. A contrary signal will 
undermine any restraint that the Centre can bring to bear on the States. 
Peter,M., Kerr,l. & Thorpe,M (2002)"*' in their study said that the tax reforms 
of recent years in India are based on Chelliah's recommendations of simple broad-
based taxes with a moderate and limited number of rates. The reduction in direct tax 
rates in the economy has not only increased revenue collection but also accelerated 
economic growth. Their aim is to investigate the effect of India's tax policy on private 
capital formation. A time series analysis of data for the economy for the period 1950-
51 to 1994-95 reveals that a one percent increase in the direct tax ratio has led to a 
reduction of 0.12 percent in the ratio of private capital formation to GDP. They also 
examine whether there is any gain in opting for an expenditure tax to promote savings 
ancl capital formation in the economy. The major problem facing the Indian direct tax 
system is evasion of income taxes. They concluded that an expenditure tax is powerfijl 
tool to combat evasion. 
Sarma,A. & Gupta,M (2002)^ ^ in their paper show that the year 1991-92 was 
one; of the toughest years for the Indian economy. All the macroeconomic indicators 
became adverse. The overall economic growth slumped to a mere 1.1 percent. The 
gross fiscal deficit stood at 8 percent of the GDP and the revenue deficit on the current 
account at 3.5 percent in 1990-91. Prices shot up to 17 percent, an all time high level. 
In the external sector, the balance of payments with as little as $1.1 billion foreign 
exchange reserves or barely enough to meet two weeks' import bill became precarious. 
The shortage of foreign exchanges apart from inducing import squeeze for industrial 
production led the country by June 1991 to face a hard option of defaulting on 
inte;mational commitments such as debt servicing or accepting IMF structural 
adjustment and stabilization programme. The new government decided to adopt in 
June 1991 programme of macroeconomic stabilization to restore viability to fiscal 
balances and the balance of payments and to contain prices. At the same time it 
undertook a far reaching programme of structural reforms involving bold initiatives in 
ext(jmal trade, exchange rate, industrial policy and so on, higher growth trajectory 
through infusing efficiency and international competitiveness. It also aimed at 
integrating the Indian economy with the global system and enhancing its robustness 
through wider access to better technology and benchmarking with the global 
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performer. The reform process was relying more on market forces and trade related 
reforms. Subsequently reforms were extended to cover financial sector and to put in 
place law and regulatory framework compatible with a market system. The full impact 
of the reform measures edges into view over a long span of time. Nevertheless, a 
decade since the introduction of the reform process is a long enough period to make 
visible the results of the reform measures. It is in this background that this paper 
addresses itself to a vital area of reforms, viz, fiscal reforms. It attempts to evaluate the 
im]3act of fiscal reforms on the public finances of the Union and State governments. 
Th(j paper starts with the outcome of the reform process as reflected in different 
measures of balances and then proceeds to examine the performance of the process 
variables that detemiine the aggregate balances. To form a view of the effectiveness of 
fiscal reforms, they have examined the performance of some of the important fiscal 
variables in an intertemporal context. To be more specific, they have compared the 
performance of fiscal variables in the post-reform decades with that of the proceeding 
decades. 
Bhattacharya, B. & Sabyasachi, Kar (2004) examined the nature of 
relationship between aggregate economic growth and fiscal and external balances in 
the Indian economy. Acceleration in aggregate GDP growth can lead to worsening of 
fiscal deficit which is to be financed by other sources. Investment and productivity 
capital is further prerequishes for acceleration of GDP. This study examined the inter-
linlcages between the production sector, the fiscal and external sectors. 
Lahiri, Ashok & Kaman (2004)'*'' in their study examine the sustainability of 
fiscal deficits, the differences between monetary versus debt financing of fiscal 
deficits, the increasing importance of revenue deficits. According to them high fiscal 
deficits are not exclusive to India but high sustained deficit are quite unique, especially 
in the content of relative stability of the external balance of payments. The authors 
allude to two factors to explain sustainability: that the interest rate has been more or 
less consistently below the rate of growth of nominal GDP and the deficit has been 
mostly financed domestically rather than through external savings. 
Mohan,R (2004)"^ ^ in his paper examines the trends in Central finances over a 
thr(2e decadal period beginning from the 1970s. It is found that there is lack of 
buoyancy in all the major sources of revenue of the Central Government. This calls for 
demising new methods of revenue mobilization. There are political economic limits to 
the premise that direct taxes with its simplified rate structure and administrative 
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reforms will make good the losses from the cuts in customs duty revenue. The analysis 
of the issues involved would require an examination of the influence of dominant 
classes on the State. Very recently however, the thrust of the tax reform seems to be on 
introduction of a Central value-added tax (VAT). Total expenditure of the Central 
Government as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) has not increased 
during the 1990s when compared to the 1980s. But the composition of expenditure has 
shifted more towards revenue expenditure. An emphasis on expenditure allocation with 
targeting at a detailed level and innovative tax reforms aimed at more revenue 
mobilization are necessary to achieve qualitative fiscal correction, but this is often 
stymied for political economic reasons. Procrustean fiscal correction aiming merely at 
deficit targeting is not a very desirable method. His study finds that the main problem 
in achieving fiscal consolidation at the Central level is falling revenue and tax receipts 
during the 1990s. 
C.Rangarajan (2004)"*^  Chairman of the Twelfth Finance Commission, 
Government of India, emphasized on current fiscal situation, fiscal deficit and its 
ad\'erse impact on the economy. Raising debt results in raising interest payments, fall 
in the growth rate of development expenditure, serious implications of balance of 
pa>'ments and low investment. Debt-GDP ratio is needed to be reduced and tax-GDP 
ratio has to be picked up considerably by introducing VAT. Raising revenues for 
accelerated flow of development expenditures are leading to improved socio-economic 
growth. 
Raju, S (2004)'*' in her study examined that deficits measure the excess of 
go '^emment spending over revenues and reflect the fiscal health of an economy. Fiscal 
consolidation has been the focus of the reform process initiated in 1991-92. Fiscal 
reforms have seen tax reforms, rationalization and restructuring of the tax structure to 
augment revenues as well as expenditure management which in turn can influence 
deficit containment. Interdependence between revenues and expenditures can lead to 
ambiguous impact on deficit and the efforts to contain the deficit. Our results indicate 
bi-directional causality between total government expenditures and tax revenues and 
revenue receipts. Instantaneous causality is observed for all variants of revenue. 
Rakshit, M (2005) has attempted to examine some analytics and empirics of 
fiscal restructuring in India. The study concluded that TFC's focus on growth as a key 
elejuent of its fiscal reform strategy is well taken. Also eminently sensible are its 
recommendation for performance budgeting; doing away with the distinction between 
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plan and non-plan expenditure; and transparency including elimination of all hidden 
subsidies. However, the major weakness of the strategy consist of not dovetailing 
demand management policies in a developmental programme; ignoring the saving-
generating impact of investment in an economy where rural and informal sectors are 
characterized by considerable underutilization of resources even while the formal 
sector may not have much slack; treating education, health and other social sector 
expenditures as current; and absence of optimality considerations in respect of 
allocation of expenditures, and of alternative modes of their financing, taking into 
account their short- and longer-term effect on growth, equity and government finances. 
Bagchi, A (2006)^ ^ is of the view that deficit reduction has had the adverse 
fallout for public spending on health and education in several states, forcing shrinkage 
of the public sector's involvement in the social sector. Policy-makers are now seeking 
an escape route by getting the fiscal and revenue deficit targets relaxed. While there 
can be valid arguments against inflexible targets, abandoning the discipline underlying 
fiscal responsibility legislation, as has been suggested, is questionable. For, at base, the 
fiscial problems of democracies have their origin in the short time horizon of 
go '^emments and their penchant for promising the moon to electorate while showing 
an (sxtreme reluctance to tax. 
Kochhar, K (2006)^ °examines both the evolution of India's fiscal imbalances 
since the early 1990s and the key developments in major macroeconomic variables-
inflation, external balances, interest rates, and growth- in order to assess the 
macroeconomic implications of the growing fiscal imbalances and rising public debt-
GE»P ratio reflects a weakening in revenue mobilization, persistent deficits at both the 
Central and State levels and narrowing of the gap between the real interest and growth 
rate. Deficits of the States have become increasingly large relative to that of the 
Central Government. After exploring why fiscal imbalances have not led to serious 
macroeconomic problems, she then explores their hidden costs on the economy in 
tenns of the foregone potential for even higher economic growth than that has recently 
been experienced. In effects, by its high fiscal deficits, productive public expenditure 
has been crowed out, the scope for further structural reforms and liberalization has 
been constrained, and room for macroeconomic policy manoeuvre has been narrowed. 
Kochhar argues that time is running out for India to address these fiscal imbalances in 
a way that does not resuh in enhanced vulnerability to macroeconomic crisis. She 
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ad\'ocates stronger revenue mobilization efforts and a reorientation of expenditure 
away from subsidies and toward physical and social infrastructure projects. 
Rao,M,Govinda & Singh,Nirvikar (2006)^' examine recent and potential 
reforms in India's fiscal federal system. They summarize key federal institution in 
India, including tax and expenditure assignments, and mechanisms for Centre-State 
transfers. They discuss the institutional process by which reforms can and do take 
place, including the role of academics, political influences, and especially institutions 
such as the Finance Commission. In contrast to the past, recent Commissions have 
played a greater role in articulating an agenda for fiscal federal reform, which then 
proceeds through political bargaining. This change has taken place in the context of, 
and been influenced by, broader economic reform in India. 
en 
Gurria,A (2007) examines areas of government spending, taxation and fiscal 
federalism where further reforms are desirable to reduce economic distortions and 
im])rove the provision of public services. As to government spending, it finds that a 
large share is used to subsidize commercial undertakings, agriculture and food 
distribution and that there is much room to improve the quality of spending and target 
it bietter to reduce poverty. On taxes, which have undergone major reforms since the 
early 1990s, it points to the large number of loopholes and suggest that a broadening of 
the tax bases would allow further reductions in tax rates and make the system simpler 
and more efficient. Reforms of indirect taxes should focus on creating a common 
market within India so that goods can move between States without border controls. 
India's federal structure has led to a well-developed system of tax-sharing and 
transfers, both through constitutionally empowered bodies and delivered through the 
annual budget. Overall, this transfer system has worked well; moving resources 
tov^ards the poorest States, but the system has become very complex and, in the past, 
weakened fiscal discipline. Furthermore, it has not been able to create an effective 
local government system; this would be important for improving account ability and 
res]3onsiveness to citizen needs as three-quarters of the population live in States with 
over 50 million inhabitants. 
Mohan, R (2008)^^ in his paper shows that the performance of the Indian 
economy in recent years has attracted increasing international interest. His paper 
focuses on the role of fiscal and monetary policies in the evolution of the Indian 
economy over the years, with particular attention being given to the reforms 
undertaken in these policies since the early 1990s. The coordination of fiscal and 
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monetary policies has been crucial in the sequencing of the economic reform process 
canied out since the early 1990s. Monetary policy aims to maintain a judicious balance 
between price stability and economic growth. With the opening up of the Indian 
economy and the spread of financial sector reforms aimed at functional autonomy, 
prudential strengthening, operational efficiency, and competitiveness of banks, 
considerations of financial stability have assumed greater importance in recent years 
alongside the increasing openness of the Indian economy. The biggest challenge facing 
the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in India is to continue the accelerated growth 
process while maintaining price and financial stability. Therefore, the self-imposed 
rule-based fiscal correction at both the national and sub national level has to be 
consolidated and carried forward. The existence of a high level of fiscal deficit also 
contributes to the persistence of an interest rate differential with the rest of the world, 
which then also constrains progress toward fiill capital account convertibility. The 
success achieved in revenue buoyancy through tax rationalization and compliance has 
to be strengthened further. 
1.3 Objective of the Study: 
The need for comprehensive fiscal reforms in India was apparent during the 
late 1980s, as there was rapid deterioration in Government finances. During this 
period, the expenditure of the Central Government rose much faster than its revenue 
leading to a steep rise in the Centers' fiscal deficit to GDP ratio. The sharp increase in 
revenue deficit of the Central Government and the emergence of such deficits in State 
finances happened to be the most worrisome developments in the fiscal scenario 
during the 1980s. 
Economic and fiscal reforms undertaken from the early nineties brought fresh 
air and released clogged up economic energies. Growth rates accelerated and the 
economy went through a major structural shift in the composition of output. The 
poverty ratio fell tangibly in the high growth years. If there is one vulnerable part of 
these otherwise sound developments, it is the disarray in the fiscal scenario. 
Comprehensive economic and fiscal reforms were initiated in the early nineties leading 
to a substantial rise in the overall growth rate by the mid-nineties. The nineties 
witnessed momentous changes in the macroeconomic scenario of India in terms of 
economic growth, changes in the sectoral composition of output, public finances, and 
the overall policy environment that characterized and influenced the macroeconomic 
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outcomes. Towards the close of the decade, reforms appeared to have slowed down 
even as industrial recession seriously beset the economy for three consecutive years 
tov '^ards the end of the decade. Several events in the latter part of the nineties clouded 
the gains from the fiscal reforms of the initial years, leading the public finances of the 
Centre as well as the States to exhibit chronic imbalances showing themselves up in 
the form of large revenue and fiscal deficits. Important among these was the revision 
of salaries of Central and State Government employees in the wake of the 
recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission. A second reason was a 
substantial rise in the nominal and real interest rates, with low inflation rate. A third 
reason was the onset of recession that led to a fall in Government revenues relative to 
GDP and large fiscal imbalances, with Government expenditures adjusting much less 
than revenues. The new crisis led to new responses. The Centre and many State 
Governments emerged with fiscal responsibility legislafions and medium term 
adjustment programmes. 
India's fiscal policy is a key part of its overall economic history and central to 
its gro\\4h prospects. Fiscal reforms, particularly those relating to taxation constituted 
the core of economic reforms in the early stages. Fiscal reforms that have been carried 
out so far and those that are forthcoming can be studied under the following broad 
heads: 
i. Revenue side reforms consisting of 
a) Taxation reforms at the Centre and State level, and 
b) Reforms affecting non-tax revenues, 
ii. Expenditure reforms affecting 
a) Subsidies, 
b) Salaries of Government employees, and 
c) Pensions. 
iii. Reforms related to managing fiscal imbalance including fiscal 
responsibility legislations, 
iv. Public sector reforms including disinvestment and power sector 
reforms. 
V. Budgetary reforms. 
In this study entitled "Fiscal Reforms in India-Policy Measures and 
Performance" an attempt has been made to analyze the fiscal sector reforms with 
following objectives: 
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i. To ascertain the adequacy as well as efficacy of fiscal policy in dealing 
with the issue of economic crisis of the country, 
ii. To examine the reasons of the fiscal reforms started by the Government 
of India, 
iii. To discuss various fiscal measures initiated by the Government as a part 
of reform process, 
iv. To analyze the effectiveness and performance of the fiscal measures in 
correcting the fiscal imbalances. 
V. To suggest appropriate measures for improving fiscal scenario of the 
country. 
1.4 Sources of Data and Methodology Used: 
The study is entirely based on secondary data. Relevant data have been 
collected from Economic Survey, Government of India, Report of Tax Reform 
Committees, Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, Direct Taxes Enquiry 
Committee, Report of the Ninth and Twelfth Finance Commission, Report of Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), RBI Bulletin, Report on Currency and 
Finance, RBI, Union Budgets, Government of India. Data have also been collected 
from RBI Handbook of Statistics, Economic and Political Weekly, Uma Kapila (ed.) 
Eccinomic Development in India, and various websites such as www.rbi.org.in , 
www.oecd.org, and www.icrier.org. 
The methodology used for evaluating fiscal sector reforms is based on different 
statistical tools. In order to study the year-wise growth in the variables, percentage 
growth rates have been calculated. It is a simple measure to get a look at the year-wise 
inci'ease and decrease in the variables under study. The formula used is current year 
value minus last year's value, the whole divided by the last year's value. The 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is used to calculate the growth over the period 
of lime. The CAGR is a number that represents a steady level of growth from the 
initial value to an ending value as it determines the average of year to year growth rate 
for time series data. For calculating CAGR the years have been coded as 0,1,2,3, and 
so on. The coded years have been taken as the independent variable and the natural log 
of the variable under study is taken as the dependent variables for obtaining the 
regression coefficients. The beta coefficient is processed further by taking the inverse 
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and natural log and subtracted by one and then multiplied by 100, which finally yield 
the value of CAGR. In addition, averages, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation have also been used to analyse different variables to get meaningful results. 
ANOVA, in general, is used to test whether the differences among the variables 
for more than two periods are significant or not. It is based on a comparison of two or 
more estimates of the population variance. One estimate is obtained from variance 
among the sample means and the second estimate is obtained from variation that exists 
within samples. This ratio is referred to as F-ratio. If the value of calculated F-ratio is 
less than the critical value or table value at the particular degrees of freedoms and 
significant level then we accept the null hypothesis or else we reject it. In this study 
ANOVA has been used to check the hypothesis as to whether there is any significant 
difference in the value of variables between three periods at 5 percent level of 
significance. The first period relates to the period before reforms (prior reform period), 
i.e from 1980-81 to 1990-91. The second period is the first generafion reform period i.e 
from 1991-92 to 1999-2000. And the third period is second generation reform period 
i.e from 2000-01 to 2007-08.Given the objectives of the study, the above statistical 
tools have been used in order to obtain meaningful results. 
1.5 Scheme of the Study: 
The whole study is organized into six chapters. First Chapter introduces the 
main theme of the study, explaining about statement of the problems along with review 
of literature, objectives of the study, sources of data and methodology used, and 
limitations of the study. It is an introductory chapter of the study. 
Second Chapter presents an overview of fiscal policy and its role in economic 
development of the country. It deals with the role of fiscal policy in resource 
mobilization, allocation efficiency, equity and economic stability. Finally, it deals with 
the nature of India's fiscal policy. 
Third Chapter explains rationale, reasons as well as objectives of fiscal 
reforms. It also includes the RBI's perspective on fiscal reforms, quality and 
sequencing of fiscal reforms in India. Further, it also explains various policy measures 
of fiscal reforms such as tax reforms, expenditure reforms, and restructuring of PSUs 
etc. in India. 
Four Chapter deals with the fiscal reforms in India. It describes in detail about 
the tax and expenditure reforms. It examines the trends and composition of both tax 
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and. expenditure during given period of the study. In addition, it also explains findings 
and. recommendations of the tax reforms Committees which have been set up in the 
coi]:ntry from time to time. 
Five Chapter analyses the performance of fiscal reforms and effectiveness of 
policy measures in correcting fiscal imbalances. For evaluating the performance of 
fiscal reforms various parameters such as total receipts and expenditure, real GDP 
growth, tax-GDP ratio, expenditure-GDP ratio, debt-GDP ratio, deficit indicators, 
BOPs indicators, and inflation have been undertaken. The chapter also deals with the 
cor.cept and measurement of fiscal gap. In addition, it also incorporates major 
problems as well as challenges of fiscal reforms in India. 
Six Chapter of the thesis provides summary and conclusion of the study and 
some specific suggestions regarding fiscal reforms for correcting fiscal imbalances in 
the country. 
1.6 Limitations of the Study: 
This study is strictly limited to the secondary data available and concentrates 
mainly on the Government and official data. The study is limited to the period of 
twenty eight years from 1980-81 to 2007-08. However, for the purpose of analyzing 
the performance of fiscal measures, the entire period of the study has been divided into 
three sub-periods: 
• First phase (P1)-1980-81 to 1990-91 (Prior reform period) 
• Second phase (P2) -1991 -92 to 1999-2000 (First generation reform period) 
• Third phase (P3) -2000-01 to 2007-08 (Second generafion reform period) 
In addition, in this study fiscal reforms and problems of the Central 
Government have only been discussed and analyzed. The study does not cover the 
fiscal reforms and scenario of the Indian States. Lastly, given different fiscal measures, 
in this study emphasis has been given on taxation reforms and expenditure 
management as fiscal instruments for dealing fiscal reforms. 
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CHAPTER-2 
FISCAL POLICY- AN 
OVERVIEW 
FISCAL POLICY- AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 Meaning and Objectives of Fiscal Policy: 
Fiscus (in Latin) refers to a purse and 'fisc' (in English) is a royal or state 
treeisury. Mrs. Hicks says that fiscal policy is concerned with the manner in which all 
the different elements of public finance, while still primarily concerned with carrying 
out their duties ( as the first duty of tax is to raise revenue), may collectively be geared 
to forward the aims of the economic policy( Hicks.U.K., 1968)'.The crux of a good and 
effective fiscal policy lies in keeping its ingredients like expenditure, loans, transfers, 
tax revenues, income from property, debt management, and the like in a proper balance 
so as to achieve the best possible results in terms of the desired economic objectives. 
Usefulness of fiscal policy lies only if it facilitates in achieving socio-economic 
obj(jctives of the society. But it must not be forgotten that fiscal policy is only one of 
the many sets of weapons in the hands of the Government. It should also be 
emphasized that fiscal policy tries to achieve its objectives by regulating the working 
of market mechanism (while in contrast some other weapons may by-pass it). The 
exte;nt of its success, therefore, largely depends upon the response of market forces to 
various policy steps initiated by the Government. The fact that fiscal policy can be a 
potent tool in the hands of the authorities came to be recognized only slowly. For 
decades, both official and academic thinking favored laissez-faire and balanced 
budgets. This policy, obviously, had its own drawbacks. As Keynes pointed out, an 
attempt to balance the budget results in its imbalance and vice versa. In spite of these 
prob'lems, the appropriateness and usefulness of fiscal policy came to be recognized 
only during 1930s and later. The significance of fiscal policy as an instrument of 
economic control was first emphasized in the mid-1930s by Keynes General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money Keynes showed clearly the direct and indirect effects 
of fiijcal action on aggregate spending in the community and its influence on economic 
activity and gave a new importance to the budgetary policy of the Government as a 
weaf ion of economic management. 
Fiscal policy has three important tools: taxation, public expenditure, and public 
debt management. The tax system of the country, of course, is meant to bring in 
revenue to the Government but it can also be used to encourage or restrict private 
expenditure on consumption and investment. Public expenditure of the Government 
may take various forms-normal government expenditure (on civil administration, 
def(;nce, etc.), expenditure on public works (such as road, parks, etc.), expenditure on 
relief works, subsidies of various types, etc., while taxes reduce the income of the 
general public (they transfer income from the general public to the Government), 
public expenditure transfers income from the Government to the general public. 
Finally, Government borrowings and public debt influence the volume of liquid assets 
with the public, for example, subscription to a Government loan would transfer liquid 
funds from the general public to the Government, while repayment of a public debt 
would mean transfer of funds from the Government to the general public. 
All these three tools of fiscal policy- tax policy, public expenditure, and public 
debt management- are significant to maintain economic stability and for influencing 
the level of economic activity. It is now generally accepted that the main problem of 
industrial or high income economies is stability in business conditions and maintaining 
full employment, while rapid economic progress and increase in employment are the 
basic needs of less developed countries. Fiscal policy has come to assume significance 
as effective means of stabilization in an advanced economy and, therefore, for high 
inco]me countries. It is now generally held that no other measure of economic planning 
is better than adoption of a correct fiscal policy. Some fiscal theorists argue that fiscal 
policy may not be effective in an underdeveloped economy, since modern economic 
and financial institutions are not as well developed. Even then, fiscal policy has a 
positive and significant role to play in an underdeveloped economy. In the first 
instance, the state is called upon to play an active and important role in promoting 
economic development, especially through control and regulation of economic life; it 
is argued that fiscal policy is the most powerful and the least undesirable weapon of 
control which the state can employ to promote economic development. Secondly, 
capital accumulation is the key problem of an underdeveloped economy and this can 
be done through taxation. Finally, fiscal policy has an important role to play under 
democratic plarming; financial plan is as much important as physical plan and the 
implementation of the financial plan will obviously depend upon the use of fiscal 
measures. 
Fiscal policy may be taken to embrace all government transactions which have 
as their objective the support of general economic policy. In an advanced country 
(atleast of the welfare state type) general economic, as distinct from political, policy is 
distribution of available (spendable) incomes. In an advanced country fiscal policy 
very largely operates on the expenditure side of the account, through w i^despread social 
expe;nditure and through selective incentives directed to particular industries or 
localities which it is desired to encourage. These are both long term fields of operation. 
Exp(;nditure policy is also extremely important in respect of short-term stability 
(compensatory finance), because of the ease with which alterations can be brought 
about in social expenditure, or, more precisely, in the balance between social 
expenditure and social taxation (insurance contributions). Main reliance for income 
redistribution falls, however, on the tax side of the account. By controlling the 
available incomes of the rich and by redistributing capital assets through taxation a far 
greater equality of spending power is obtained than results from the productive 
process. Increasingly also, on the side of production, attempts are made to write into 
tax formulae (especially of profits taxes) incentives for investment, both general and 
selective. These too can be varied over time in the interests of stability. Thus, fiscal 
policy in an advanced country comprises a large supply/armoury of weapons, some 
concentrating mainly on welfare effects, others on considerations of economic growth 
with stability; some aiming mainly at short-term effects, others at long-term 
devi^lopment. But no means all these objectives are consistent. For instance 
redistribution carried out too violently, or a stability policy which reaches the point of 
long-term disincentive, are both inimical to growth. Subsidies to certain industries 
(paiticulaily to agriculture, which are the most general) may counteract an income 
redistribution policy by forcing consumers to pay more for their food, thus injuring the 
poor more than the rich. In a developing country the main emphasis of general 
economic policy will be on growth, with sufficient stability to prevent recurrent crises 
which would cause development to slow up or even retrogress, and hence give rise to 
losjies on investments already made. With different emphasis in different countries, it 
willl probably also be desired to use fiscal policy to reduce the very large gap between 
the incomes of the few rich and many poor. On the expenditure side there is not likely 
to be a great deal of opportunity for a policy either of income distribution through 
social expenditure or of stabilization through compensatory variations in public outlay. 
In all lines of expenditure growth must have the priority. Hence, the heaviest 
res]3onsibility both for stability and for income redistribution must fall on the tax side 
of the account (Hicks, U.K., 1965)1 
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The chief objective of the fiscal policy in the developed countries is to 
counteract cyclical fluctuations arising out of the dips and spurts in the level of 
aggregate effective demand. As such the Keynesian fiscal recommendations hinged on 
the v/ays to regulate the level of aggregate effective demand and the total flows of 
purchasing powers are well suited to the needs of these economies. But growth being 
the primary goal of the underdeveloped countries, the fiscal policy in their case has to 
be tailored to the needs of rapid economic growth. Further, the very fact that these 
countries have a low propensity to save and a high propensity to consume, an inversion 
of Ki^ ynesian fiscal measures is called for in their case. Thus, whereas the maintenance 
of stability is the key-note of fiscal policy in developed countries, and this key-note of 
the fiscal policy in underdeveloped countries has to be the fostering of an accelerated 
rate of economic growth. 
Fiscal policy seeks to influence the economy through a double-barreled course; 
by the magnitude of public income that could be raised, and by the volume and 
direction of the public expenditure. The latter, of course, to large extent depends on the 
former. The magnitude of fiscal revenue pre-eminently determines the availability of 
resources with the government to finance economic development. The government has 
access to three important fiscal means through which resources can be raised, viz., 
taxation, public borrowing and credit creation. A successful operation of the fiscal 
policy requires a harmonious combination of these three means. Only then it can 
engender rapid economic growth with stability. However, taxation remains the most 
effective instrument of fiscal policy. As such, the actual efficiency of fiscal policy 
largely depends on the country's tax system. Within the framework of general 
programme for accelerated development, fiscal policy in general and taxation policy in 
particular should be so attuned and used as to accomplish the following main 
objectives of developing countries: 
i, Mobilization of resources: Developing economies are characterized by low 
levels of income and investment, which are linked in a vicious circle. This can 
be successfully broken by mobilizing resources for investment energetically. 
ii. Acceleration of economic growth: The government has not only to mobilize 
more resources for investment, but also to direct the resources to those channels 
where the yield is higher and the goods produced are socially accepted. 
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iii. Minimization of the inequalities of income and wealth: Fiscal tools can be 
used to bring about the redistribution of income in favor of the poor by 
spending revenue so raised on social welfare activities. 
iv. Increasing employment opportunities: Fiscal incentives, in the form of tax-
rebates and concessions, can be used to promote the growth of those industries 
that have high employment generation potential. 
V. Price stability: Fiscal tools can be employed to contain inflationary and 
deflationary tendencies in the economy. 
The main objectives of fiscal policy in developed countries are: 
i. To raise the level of investments: The main objective of fiscal policy in a 
developed county should be to raise the volume of production keeping in view 
the fact that the level of production should not be higher than the level of 
consumption. Now to increase production, it is essential to raise the level of 
investment. The level of production should be increased by increasing effective 
demand. 
ii. To check the fluctuations in the effective demand of money: In developed 
countries there exists irregular unemployment. If the people do not like to work 
inspite of the available opportunities of work or if they possess so much income 
that they can lead healthy life even without doing any work, it will lead to 
irregular unemployment. The manpower will become idle. Now to control 
irregular unemployment, it is essential to check fluctuations in the effective 
demand of money. 
iii. To control the automatic process of the market: Today, all the economists are 
of the opinion that on reaching the developed economy at the top, it caimot be 
left alone. This fact has been verified by 1930 worldwide depression. The 
worldwide depression has disturbed the economy of world badly. Hence, in 
order to avoid the uncertainty of the market, effective control is needed. 
iv. Proper direction to government investments: In order to have effective 
coordination between demand and supply, the Government investments are 
required to play an important role. Hence, proper direction should be given to 
Government investments. 
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V. Determination of suitable taxation policy: In order to establish short-term and 
long-term balance in the economy, it is essential that there must exist complete 
coordination between taxation policy, credit creation policy, lending policy, 
and resources mobilization policy of the Government. Unless there is a mutual 
coctrdination between them, it is not possible to bring about stability in 
developed economy. Prof. Musgrave pointed out the following objectives of 
fiscal policy in a developed economy: 
i) To secure adjustment in the allocation of resources; 
ii) To secure adjustment in the distribution of income and wealth; and 
iii) To secure economic stabilization (Kumar,N. & Mittal, R., 2002) . 
2.2 Role of Fiscal Policy in Economic Development: 
Lord Keynes threw out the traditional doctrine of the neutrality of public 
finance- held since the time of Adam Smith- and laid the foundations of the 
"fiinctional finance". He insisted that Government finance should be adjusted to the 
changing conditions of the economy, to fight inflationary pressures and deflationary 
tendenciei5. By assuming that fiscal policy can influence the level of individual and 
corjDorate incomes, many economists have recommended the use of fiscal policy to: 
a) Achieve opfimum allocation of economic resources; 
b) Bring about equal distribution of income and wealth; and 
c) Going for rapid economic growth. Under the influence of Keynes, the 
promotion and maintenance of fiill employment was regarded as the 
most important objective of fiscal policy. 
The concept of fiscal policy in developing countries suggests a relatively 
homogeneous body of fiscal instruments applicable to such countries and also, perhaps 
more important that public finance and fiscal policy in developing economies 
constitutes an academic discipline distinct from its counterpart in the more advanced 
economy. Both notions are certainly false, the former being contradicted by the greater 
di\'ersity in conditions pertaining to third world countries when compared with the 
more integrated advanced economies, whilst the latter encounters the objection that 
policy objectives, fiscal instruments and both political and administrative constraints 
are in principle the same(Shaw,G.K.,1981) . 
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For developed countries which experienced the process of economic 
development over two centuries ago under conditions of frugality and dexterity-self 
fma.nce by economic units was the primary source of capital accumulation. For the 
present-day developing world, time is of the essence. Rising aspirations place 
pressures on limited savings and there is a broader role for credit in investment and in 
enti'epreneurial development. Unlike in developed countries where market forces help 
to (Evolve financial institutions and instruments, the developing economies have to 
make deliberate efforts to promote and nurture diverse institutions and instruments as 
part of the process of development. With the system of physical controls and 
regulations gradually losing its hold, the banking industry and financial system in 
developing countries will have a larger role in establishing investment and production 
priorities (Malhotra, R.N.,1991)l 
The importance for economic development of a comprehensive integrated and 
efficient fiscal policy in general and taxation policy in particular is undoubtedly 
pivotal. However, in the context of underdeveloped countries the fiscal measures need 
to be reformed in such a way as to achieve a number of accepted objectives-which are 
priiTiarily related to the basic goals of rapid economic development and establishment 
of a desired pattern of distribufion. 
The role of fiscal policy in the process of economic development occupies a 
dominant place among all the special tools of the government employed to direct and 
control the economic affairs of a country. But fiscal theories propounded with 
reference to developed countries do not, generally, suit to the requirements of under-
developed economies, mainly due to peculiar economic conditions prevailing in these 
countries. The classical economists followed the principles of 'fiscal neutrality, and 
ad^/ocated to slim the size of public sector and to reduce the functions of government 
to the minimum possible extent in order to have a free play of market mechanism. 
They advocated a tax structure which disturbed the pricing system as little as possible 
including the pricing of factors of production (Hansen, A.H., 1941)^. In modem fimes, 
classical ideas are irrelevant in case of advanced as well as under-developed countries 
as fiscal policy has to play an important role in the fields of economic growth and 
economic stabilization in these countries. 
The theory of national income and employment, originally developed by 
Keynes, shed new light on the relation of Government finances to the level of income 
and employment in the economy. It was realized then that Government finances could 
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be manipulated to influence the level of economic activity, by influencing the level of 
effective demand. This is the genesis of the modem concept of fiscal policy in 
advanced economies. Its underlying notion is that the revenue and expenditure 
programmes of the Government should be so adjusted as to produce and maintain a 
stable and high level of economic activity (Chelliah,R.J.,1960) .^ The fiscal policies 
advocated by Keynes and Lemer are, generally, concerned with achieving 'short-term 
stability' in the economy. Keynes regarded fiscal policy "as a balancing factor" 
(Keynes, J.M., 1936) which would "bring about an adjustment between the propensity 
to consume and inducement to invest" (Ibid)^ . He visualized the operation of a fiscal 
policy in the context of a static model in which skill and quantity of labour, technique, 
degree of competition and tastes and habits of consumers, etc. were assumed constant 
and a certain rate of growth was assumed. According to him, "The economy tends to 
fall below this rate of growth because investments do not equate themselves with the 
pot(jntial savings of the system" (Ibid)'". Keynes advocated increase in effective 
demand and reduction in savings and these factors made his theory irrelevant to 
economic development in under-developed countries. For achieving economic 
development in under-developed countries, it is necessary to use fiscal policy for 
restraining propensity to consume and thus raising propensity to save. Keynes 
advocated a rise in the level of investment in order to increase national income and 
emjDloyment. This rise was restricted to a level which utilizes all the potential savings 
of the economy. But, in underdeveloped economy if the volume of investment is 
limited to savings, it would tend to stay stable at a level of underdeveloped equilibrium 
as savings constitute a comparatively much lower proportion of its national income. 
Two important implications of this concept of fiscal policy are worthy to note 
here. First, the finances of the Government should be conducted on a 'functional' 
basis, and revenues and expenditures should not be considered as being occasioned 
solely by the requirement of securing collective consumption. This view of public 
finance may be called 'functional finance'. Secondly, the budget needs not always be 
balanced. Under conditions of less than full employment, for instance, a deficit would 
be desirable (Chelliah, R.J., I960)". It is the concept of functional finance which 
constitutes the real revolution in point of view. If the Government's expenditure and 
tax programmes are to be treated on a functional basis, the simple analogy with private 
finance no longer holds good. Expenditure may be incurred not mainly for the sake of 
its direct benefit, but for the sake of the indirect effect it produces in the form of a rise 
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in employment; and revenue may be raised not to meet a proposed expenditure, but to 
curtail effective demand. It follows that taxation no longer can be looked upon merely 
as a means of finding the money for the state; it becomes one of the primary weapons 
in tlie hands of the Government to promote stability and progress. Functional finance, 
thus deliberately aims at unbalancing the budgets with a view to attaining and 
maintaining full employment level in a developed economy. In an underdeveloped 
economy, however, the main problem is not one of full employment but that of rapid 
economic growth. In a developing economy, thus, the functional aspect of fiscal policy 
is to be conceived in the context of a planned process of economic development. In the 
words of Tripathi, "The requirements of economic growth demand that fiscal policy 
has to be used for progressively raising the level of investments and savings and thus 
the criteria of fiscal policy in developing economy are different from those of 
flincfional finance" (Tripathi, R.N., 1964)'l 
In the early Keynesian era, the preoccupation was with the problem of short-
run stability and with counteracting cyclical fluctuations. Attention was given mainly 
to the perfecting of a counter-cyclical policy. Pressing short-run problems_ the 
depression of the thirties and the inflation of the first world war and post-war years_ 
absorbed all attention, to the neglect of the long-run problems of growth. More 
rec(jntly, however, condition for long-run equilibrium in a dynamic economy have 
been analyzed, and the possibility of the emergence of long-run disequilibrium has 
been pointed out, calling for a shift in emphasis in the goal of fiscal policy. The goal 
postulated now is that of insuring conditions of stable grow t^h (Chelliah, R.J., 1960)'^. 
Mr Harrod (Harrod,R.F.,1948)"' and Professor Domar (Domar,E.D.,1957)'^ have been 
in the forefront of the economists who have tried to study the requirements of steady 
growth in an economy. The growth models developed by Harrod and Domar gave a 
strategic importance to capital accumulation in the process of economic growth. They 
emphasized that investment has a dual character: on one hand investment creates 
income and on the other, it augments the economy's productive capacity by enlarging 
its capital stock. According to Harrod's model, if equilibrium is to be maintained in an 
expanding economy at the level of full employment, the actual rate of growth must 
correspond to the warranted rate of growth. The rate of growth required to maintain 
flail employment without inflation is referred to as the required rate of growth 
(Musgrave, R.A., 1959)'^.Musgrave assigned the similar rate to fiscal dynamics in 
economic growth of advanced economics. According to him, the problem of fiscal 
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dynamics in economic growth is "one of securing a growing level of capacity income 
at stable prices" (Ibid) . Harrod-Domar growth models assume an economy at an 
ad\'anced stage of economic development and with a high rate of capital accumulation. 
In such an economy, if unemployment develops, this is due to deficiency of effective 
demand and the situation can be remedied by raising the rate of investment 
expenditures in money terms. In under-developed countries the problem of ensuring 
the purchase of growing output at stable prices is not very important because there is 
al^ '^ays pressure of money demand on the limited productive capacity of the economy. 
Thus, fiscal policy has to play distinct roles in the process of economic development in 
case of cidvanced and under-developed countries. Broadly speaking, "Whereas the 
maintenance of stability will be assigned the first priority in an advanced economy like 
the United States, capital accumulation would have to be assigned first priority in an 
under-developed economy, like India" (Chelliah, R.J., 1969) . 
Fiscal policy has an important role to play in regard to accumulation of human 
capital and promotion of education and skills. Human resource development is a vital 
eleiment in social welfare activities of the state; and transfer payments for purposes of 
de\'elopment of education and skills, health and family welfare- as also housing-
constitute an important part of government's social expenditure. The modem concept 
of human development index (HDI) has attracted considerable attention and may be 
considered. The total quantum of allocation of budgetary funds for providing 
education, health facilities and the various factors that contribute to improvement in 
standards of living of the masses is a prime determinant for improving HDI. Fiscal 
policy has an important role to play in determining not only the overall volume of 
funds, but also in channelizing these funds in the manner best calculated to maximize 
human capital accumulation. An important aspect of budgetary formulation is the 
decision to allocate available funds between various areas of research: military 
resisarch, nuclear and space development; scientific research; industrial, medical and 
other research. It follows that if budgetary allocations in accordance with the 
go\^ emment policy give primacy and direct large funds to military research, and funds 
for industrial or other research are inadequately provided for, it could have an impact 
upon development of industrial technology and the competitive capacity of industry. 
Fiscal policy has an important role to play in the development of infrastructure. 
Th(j quantum of funds to be allocated every year for development and maintenance of 
infrastructure are decided by the finance ministry on basis of requisition for funds from 
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the concerned ministries. However, the total allocation would depend upon the 
availability of funds in the budget. The bulk of infrastructure in many developing 
countries is provided by the state. In many cases, there is an element of subsidy, often 
implicit, in the prices that are charged to consumers. This imposes a burden on the 
budget and deprives other sectors of the economy of resources. Actually, the 
government should endeavour to increase user-charges to reduce the gap between cost 
and charges, so as to reduce budgetary deficit. Budgetary policy has also to determine 
expenditure allocation among and within infrastructure sectors: between irrigation, 
pov/er, transport and communication; on new construction or maintenance of existing 
works; between rural and urban sectors; and between different districts and regions. 
So, it may be observed that allocative efficiency of resources is increased, provided 
infrastructure services are efficiently delivered (Kothari, S.S., 2001)'^. 
The process of economic development accompanied by a large amount of 
investment tends to be, inherently inflationary because it tends to generate additional 
effective demand in the economy without an immediate and corresponding increase in 
the output of consumption goods. Therefore, the methods adopted by the government 
for financing its development plans must ensure that mobilization of adequate volume 
of resources is compatiable with the maintenance of a reasonable measure of economic 
stability. Fiscal policy can play important role in counteracting inflationary tendencies 
and in influencing the structure of relative prices in the interest of economic 
development. The progressive tax structure is an effective fiscal stabilizer as it has a 
built-in-flexibility. Thus, if a tax structure has to work as an effective stabilizer, the 
marginal rate of taxation should be very high. But a highly progressive direct tax 
policy may adversely affect savings investment and output. Therefore, "Tax policy 
must be judiciously planned and it should discriminate in favour of essential 
production and consumption and against speculative investment and non-functional 
consumption" (Tripathi, R. N., 1964) . In under-developed countries like India, direct 
taxation covers very small segment of the population, therefore, progressive rates of 
commodity taxation work as better economic stabilizer. As economic development 
takes place larger part of income accrues to those persons who own means of 
production. Income is redistributed in favor of rich persons; hence a redistribution of 
income in favor of poor persons is required. Any fiscal programme which involves 
imj)rovement in the quality of manpower like education, training, health, housing, 
sanitation and subsidies on food and clothes, etc. generally benefits poor classes. To 
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the extent that tax finances this process of human capital formation at the expense of 
lavish consumption and speculation, etc., it results in redistribution of income in favour 
of poor persons. Generally, it is argued that redistribution of income in favour of poor 
persons may adversely affect savings and investment by entrepreneur class. But high 
income in underdeveloped countries may, comparatively speaking, be derived from 
such sources and devoted to such uses that the disincentives effects are less damaging 
than in developed countries. 
Through fiscal policy the Government creates and sustains the public economy 
consisting of the provision of public services and public investment; at the same time it 
is an instrument for reallocation of resources according to national priorities, 
redistribution, promotion of private savings and investments, and the maintenance of 
stability. Thus, fiscal policy has a multi-dimensional role. It particularly aims at 
improving the growth performance of the economy and ensuring social justice to the 
people. 
Fiscal policy plays a central role in enabling a country to achieve its economic 
and social objectives, from macro-economic stability to sustainable growth and 
poverty reduction. Specifically, in the 1990s, fiscal policy has also assumed 
importance in the policy deliberations of most countries since concerns with fiscal 
dimensions, such as high unemployment, inadequate national savings, excessive 
budget deficits and public debt burdens have intensified. Looming crises in the 
financing of pension and health care systems are also putting pressure on fiscal policy 
management (Caron, Y., 2002) . In order to accelerate the growth of the economy, 
fiscal policy is used: 
a) to mobilize the human and material resources of the economy and maximize their 
flow; 
b) to promote savings in the economy and minimize current consumption; 
c) to direct investment in the desirable channels both in the public and in the private 
sectors by providing suitable incentives; 
d) to restrain inflationary forces in order to ensure economic stability; 
e) to ensure equitable distribution of income and wealth in the country so that the 
fruits of development are fairly distributed. Reduction of economic inequalities 
and prevention of concentration of economic power become the major 
objectives of fiscal policy in developing countries; and 
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f) to protect the economy from unhealthy development abroad, i.e., to reduce the 
exposure of the economy to the ebbs and flows of world markets and to 
eliminate or reduce dependence on foreign food or foreign investments. 
The role of fiscal policy can be likened to the driving of a car. While driving up a 
gradient (i.e. stepping up production and productivity), what is needed is an increase in 
power (promotion of higher saving and investment through fiscal measures). On the 
othej: hand, when it moves against the national interest it is necessary to control the 
supply of power (to combat inflationary and foreign exchange crises through higher 
taxation) and also to apply brakes judiciously to ensure that the vehicle does not slip 
out of control but keeps on moving all the same. The national exchequer should see 
that the brakes are not pressed so much as to bring the vehicle to a stop (Rastogi, K. 
M., 1965) . A sound fiscal policy, responsible social spending and a well functioning 
and competitive financial system are the elements of good governance that are crucial 
to economic and social development. Strategies for moving forward include, inter alia, 
disciplined macro-economic policies and fiscal policy, including clear goals for the 
mobilization of tax and non-tax revenues and responsible public spending on basic 
education and health, the rural sector and women. The Monterrey Consensus adopted 
at the International Conference on Financing for Development has recommended, inter 
alia, that developing countries and economies in transition should set up an effective, 
efficient, transparent and a accountable system for mobilizing public resources and 
managing their use by Governments as also emphasized the need to secure fiscal 
sustainability, along with equitable and efficient tax systems and administration, as 
well as improvements in public spending that do not crowd out productive private 
investment (Shende,S.N.,2002 f^. 
A. Fiscal Policy and Resource Mobilization: 
Economic development has two main props- plan implementation and 
de '^elopment financing. Planning and finance are interdependent with each other. One 
of the essential conditions for successflilness of planning is its financing. A plan, 
whether big or small in size, can be framed and implemented only when its scheme of 
financing is so well-devised that sufficient financial resources become readily 
available as and when required for meeting the development outlays of the process of 
plsinning. Availability of finance means mobilization of resources, entirely depends 
upon the extent of measures taken together for resource mobilization, refer to the 
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scheme of collecting of funds for financing the plan. Hence, the term 'resource 
mobilization' stands for the collection of funds to allocate resources for meeting the 
plan outlays which covers not only taxation but the income from public services, 
public enterprises and public utilities (Gadgil,D.R.,1969) '^'.In other words, the task of 
mobilizing resources involves not only direct measures of taxation or changes in 
service charges, but also deliberate decisions on selection of major investments, 
control of expenditures, monitoring of performance and realization of planned levels of 
economic activity, in a broader view, prevention of tax evasion and tax avoidance and 
changes in the tax structure are, of course, crucial(Singh,Tarlok.,1947)^^Mobilization 
of resources also means creation of 'economic surplus'. This is possible by mobilizing 
the (existence of difference between the actual current output and actual current 
consumption in the economy and to continually enlarge it by curbing increments in 
consumption (Chelliah,R.J., 1969) . Mobilization of economic surplus would enable 
the Government to acquire funds with the help of which it can obtain resources and can 
direct them into developmental projects. Both direct and indirect taxes are instrumental 
for tapping such type of surplus. 
Mobilization of resources in the monetized world means raising of necessary 
finance for developmental purposes. Thus, finance is the mobilizer of resources. 
Mobilization of financial resources and economic development are synonymous with 
each other. The economic development is the function of mobilization of financial 
resources plus productivity of capital minus rate of inflation growth caused by 
excessive use of the technique of deficit financing. Resource mobilization is a direct 
mea.ns to the outcome of sustained growth. A decline in the resources mobilized may 
result in failure to attain the growth targets. It is for this reason that in a mixed 
economy inadequate resource mobilization manifests itself in internal and external 
instability. 
The nature and extent of problem of resource mobilization is somewhat 
different in underdeveloped countries from the developed countries. For instance, in 
developed countries the income and the ratio of saving to national income is high 
while in underdeveloped countries, it is low as the "road to economic development is 
paved with vicious circles"(Higgins,B.,1959)^^ In underdeveloped economies where 
marginal propensity to consume is high, only a small part of income is saved for 
meeting the investment demands. Therefore, in order to raise the level of investment 
and saving in the underdeveloped economies it is imperative that the level of 
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consumption must be curtailed. However, in such economies the level of consumption 
is already low due to low per capita income and it would be difficult to reduce it 
further. Since this task of capital formation cannot be shouldered by the private sector 
alone, in the developing economies the Government must come forward to hold this 
responsibility of raising the level of saving and investment. The Government is 
expescted to guide the economy by anticipating impediments to growth and providing 
necessary remedial action through institutional and other methods. As Jagdish 
Bhagwati remarks in this connection, "History seems to underline the importance of 
state; action in engineering and assisting the process of take-off in developing 
economies. The more backward an economy when it proceeds to modernize itself, the 
largi3r tends to be the range of necessary action by the state" 
(Bhargwati,Jagdish.,1966) .In fact, no country has made economic progress without 
positive stimulus from intelligent Government as has been the experience of England 
and the U.S.A"(Lewis,W.A.,1960)^^ 
Resources can be raised both internally and externally which include revenue 
from taxation, public borrowing, surpluses of public enterprises and deficit financing 
and foreign aid, grants and loans from various foreign agencies respectively. The 
design or pattern of financing of a country is determined by these sources taken 
together having their distinct nature and contributions. Now, we may examine the 
nature, importance, extent, usefulness and defects of each source in order to mobilize 
the financial resources. 
I. Taxation: 
Taxation is an important instrument to achieve the objective of resource 
mobilization. As an instrument of resource mobilization for the development plan of 
the public sector, its principal function lies in raising the volume of public savings to 
be used for capital formation consistent with the growth in the rate of savings in the 
economy as a whole (Tripathy, R.N., 1964) .Emphasizing the importance of taxation 
Mrs. Ursula Hicks has rightly remarked, "Tax bankruptcy was an important 
contributory factor to the fall of the Roman Empire. Unjust and inefficient taxes set the 
Fre;nch Revolution aflame. An important part of the explanation of the Germany's 
failure in the war of 1914-18 was her antiquated tax structure... inefficient taxes 
helped to lose Britain the American colonies" (Hicks, U. K., 1961) '^. Tax policy is, 
thus, a vital instrument in the hands of the public authority. 
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Taxation is used as the main policy instrument for transferring resources to the 
public sector. It can also assist in creating an atmosphere within which the private 
sector operates in conformity with national objectives. It has been argued by 
multilateral institutions, among others, that the tax system should be used only to raise 
finances that are sufficient for meeting the minimum necessary level of public 
expenditure, such as, to preserve territorial integrity, to maintain law and order, to 
provide various public goods and to regulate undesirable activities. From the efficiency 
vie^vpoint, it can be said that taxes provide the best means of financing the bulk of 
public expenditures. However, taxes impose three types of cost: 
a) A direct cost or revenue forgone, as taxes, as taxpayers reduce their disposable 
income by paying the amount due; 
b) An indirect allocative effect, or excess burden, which is the welfare cost 
associated with the economic distortions induced by taxes as they alter relative 
prices of goods, services and assets; and 
c) An administrative/compliance cost, since tax forms, tax control, payment 
procedures and tax inspection are costly (Shende, S. N., 2002) . 
The use of tax policy for the mobilization of development finance for the public 
sector in a developing country may be considered in two aspects - (i) static and (ii) 
dynamic. In the static aspect, when the economy tends to stay at a stable level of 
underdevelopment equilibrium, taxation as an instrument of development finance 
should impinge on the consumption constitute of the aggregate output in such a way 
that work incentives are not unduly impaired. To the extent that taxation releases 
resources from non-fiinctional consumption and unessential investment, its importance 
lies not so much in the reduction of over-all effective demand, but rather in the 
reduction of demand for certain resources which are thereby set free and made 
available to the public sector. But in its dynamic aspect, as the aggregate output tends 
to grow at a higher rate as a result of the initial efforts at planned development, tax 
policy must aim at preventing the increment in output from being consumed by 
dekberately siphoning an increasing proportion of it into the pool of investible 
resources of the public sector. Apart from the low level of per capita output, a number 
of j'actors of a purely technical nature operate in low income countries which make it 
very difficult for them to accomplish as large a proportionate resources transfer 
through taxation as high income countries. Their administrative mechanism is 
generally not very efficient partly due to the dearth of trained technical personnel. As a 
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result of a general lack of education among the tax payers, there exist difficult tax 
comipliance conditions, including in many cases considerable taxpayer resistance and 
little moral disapproval of tax evasion. Due to the small size of the corporate industrial 
and commercial sector, it requires a larger proportionate investment of administrative 
resources to extract through taxation a significant proportion of the national income in 
low income countries as compared with the high income ones. Therefore, the tax 
structure is likely to show signs of strain at much lower rates of tax in the under-
devi3loped countries; and as a result, they may fail to utilize to the full, the existing tax 
potenfials in their economies. Besides, the existence on a large scale of non-monefized 
sector also makes it difficult for them to tap the tax potentials of that sector through the 
usual forms of taxation. Thus, the success of a developing country in diverting through 
the medium of taxation an increasing proportion of the national income into 
development financing depends partly upon the improvement of technical conditions 
such as improvement in tax administration, partly upon the spread of education, and 
upon the growing consciousness of the benefits flowing from larger development 
expenditure which will tend to diminish the psychological resistance of the tax payers 
(Tripathi, R. N.,1970) . As a U.N Report puts it, "The problem of resource creation 
and deployment entails institutional innovation both in respect of the elaboration and 
use of fiscal machinery for stimulating saving and for raising the investment of public 
rev<mue and in respect of the organization and operation of a capital market for 
channeling savings into productive use in the private sector" (World Economic Survey, 
1965, U.N., 1966)^^ 
In the early stages of the economic development of U.K and U.S.A., their fiscal 
structure as a whole favoured the act of accumulation and capital formation and 
discriminated against the act of consumption. The economic development of these 
countries has been brought about largely by the efforts of a dynamic private enterprise; 
and to enable it to plough back its increasing incomes into investment, the structure of 
taxation was made highly regressive and the fiscal structure as a whole tended to 
redistribute the national income in favour of the investors and savers. According to the 
Colwyn Committee, "taxation (in England) in 1818 hardly touched the saving power of 
the wealthy" (Report of the Committee on National Debt & Taxation, 1927) , and as a 
result, "all their savings were available for investment" (Hansen, A.H., 1941) . In 
regard to the effect of taxation on the pattern of investment, it may so happen that taxes 
whi^ ch reduce the rewards of successful investment may be a disincentive to risk-taking 
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and i:his could have adverse effects on economic growth. The more people are 
encouraged to put their money into saving accounts or to keep in liquid form, the less 
entrepreneurship is there. Some of the empirical evidences also show that income and 
corporation tax have greater impact on the pattern of investment than on total savings 
and investment. But these adverse effects of taxation can be removed by appropriate 
public investment programmes and a combination of different type of taxes. 
In underdeveloped economies, while making an effort at resource mobilization, 
the state is obliged to rely heavily on indirect taxation for collecting adequate revenue. 
The base for direct taxes is generally quite narrow and cannot be considered adequate 
for fiscal needs. In developed economies, however, no such generalization is possible. 
In their case while some economies rely more on direct taxes, other collect more 
revenue from indirect taxes. In U.S.A, for example, indirect taxes are only about 1/13 
of direct ones, in Canada this ratio is about V2, in Belgium it is about 2/3, in Australia 
3/2, and in Norway 7/2. 
Taxes curtail consumption and thereby lead to forced savings and releases 
resources from consumption goods sector and make it available for the capital goods 
sector in the hands of the Government. In short, increase in taxation implies transfer of 
resources from households consumption to public sector investment. But, taxes should 
not amount to reduce output of consumption sector and create scarcity of wage goods, 
otheTwise, it would mean an inflationary impact. Development rebate in taxation 
pro /^ides incentives to investment in the private sector. Similarly, indirect taxes also 
reduce consumption and increase saving for capital formation. Again taxation may 
lead to a change in the pattern of production by influencing allocation of resources in 
the various industries and regions. During inflation, direct taxes may be raised to seize 
excessive purchasing power and have economic stabilization. 
Taxation is quite better than the other means of resource mobilization, i.e. 
deficit financing particularly in case of raising resources, promoting private 
investment, controlling inflation and securing an equitable distribution of burden of 
development finance on all sections of the community. Again since some dose of 
deficit financing is desirable, a proper system of taxation is inevitable to control the 
adv'erse effects of the former. In this way, as matter of fact, taxation is both a substitute 
and a complement to deficit financing and for this the Government should be tough to 
taxation. 
48 
II. Public Borrowings: 
In modern public finance, developmental resources are also mobilized through 
public borrowings from internal and external sources, in order to meet increasing 
public expenditure. Government offers savings certificates, bonds, securities, etc. in 
order to borrow from the citizens and institutions like banks, insurance companies etc. 
It is refeiTcd to as internal public debt. Government may also raise loans from foreign 
international institutions like World Bank etc. It is called external debt. Compared to 
taxation, a public debt has distinctive advantages such as: 
i. Taxes are compulsory and pinching. While, public debt being voluntary, 
contribution to Government loans by the people depends on their will. Hence, 
no element of any psychological pinch or dissatisfaction is involved in public 
debt. 
ii. Taxes have no direct benefits. Loans confer direct benefits to the creditors like 
bond-holders, 
iii. Taxes may have adverse effect on desire to work, and save. Loans have no such 
disincentive effects, 
iv. Taxes are never refunded. Public loans are repayable. So, people always prefer 
public loans to taxation. 
V. Taxes curb consumption by force which may adversely affect the standard of 
the people. Public loans also induce voluntary savings which, in turn, create an 
expansionary effect, 
vi. Public borrowings implies reallocation of resources from unproductive to 
productive uses, 
vii. Public borrowings can also serve as an anti-inflationary device, because they 
enable the Government to curb excessive purchasing power and utilize them for 
increasing the production. 
Public borrowing is considered a better method of collecting public revenue 
thaji taxation (on the one hand Government will get sources for development 
programmes and, on the other, conspicuous consumption will be reduced). But it 
cannot substitute taxation completely because there are certain limitations to the use of 
this source of financing development. Firstly, public borrowing depends on the credit 
worthiness of the Government. Secondly, people do not want to lend to the 
Government because the rates of interest offered by the Government are lower than 
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those offered by the borrowers in the private sector. And thirdly, if the prices are 
rising, people will not be interested in saving and lending because of depreciation in 
the value of money (Aggarwal, Chawla, Medury, Uma, Mukherjee, Indira, Rao & Sopory, 
Aparna, 2008)". 
However, for a successful programme of public borrowings, the Government 
security market should be strong. It requires well developed capital and money 
markets. Again, there is a problem of debt servicing. As such, the Government carmot 
resort to endless bon-owings. Above all, public debt needs to be appropriately managed 
and fully redeemed in order to maintain the prestige and image of the Government. 
III. Deficit Financing: 
Deficit financing as a method of resource mobilization has assumed an 
important place in public finance in recent time. It refers to means of financing the 
deliberate excess of expenditure over income through printing of currency notes or 
through borrowings. The term is also generally used to refer to the financing of a 
plamied deficit whether operated by a government in its domestic affairs or with 
reference to balance of payments deficit. Keynes organized the idea of deficit 
financing as a compensatory spending meant to solve the problem of unemployment 
and depression. Modern economists prescribe deficit financing for development 
purpioses. 
The concept of deficit financing in the western countries implies financing of a 
deliberately created gap between public revenue and expenditure or a budgetary 
deficit. This gap is filled up by Government borrowings which include all the sources 
of public borrowings viz., from people, commercial banks and the central bank. In this 
mariner idle savings in the county are made active. This increases employment and 
output. But deficit financing as used in the Indian context is resorted to when there are 
budgetary deficits. Government borrowing from public and commercial bank does not 
come under deficit financing as in the west. In Indian context, borrowings from the 
central bank of the country, withdrawal of accumulated cash balances and issue of new 
currency are included within the purview of deficit financing. The technique of deficit 
financing has its historical origin in war finance. In war times, the Government tends 
to resort to deficit financing in order to quickly acquire a command over resources to 
meet the growing war expenses. As a rule, however, deficit financing is unproductive 
when it is used in the case of war finance. Deficit financing during war is always 
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inflationary because monetary incomes and demand for consumption goods rise but 
usually there is shortage of supply of consumption goods. The use of deficit financing 
during times of depression to boost the economy got impetus during the great 
depression of the thirties. It was Keynes who established a positive role for deficit 
financing in industrial economy during period of depression. It was advocated that 
during depression, Government should resort to construction of public works wherein 
purchasing power would go into the hands of people and thereby demand would be 
stimulated. This will help in fuller utilization of already existing but temporarily idle 
plants and machinery. Deficit spending by the Government during depression helps to 
start the stagnant wheels of productive machinery and thus promotes prosperity. 
Deficit financing for development, like depression deficit financing, provides stimulus 
to economic growth by financing investment, employment and output in the economy. 
On the other hand "development deficit financing" resembles "war deficit financing" 
in its effect on the economy. Both are inflationary though the reasons for price rise in 
both the cases are quite different. When Government resorts to deficit financing for 
development, large sums are invested in basic heavy industries with long gestation 
periods and in economic and social overheads. This leads to immediate rise in 
momjtary incomes while production of consumption goods cannot be increased 
imm(2diately with the result that prices go up. It is also called the inflationary way of 
finar^cing development. However, it helps rapid capital formation for economic 
development. Deficit financing in developing country is inflationary while it is not so 
in ail advanced country. In an advanced country the Government resorts to deficit 
financing for boosting up the economy. There is alround unemployment of resources 
which can be employed by raising Government investment through deficit financing. 
The result will be an increase in output, income and employment and there is no 
danger of inflation. The increase in money supply leading to demand brings about a 
corresponding increase in the supply of commodities and hence there is no increase in 
price level. But, when, in a developing economy, the Government resorts to deficit 
financing for financing economic development the effects of this on the economy are 
quite different. Public outlays financed by newly-created money immediately create 
monetary incomes and, due to low standards of living and high marginal propensity to 
consume in general, the demand for consumption of goods and services increases. But 
if the public investment is on capital goods, then the increased demand for the 
consumer goods will not be satisfied and prices will rise. Even if the outlay is on the 
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production of consumption goods the prices may rise because the monetary income 
will rise immediately, while the production of consumer goods will take time and in 
the meanwhile prices will rise. Though investment is being continuously raised 
(through taxation, borrowing and external assistance), most of it goes to industries with 
long gestation period and for providing basic infrastructure. Though there is effective 
demand, resources lie under or unemployed. Lack of capital, technical skill, 
entrepreneurial skills etc. are responsible in many cases for unemployment or 
underemployment of resources in a developing economy. Under such conditions, when 
deficit financing is resorted to, it is sure to lead to inflationary conditions. Besides, in 
developing economy, during the process of economic development, the velocity of 
circulation of money increases through the operation of the multiplier effect. This 
factO]- is also inflationary in character because, on balance, effective demand increases 
more than the initial increases in money supply. Deficit financing gives rise to credit 
creation by commercial banks because their liquidity is increased by the creation of 
new money. This shows that in developing economy total money supply tends to 
increase much more than the amount of deficit financing, which also aggravates 
inflationary conditions. The use of deficit financing being expansionary becomes 
inflationary also on the basis of quantity theory of money. Deficit financing has proved 
to be conducive to economic development, especially in countries with acute shortage 
of capital. Deficit financing in developing economies can be regarded as a necessary 
evil which can be tolerated only to the extent it promotes capital formation and 
economic development. This extent of tolerance is known as safe limit of deficit 
financing. To minimize the inflationary effects of deficit financing during the process 
of development, certain measures have to be taken like proper channelizing of 
investment in areas with low capital-output ratio, adoption of policies of physical 
control like rationing, import of only necessary capital equipment etc. In economies 
witti low capital formation, deficit financing becomes a necessary and positive 
instrument if used with efficient and well executed plan of economic development 
(Aggarwal, Chawla, Medury, Uma, Mukherjee, Indira, Rao & Sopory, Aparna, 2008)'' . 
Deficit financing can give a boost to development process. It makes optimum 
use of unutilized resources possible through effective mobilization in the country's 
economy. Again, deficit financing may cause a price rise and reduction in 
consumption. Thus, it implies a forced saving. Since poor countries lack voluntary 
savings, forced savings through deficit financing is much desirable phenomenon. 
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When this forced savings leads to capital formation, productivity and output increase, 
and bring down the price level. Thus, inflation is in due course self-destructive. As 
IMF (staff Paper states, "the expansion of money supply within proper limits in a 
growing economy represents an increment of real resources for investment so long as 
the expansion of money supply (caused by deficit financing) is no more than enough to 
finance the larger volume of production, consumption, and investment at stable prices; 
it is not only non-inflationary, but is essential to the proper functioning of the 
economy. 
With a view to mobilization of resources of the country these various 
instruments can be used as a complementary method to each other and the duty of an 
intelhgent Government is to evolve a mutual and judicious combination of them for the 
required purpose. But, under certain circumstances, the policy of taxation is the most 
effective fiscal instrument for raising resources for the development of the public 
sector, accelerating development of private sector, controlling inflationary pressures 
and improving the even distribution of income and wealth. Taxation does not create 
any greater real burden on the community than would be caused by an equivalent 
amount of public borrowing owing to the fact that they do not raise the intense 
problem of repayment of interest on capital in the future. Successive increment in 
public debt may accentuate inequality, dampen incentives to the entrepreneurs and 
create a big pressure of inflation on the smooth growth of the economy. The 
experience of post-war development in different countries show that the inflationary 
potential of a big development programme can be held within bounds by an 
appropriate degree of surplus budgeting on revenue account. In this way, taxation 
becomes indispensable both as a complement and a substitute to borrowing despite 
knowing the fact that taxation is unjust and harbinger of hardship to the people. A 
developing country can, therefore, escape from increased taxation only at its own peril 
(Mishra, B.,1978)^ .^ Likewise, when we compare taxation and deficit financing, we 
find no compromise with deficit financing which is considered to be the most 
important cause of economic peril in the under-developed countries by sustaining pain 
of inflationary jerks. Deficit financing is a quicker technique to raise resources. 
Thexefore, it can be asserted that "under the constraints of tax administration, taxes 
should be selected in a way that reflects the realities of the environment in which they 
are enforced, they must provoke the least resistance possible from taxpayers and 
establish through their multiplicity the necessary tax illusion which enables 
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Government to increase its share in gross national product and effectively contribute to 
economic development. 
B. Fiscal Policy and Allocative Efficiency: 
Economics deals with the efficient use of resources in best satisfying consumer 
wants. If the economy consisted of one consumer only, the meaning of efficiency 
would be quite simple. Robinson Crusoe would survey the resources available to him 
and the technologies at his disposal in transforming these resources into goods. Given 
his pj-eferences among goods, he would then proceed to produce in such a way and 
such a mix of output as would maximize his satisfaction. In doing so, he would act 
efficiently. But the real world problem is more difficult. The economic process must 
serve not one but many consumers; and various outcomes will differ in their 
distributional implications. This calls for a more careful definition of what is meant by 
"efficient" resource use (Musgrave, R. A, & Musgrave, P.B., 1973/°. 
The Governmental operations basically involve the efficient provision of 
Government funds in maximizing the welfare of the community. The Government 
taxesi the public and uses the amount in providing certain facilities and services 
considered essential by the people and the community. These facilities are such that 
they could not be provided by the people themselves (e.g., defence) or they could be 
provided but only at a high cost (e.g., education and medical facilities). Fiscal 
operations of taxation and public expenditure have the effect of transferring resources 
fron:i the public which would have been used for consuming private goods to produce 
social goods which would satisfy collecfive wants. The objective of fiscal operations is 
to provide for the proper allocation of resources between private and social goods so as 
to maximize social welfare. The primary task of fiscal policy in under-developed 
countries is to raise the ratio of savings to national income. The need is much more 
urgent than is generally recognized by policy makers in these countries. And there is 
reason to believe that well-devised policy measures can succeed in making available a 
larger flow of resources for economic development. This means that the role of fiscal 
policy in underdeveloped countries essentially has to be allocative. It is concerned with 
allocating more resources for investment and restraining consumption. By contrast, 
fiscal policy in developed economies is concerned mainly with regulating the total 
flow of purchasing power, with determining the level of total effective demand. 
SptJaking of the United States, Arthur Smithies says: 'fiscal policy aims primarily at 
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controlling aggregate demand and leavesTo"^ivate enterprise its traditional field _ the 
allocation of resources among alternative uses'. It is obvious that in an underdeveloped 
country the emphasis has to be on allocation, that is, the broad allocation as between 
consumption and investment, and as between forms of investment. True, in a 
developed economy too, under certain circumstances, the rate of investment might 
have to be changed by public policy. But in the conditions prevailing in the developed 
economies at the present stage of their development maintenance of stability_ short-
run and long-run _remains the keynote of fiscal policy, whereas in the underdeveloped 
countries the keynote of policy must be acceleration of the rate of 
growth(Chelliah,R. J., 1960 f. 
Fiscal policy also influences grov^h performance of an economy through its 
effects on the allocation of resources. An efficient and rational allocation of resources 
will obviously be helpful in raising the rate of economic growth. Therefore, if fiscal 
policy favorably affects the efficiency of resource allocation, then in the process, 
groA t^h performance of the economy is bound to improve. An indifferent fiscal policy 
adversely affecting the efficiency of resource allocation on the contrary retards the 
productive activity and thereby results in lower rate of economic growth. 
Among the various instruments of fiscal policy perhaps tax policy is the most 
important determinant of the efficiency of resource use. It has been observed that the 
allocative effects of direct taxes are superior to those of indirect taxes. If a particular 
amount is raised through a direct tax like income tax, it would imply a lesser burden 
than the same amount raised through an indirect tax like excise duty. This is because 
an indirect tax involves an excessive burden since it distorts the scale of preference due 
to price changes caused by its imposition. Thus, in practice, the allocative effects of 
indirect taxes would be superior to those of direct taxes provided the Government 
chooses the indirect taxes judiciously. In an underdeveloped economy, there is a need 
to shift the resources toward various priority industries and indirect taxes can be of 
helj) there. Even in a modem developed economy, there are usually numerous 
imperfections, monopolies and so on, as also a good deal of divergence between social 
and private costs on the one hand and between social and private benefits on the other. 
However, production of certain high priority goods may be lower not because 
resources invested in them are too few, but because due to market imperfections there 
are unutilized capacities as in the case of monopolies and monopolistic competition. 
The appropriate approach in breaking a monopoly is not to push more resources into it 
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through taxation of goods produced by competitive industries and subsidizing the 
goods; produced by competitive industries and subsidizing the goods produced by 
monopoUes. Instead, steps should be taken whereby monopolies are forced to make 
use of their unutilized capacities. 
Another reason on account of which a judicious use of indirect taxes turns out 
to be better than direct taxes in their allocative effects is the fact that it is rather 
difficult to have really proportional income taxation. The very concept of taxable 
incorae is an imprecise one and its definition differs from country to country and even 
within the same country from time to time. So, it is not easy to lay down exact 
standards by which to estimate the expenses for earning the income, or by which to 
estimate the depreciation. In a modem economy, due to changes in prices and other 
uncertainties, there are capital gains, windfall profits and casual incomes, which pose 
difficult problems of devising a system of proportional income taxation. In practice, 
the above comparison between the allocative effects of a proportional income tax with 
thosij of an equal-yield indirect tax is an academic exercise only, since a modem 
Govismment is expected to prefer a progressive direct income tax with an exemption 
limit to a proportional income tax. 
Direct tax will have a resource allocative effect by changing the relative 
attractiveness of different sources of income. On this basis, therefore, supplier of 
labour would shift from one employment or industry to another if by so doing he can 
reduce his direct tax liability more than the reduction, if any, in his eaming from the 
supply of his labour. If he finds that by shifting his employment, his tax liability 
remains unaltered, there would be no reallocative effect on existing labour supply in 
the economy. If in general taxation reduces one's eamings from each type of 
investment substantially, then there will be a tendency for savings to go uninvested or 
get invested into those lines from which little or no income may be expected. Taxation 
of eamings from investment would tend to reduce the supply of savings and 
investment in general. But a system of differential taxation causes a resource 
reallocation effect also. A direct tax can also have an indirect effect on resource 
allocation. Through a shift in income distribution or even otherwise, a direct tax can 
lead to a shift in demand pattern and cause a reallocation of productive resources. 
In addition, diversionary effects of taxes are, however, beneficial and socially 
very much desirable. In a free economy, very often, undisturbed economic forces may 
tend to establish a pattern of production which may not be desirable from the social 
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welfare point of view. In such cases, certain forms of taxation may achieve a desirable 
reallocation of resources, causing improvement in the social benefits. For instance, in a 
developing economy when luxuries are taxed at a progressive rate, resources will be 
diverted from such non-essential goods industries to the essential goods industries. 
Similarly, if harmful goods like tobacco, opium, liquor, etc., are highly taxed so that 
their consumption is curbed, production of such goods will be reduced and the realized 
surplus resources would then be made available for better purposes like capital 
formation, etc. when such allocative effect takes place it is beneficial to the society, 
which is welfare-oriented, as it implies efficient and optimum use of the scarce 
resources. Similarly, concessional taxation on priority industries and heavy taxation on 
non-priority industries tend to divert the flow of resources (land, labour, capital, etc.) 
from the latter to the former, which would be a socially desirable channelisation of 
resources. Likewise, when a protective tariff is raised, it will cause a diversion of the 
productive resources from non-protected industries to protected industries which might 
have: been assigned a strategic position in the country's economic development. 
Moreover, a significant diversionary effect of taxation is to shift resources from the 
present use to future use or sometimes from future use to present use. 
Apart from a change in the use of resources, taxes may lead to a shift in 
resources from one region or place to another. In fact, the main object of a modem 
public policy is to promote a balanced regional growth, which calls for re-allocation of 
resources from advanced regions to economically backward regions. This can be 
effected through appropriate adjustments in the tax structure and tax rates in the 
diff(irent regions. Since the resources have a natural tendency to move from a high-
taxed region to a low taxed region, it follows that the Government has to tax the 
developed regions more heavily than the backward regions, in order to bring about a 
desired transfer in the interest of balanced growth. Otherwise, if the differential rates 
are adopted at random by the states in a federation, a lopsided development may result. 
Thus, the overall effect of the tax policy on allocation of resources should not be 
judged in isolation because a well-devised system of public expenditure may more 
than compensate any adverse effect of taxation of production. The basic thing, 
however, is that the revenue obtained through taxation must be wisely spent, which 
would help in increasing economic and social welfare in the community. 
Public expenditure can help the economy in numerous ways in attaining higher 
levels of production and growth. The ways in which such effects might be brought 
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about are obviously inter-related. The analysis of these effects can be taken up 
separately in the context of developed and underdeveloped economies. Developed 
market economy has enough of flexibility but may be suffering from a deficiency of 
effective demand. Public expenditure can add to the effective demand directly and 
thus, generate conditions favorable for the market forces to push up production. Such 
public investment need not be productive in the sense of adding to the supply side of 
the market also. This public investment can just be a means of disturbing purchasing 
power to those who would spend the same and add to the effective demand. But the 
technique of increasing production through increasing demand becomes ineffective 
oncie the level of full employment is reached. Money income goes up but real income 
does not increase correspondingly because real income depends upon the use of real 
resources. If, therefore, demand is pushed beyond full employment, it will only add to 
inflationary pressures. Further, public expenditure may not be able to push up 
prctduction proportionately because of various rigidities from which even a developed 
economy is likely to suffer. For example, some industries may not have unutilized 
excess capacity when demand goes up. In some industries monopolistic practices may 
be in vogue and there can be strong militant trade unions. Under different technical and 
other types of rigidities the economy may not be able to respond fully to increased 
demand. The result is likely to be a partial increase in production when demand 
increases through the use of public expenditure and the results can be quite inflationary 
beyond a limit. Once rigidities are recognized from which a developed economy may 
be suffering and the corresponding lack of complete inter-flow of demand between its 
vaiious sectors, the co-existence of inflation and unemployment carmot be ruled out. In 
such a case, the authorities cannot be indifferent as regards the manner in which public 
ex])enditure generates additional demand in the economy. 
The case is a different one with underdeveloped economies. Such economies 
are characterized by a low level of saving and investment activity. This deficiency, 
again, may be remedied by stimulating private saving and investment, or through 
dirsct public saving and investment, or both. Thus, in underdeveloped countries, there 
is a shortage of social overheads, skilled labour, capital equipment and machinery. 
PUIDHC expenditure can be directly used to create and maintain social overheads. It can 
also be used to create human skills through education and training. In India, good deal 
of regional disparities is found. Certain districts, or parts thereof, have been enlisted as 
economically backward. Various tax concessions and credit facilities are being 
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provided for setting up industries in these areas. Public expenditure can be used to 
provide necessary economic infrastructure for tlie development of selected economic 
activities and can be used to give subsidies for increasing their profitability. Thus, the 
authorities can add to the process of caphal accumulation. To the extent this capital 
formation is financed through foreign aid, the process of economic growth is 
accelerated. 
Public expenditure may also be used to encourage the market sector of an 
underdeveloped economy for contributing to the process of economic growth. It is not 
necessary that all the additional investment should be in the form of direct public 
investment only. Public expenditure can help private investment and production 
tkough measures which reduce the cost of production, or push up demand or remove 
piarticular shortages and bottle-necks. Creation and maintenance of social overheads 
lead to an all-round reduction in cost of production and improvement in efficiency. 
This, therefore, increases profitability and production. Also social overheads bring 
different regions and sectors of an economy in closer contact, and thereby stimulate the 
process of economic growth. Also, public investment can go directly into the 
development of basic and key industries, power, irrigation and mines etc. through these 
steps, the economy can add to its infrastructure and thus provide a firm basis for 
growth. 
Public expenditure can bring about a better allocation of economic resources as 
between the present and the future. In a free capitalist society very little provision is 
nriade for the future. This is because people prefer the present rather than the future 
and, therefore, they do not make adequate provision for the future. The state, on the 
other hand, is the custodian of the interests of the future generations also and, 
therefore, has to see that adequate provision is made for the future. Thus, certain type 
ol" public expenditure such as those on multi-purpose projects, road development, 
urbanization schemes, etc. do not yield immediate returns but confer social and 
economic benefits on the future generation. Public expenditure also results in diversion 
of resources between different regions and thereby reduces regional inequalities. 
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C. Fiscal Policy and Equity: 
The conception of fiscal equity, that is, equal treatment for equally situated 
individuals, has been applied to the distribution of taxes, but not to the distribution of 
expenditure in the same manner. This equity criterion, although motivated on grounds 
completely divorced from economic efficiency, does carry with it certain implications 
for efficiency in the structure of private choices. The equal-treatment-for equals 
principle does not guarantee that private choices are not modified by the fiscal 
structure, but it does, if fully applied, serve to prevent differential effects on separate 
groups or individuals. The meaningfulness of this equity principle depends, however, 
on the way in which "equals" are defined for purposes of fiscal treatment. Differential 
taxes could be imposed without violation of the technical version of the equity 
principle if the group of "equal" is defined sufficiently narrowly. A tax must be applied 
to rather broad grouping; in other words, "equals" for fiscal purposes must be defined 
in some reasonable and not wholly arbitrary manner. The general respect for the equity 
principle in the organization of the fiscal structure has been one factor tending to 
maintain general neutrality in effects. The deliberate distortion of private choices in a 
differential way has been prevented, especially in the distribution of taxes. Much of the 
opposition to the erosion of the income tax base through numerous loopholes, tax 
shelter, and tax credit schemes stems from the fear that these violate the long-standing 
principle of horizontal equity. These devices tend to classify individuals, not in 
accordance with their ability to pay, but in accordance with the relationship of their 
private activity to some concept of "private interest". At this point it is suggested 
merely as one factor which unintentionally, serves to prevent undue distortion of 
resource allocation mechanism of the private economy by the fiscal structure 
(Bauchanan, J.M. & Flowers, R.F., 1975/1 
It is important to distinguish between the static and dynamic effects of fiscal 
policy on equity. From the vantage point of comparative statistics the key issues are 
who bears the tax burden of fiscal policy and who benefits from public expenditure. Of 
course, even answering these relatively "simple" questions raises knotty theoretical 
problems. These problems are multiplied when one approaches the issue in a dynamic 
framework and asks: what has been the effect on, say, the size of distribution of 
income, over a specified period of time, which can be attributed to fiscal policy? After 
all, fiscal policy affects growth. And, depending on the structural characteristics of the 
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economy as well as the policy frame, that growth can be associated with more or less 
equity in the distribution of income or consumption or wealth (Acharya, S., 1988)'*^  
The economic structure of underdeveloped countries is characterized by the 
existence of considerable inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. A 
number of studies made in recent years have revealed that these inequalities are much 
greater in developing countries as compared to those in the advanced capitalist 
countries of U.S.A and U.K. The existence of inequality in the distribution of income 
is held to be conducive to a high rate of capital accumulation; but in the case of the 
developing countries much of the inequality is of non-functional character which is not 
justifiable either from the economic or social stand-point. Besides, concentrations of 
economic power are not compatible with a process of acceleration development in 
democratic countries because they lead to social and political discontent which 
undermines the fabric of the body politic and prevents popular participation in the 
process of development (Tripathy, R.N.,1970)'*^ A welfare state should provide social 
justice by giving equitable distribution of income and wealth. Fiscal policy can serve 
as an effective means of achieving this much desired goal of socialism in developed as 
well as developing countries. 
Market mechanism by itself generates ever-widening income inequalities. 
However, the objective of reducing inequalities is likely to come in conflict with that 
of increasing production and economic growth. The problem is break-up into two 
parts, short-term and long-term. In short-run, any income and wealth distribution 
pattern can go in harmony with the production level. Thus, it may be assumed that the 
total national product is already there and that now the problem is to determine the 
individual shares of the members of the society. Defmitionally, therefore, this stand 
makes distribution independent of its effects on production. Such a redistribution of 
income, therefore, may be brought as close to equality as various tax measures. 
However, there are following points in this connection. 
Firstly, unless there is a total political and economic revolution in a country, a 
quick redistribution of income and wealth is not a possibility. The process is a time-
consuming one if measures like progressive income-tax, wealth tax, gift tax, 
expenditure tax and the like are to be used. So long as the institutions of private 
property and inheritance are there, the process towards equality is bound to be a slow 
one. This implies, therefore, that in reality, a proper degree of redistribution might be 
expected only in the long-run, and for that reason, it is likely to have its consequences 
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on production also. Secondly, even if it were possible to reduce the inequalities to a 
desired extent in the short-run, long-term consequences of this policy cannot be 
ignored. Thirdly, in an underdeveloped country like India, use of taxation for reduction 
in inequalities of income and wealth has its own limitations. Direct taxation, with all 
its progressive rates, covers only a fraction of the population. The incidence of tax 
evasion funher aggravates its ineffectiveness. Indirect taxes, on the other hand, cannot 
be progressive enough in spite of their selective coverage and differential rates. 
Moreover, indirect taxation is inflationary in character, and adds to inequalities. 
Possibility of evading excise and sales taxes further strengthens this process. 
In the long-run, a reduction in inequalities brought about by taxation might be 
counterbalanced or more than counterbalanced by increasing inequalities of the pre-
taxed incomes. This problem may be solved by very steep taxation so as to practically 
mop-off the income above a certain height and effective checking of tax evasion. Steps 
towards reducing inequalities can have alternative effects on production and growth. If 
the progression of taxes is relatively mild, adequate incentives will be left for everyone 
to work hard and contribute towards economic growth. Thus, one acceptable objective 
before the authorities can be to check and reduce relative inequalities over time. This 
may be done through various progressive tax measures (and, of course, public 
expenditure devices also) covering income, wealth, gifts, inheritance, windfalls, capital 
gains, etc. coupled with adequate incentives of producers in the private sector and 
public sector profitability and savings on the other. However, taxing gifts, imeamed 
increments and capital gains at even steep rates will not reduce the incentives to work 
and earn because these taxes touch upon those receipts which are not based upon 
economic efforts of individuals. Wealth tax and inheritance tax, however, can become 
a disincentive to save if their rates are too steep. 
Thus, if income and wealth inequalities are sought to be reduced through tax 
measures, there is bound to be a conflict between this objective and that of growth. 
Either, therefore, the state has to abolish the institutions of private property and 
inheritance and take over the task of economic growth, or it has to provide enough 
incentives in the economy. In an underdeveloped country, such a conflict between 
egalitarian and growth objectives is all the more sharp because there is an immediate 
need for both. There is abject poverty in the masses which should be reduced to some 
extent at least. But final solution of it can come only through economic growth, 
otherwise an equality without adequate production would only amount to distributing 
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poverty. In a developed country, on the other hand, since even the poor are not so poor 
in absolute term, the objective of equality can possibly be postponed. At the same time, 
those countries are not faced with an immediate problem of economic growth and so 
they can afford to go ahead with distribution. 
Welfare considerations also favor an equitable distribution of income and 
wealth. The purpose of an economic policy should be to contribute towards achieving 
the maximum social benefits. Lemer (1946)'*^  has shown that even if we do not know 
the exact way in which marginal utility of income falls with a rise in income and even 
if we cannot have inter-personal comparisons of utility, still a shift towards equality 
would probably add to the aggregate satisfaction of the community. Such a shift 
towards equality, of course, may be achieved through various forms of public 
expenditure especially those which are meant to help the poorer sections of the society. 
A numbier of welfare measures like free education, health, water and other facilities 
cftn be given a top priority. Numerous social security schemes can be adopted whereby 
people are entitled to old-age pensions, unemployment relief, sickness allowance and 
so on. Articles of common consumption like food can be subsidized, and the 
production of those which are in short supply can be taken up in the public sector. Left 
to market mechanism, the supply of 'merit goods' is likely to be insufficient. Public 
expenditure, through direct purchases, public production or subsidies can ensure that 
their supply is augmented to the desired extent. Similarly public expenditure, through 
appropriate subsidies and other 'purchase and stores' policy encourage labour-
intensive techniques of production which reduce unemployment and improve income 
distribution. 
D. Fiscal Policy and Economic Stability; 
One of the most important objectives of fiscal policy is to control business 
depressions and business booms and maintain business stability. The problem of 
stability refers to that of recurring cyclical phases of upward and downward 
cumulative movement in income, employment, output and prices, etc. in the economy. 
In an underdeveloped country, such instability is mainly caused through pressures 
originating from abroad and imported through shifts in imports, exports, and external 
resource flows. Recognition of a close relationship between price changes and the level 
of output and employment, particularly in developed market economies, has led some 
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economists to claim that economic stability should be interpreted to mean a steady 
non-inflationary economic expansion in output and employment coupled with a very 
mild rise in prices. It is normaly found that a very mild inflation enables an economy to 
achieve a continuous expansion. 
In a development context, fiscal policy serves both as an instrument of 
macroeconomic stabilization and as an instrument to achieve growth and poverty 
reduction objectives. Correspondingly, growth and poverty reduction objectives were 
under-emphasized. Although stability is necessary for growth, it is not sufficient. The 
desi^ gn of fiscal policy needs to identify and also incorporate the transmission charmels 
through which fiscal policy influences long-term growth. This requires that attention 
be focused on the likely growth effects of the level, composition and efficiency of 
public spending and taxation. Fiscal policy that neglects these effects runs the risk of 
achieving stability while potentially undermining long-term growth and poverty 
redaction. The evidence from countries that stabilized their economies by reducing 
their deficits indicates that countries often did so by cutting public capital formation 
significantly, despite its potential negative impact on grovv1;h and poverty reduction. 
While in many cases the decision to cut investments reflected a political preference, 
the absence of domestic fiscal institutions that would have enabled governments to 
take a medium term perspective may have contributed to such short-sighted decisions. 
Fiscal policy has been broadly successful in achieving economic stabilization in part 
thriDugh reductions in fiscal deficits. The fiscal deficit is a useful indicator for purposes 
of stabilization and for controlling the growth of government liabilities, but it offers 
little indication of longer term effects on government assets or on economic growth. 
Conceptually, the long-term impact is better captured by examining the impact of 
fiscal policy on government net worth. While there are practical challenges to 
accurately estimating a government's net worth, there is clearly a need for fiscal policy 
to incorporate, as best as possible, the likely impact of the level and composition of 
ex]3endhure and taxation on long-term growth while also maintaining a focus on 
indicators essential for stabilization (Development Committee, DC.,2006)''^. 
The stabilization policy seeks to reduce fluctuations in incomes, output, 
employment and price level and demand management is one of its principal tools. The 
maintenance of internal stability, which implies price-stability and high level of 
employment, postulates an adequate level of aggregate demand, which depends upon 
the level of expenditure and receipt. Aggregate demand should be adequate to provide 
64 
the purchasing power for the goods produced by a fully employed economy and should 
expand with economic growth. If there is excess of aggregate demand there would be 
inflation; and if there is deficiency in demand, output would be less than the potential 
with inadequate utilization of capacity. If there is depression or slackness in the 
economy, the expenditure should be in excess of revenue so that unutilized resources 
are used and economy expands. Deficit budgeting may be necessary to increase 
aggregate demand. The development of the concepts of "multiplier" and "accelerator" 
and the relationship between the macro-variables like investment, income, 
consumption, and savings enabled the economists to visualize the mechanics of trade 
cycles and the role which the fiscal policy could play in an economy. This gave rise to 
i:he principals of compensatory finance and functional finance. The modem principle 
of 'compensatory finance'- essentially applicable to developed economies- is now 
accepted as being also applicable to developing economies. Actually, certain amounts 
of deficit financing and moderate inflation are regarded as means of accelerating 
growth in developing economies. 
It was realized that, to a large extent, fiscal policy can be effectively used by 
the Government to neutralize the destabilizing forces because depression is caused by 
a deficiency of effective demand and fiscal policy can remedy it. Similarly, during a 
boom period the need is to control the demand which can be partly done through 
curtailing public expenditure and partly through curbing the private expenditure. Thus, 
K^eynesian remedial scheme is essentially neutralizing changes in total effective 
demand by increasing it during a depression and decreasing it during a boom. During a 
depression, public expenditure should be increased through incurring public 
investment and enhancing consumption expenditure of the Government. Similarly, 
subsidies (with or without tax concessions) can be used to encourage private 
consumption and investment. 
Deficit financing is a very potent tool in the hands of the Government for 
increasing effective demand. This is more so if the deficit is financed through creation 
of additional currency or borrowings from the central bank of the country. Even when 
the Government borrows from the market and spends the borrowed sums, the 
agjgregate expenditure is most likely to increase because during depression the 
in\'estment opportunities in the market are not much and savings of the market get 
spe;nt through the Government. However, the Government's expenditure policy is 
more effective when the extra purchasing power goes into the hands of those people 
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who have a high marginal propensity to consume. Various social security measures 
like unemployment relief, old-age pensions, and so on are, therefore, very helpful in 
raising the total demand in the market. Productive activity picks up faster and the 
existing unutilized capacity is put to use if the Govenmient expenditure is directed 
primarily towards consumption and welfare type disbursements without creating 
additional productive capacity. In that case, the economy would be able to recover 
from the depression through the multiplier process. 
Taxation is considered an effective tool in encouraging expenditure in the 
private sector. Ordinarily, a general reduction in tax rates or abolition of various taxes 
is recommended. This pushes up profits and reduces cost of production and prices. 
Lower prices are expected to increase demand, production and employment, which in 
l;um add to effective demand, and so on. A similar action can be taken in the field of 
customs duties also. Raising import duties diverts the domestic demand from imports 
to home-produced goods; and reducing or abolishing export duties or giving export 
subsidies increases the demand for exports and contributes towards recovery from 
depression. Thus, it would be more helpful to lower tax rates on those goods which 
have a higher elastic demand. Similarly, demand would receive a greater stimulus if 
piersons with a higher marginal propensity to consume are given a relief in direct 
taxation. In the same manner, investment may be encouraged by specific tax 
concessions like tax holidays, greater depreciation allowance etc. 
When due to large increases in consumption demand by the households or 
investment expenditure by the entrepreneurs, or bigger budget deficit caused by too 
lairge an increase in Government expenditure, aggregate demand increases beyond 
what the economy can potentially produce by fully employing its given resources, it 
gives rise to the situation of excess demand which results in inflationary pressures in 
the economy. This inflationary situation can also arise if too large an increase in 
money supply in the economy occurs. In these circumstances inflationary-gap occurs 
which tend to bring about rise in prices. If successful steps to check the emergence of 
excess demand are not taken, the economy will experience a period of inflation. For 
th(5 last some decades, problem of demand-pull inflation has been faced by both the 
developed and developing countries of the world. An alternative way of looking at 
inflation is to view it from the angle of business cycles. Under such circumstances 
aniicyclical fiscal policy calls for reduction in aggregate demand. Thus, fiscal policy 
measures to control inflation are reducing Government expenditure and increasing 
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taxes. If in the beginning, the Government is having balanced budget, then increasing 
taxes while keeping Government expenditure constant will yield budget surplus. The 
creation of budget surplus will cause downward shift in the aggregate demand curve 
and will therefore help in easing pressure on prices. If there is a balanced budget to 
begin with and the Government reduces its expenditure, say on defence, subsidies, 
transfer payments, while keeping taxes constant, this will create budget surplus and 
result in removing excess demand in the economy. 
Taxes do act to some extent as built in stabilizer. Given the level of 
Government expenditure, the tax system itself tends to create a budgetary surplus 
during a boom and a deficit during a depression. (A budgetary surplus would curb 
expenditure and demand while a budgetary deficit would have the opposite effect and 
thus an anti-cyclical pressure is generated. This happens because revenue from indirect 
and direct taxes is dependent upon the level of economic activities. Moreover, direct 
taxes are usually progressive. With increasing money incomes, the direct taxes bill 
lises more than proportionately, and during a depression, there is a more than 
proportionate reduction in it. Therefore, yield from these taxes also moves in line with 
the level of economic activities. The result is that during a depression, tax revenue 
falls, and with given Government expenditure, there is a budgetary deficit, which in 
turn has an expansionary effect. On the other hand, during boom, larger revenue causes 
a budgetary surplus which has a contractionary effect. However, it is not enough to 
rely upon only buih-in-stabilizing effect of the tax system. Economic stability requires 
an all-frontal effort in which variation in tax revenue is only a part. During a boom, the 
market may develop expectations that prices would rise still further. If that happens, 
tax measures are not likely to succeed in curbing speculative demand and prices. 
Similarly, unless producers expect that their investments would be commercially 
profitable, they would not invest during a depression even when tax rates are lowered. 
Market imperfections are on the increase even in developed market economies which 
has adversely affected their adjustability and responsiveness to tax measures. Such 
limitations of tax devices become more glaring in underdeveloped countries. These 
economies are riddled with extra rigidities and they have a limited scope for the use of 
dmct taxes. Accordingly, in these countries, the authorities have to rely to a larger 
ext(2nt on non-taxation measures like import quotas and price controls. Even within the 
tax system, reliance has to be had on indirect taxes on a selective basis. It is found that 
the fiscal policy has far more chances of success during a depression, but much less in 
67 
an inflationary situation. In either case, it will be better if the fiscal policy is helped 
with appropriate monetary and other measures. 
2.3 Nature of India's Fiscal Policy: 
The objective of economic policy in India during the 1950s and 1960s was 
mainly to increase the growth rate of the economy through increasing public 
investment and overall economic plarming. Taxation was used as an instrument for 
reducing private consumption and investment and for transferring resources to the 
Government to enable it to undertake large-scale public investment in an effort to spur 
economic growth. Furthermore, taxation policy was geared towards achieving the 
economic objectives of promoting employment through grant of tax incentives to new 
investment; reducing inequality through progressive taxes on income and wealth; 
reducing pressure on balance of payments through increase of import duties; and 
st£ibilizing prices through tax rebate in excise duties on consumption goods. 
Fiscal policy during the 1970s consciously focused on achieving greater equity 
and social justice and both taxation and expenditure policies were employed towards 
this end. Accordingly, income tax rates were raised to very high levels, with the 
maiximum marginal rate of income tax moving up to 97 percent and, together with the 
incidence of wealth tax, it even crossed 100 percent. Over the years, in addition to the 
commitment towards a large volume of developmental expenditure, the Government's 
ex]Denditure widened to include rising subsidies. Large interest payments on growing 
debt and downward rigidity in prices further contributed to increased current 
expenditure. Current revenues, on the other hand, were less buoyant leading to the 
emergence of sizeable revenue deficit in the Central Government budget from 1979-80 
onwards, complicating the task of monetary policy. 
During the 1980s, Indian public finances were in a state of disarray with the 
fiscal pattern destabilizing the relationship between the economy and the budget. This 
resulted in persistently large deficits which were seemingly intractable. Considerable 
fiscal deterioration took place during the 1980s and eventually became unsustainable, 
though the growth rate did rise significantly with enhancement in public investment in 
infrastructure. During this phase, expenditure of the Government was seen as an 
instrument having a bearing upon aggregate demand, resource allocation and income 
distribution. The Government sought to reduce its deficit through tax increases. 
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Custom duties were hiked to augment revenue and to protect domestic industry. There 
was a structural change in the Government budgets during the 1980s. The emergence 
of revenue deficit in 1979-80 in the Centre's budget continued to enlarge during the 
1980s, raising concerns over the rising public debt and interest payments and the 
consequent constraint on the availability of resources for meeting developmental 
needs. The 1980s witnessed a steady increase in market borrowings along with an 
inc^ rease in Reserve Bank's support to such borrowing, thus compromising monetary 
policy. 
During 1990s, the structural adjustment programme and the consequent 
economic reforms gave a fresh dimension to fiscal system which focused not only on 
the various instruments of fiscal policy and issues of debt but also on the overall fiscal 
susitainability in the context of an open economic framework. Although the first half of 
the 1990s witnessed some fiscal correction, its retraction during the second half of the 
decade underlined the need for a consistent and sustainable fiscal consolidation 
prcicess. The Government, therefore, formulated and enactment the fiscal responsibility 
legislation which signaled a new dawn in fiscal consolidation. 
The performance of the Indian economy in recent years has attracted increasing 
intijmational interest. An interesting feature of the record of economic growth in India 
is that it has experienced a sustained slow acceleration in growth since independence. 
Growth has been accelerating gradually since the 1950s, except for an interregnum 
between 1965 and 1980. Thus, the current observed acceleration in growth has to be 
seen in the context of this long record of consistent growth, which has been 
accompanied by a relatively continuous increase in savings and investment rates over 
the years. What is remarkable in recent years is the very substantial steep increase in 
the rates of savings and investment. 
It is widely believed that Indian economy witnessed near stagnation in real 
GDP growth till the late 1970s. A closer review of the performance of the Indian 
economy, however, suggests a continuing increase in real GDP growth over each 
decade since independence, interspersed with an interregnum during the 1970s (Table-
1). Interestingly, growth of manufacturing production, in terms of decadal averages, 
was roughly constant at around 5.6-5.9 percent in the first five decades after 
independence, except for the 1970s. There are two other features of India's growth 
history that are notable. First, agricultural growth has been subject to large variation 
over the decades. The 1970s interregnum is particularly marked by the severe 
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deceleration in agricultural growth, followed by a marked recovery in the 1980s, and a 
slo^vdown thereafter. Second, until the 1990s, little note had been taken of growth in 
the services sector. A glance at the acceleration in growth in services over the decades, 
thai; had earlier been ignored, that really accounts for the continuous acceleration in 
overall GDP growth, once again, except for the 1970s interregnum. 
The slowdown of growth witnessed during the 1970s was reversed during the 
1980s; the pick up benefited from the initiation of some reform measures aimed at 
inci:easing domestic competitiveness. Since the early 1990s, growth impulses appeared 
to have gathered further momentum in the aftermath of comprehensive reforms 
encompassing the various sectors of the economy. There was some loss of the growth 
momentum in the latter half of the 1990s, which coincide with the onset of the East 
Asian financial crisis, setbacks to the fiscal correction process, quality of fiscal 
adjustment, slowdown in agriculture growth affected by lower than normal monsoon 
years, and some slackening in the pace of structural reforms. The slowdown could also 
be attributed to the excessive enthusiasm and optimism in regard to investment plans in 
domestic industry following deregulation, which was followed by significant problems 
experienced in viability and competitiveness. Monetary tightening in the face of 
inflationary pressures is also believed by some to have contributed to the slowdown 
over this period. Figure-1 shows fluctuating trend in the rate of real GDP growth. 
There was steep decline in the rate of real growth during the period of 1991-92, 1997-
98 and 2002-03 (Table-1). Since 2003-04, there has been a distinct strengthening of the 
growth momentum. Restructuring meastires by domestic industry, overall reduction in 
domestic interest rates, both nominal and real, improved corporate profitability, a 
benign investment climate amidst strong global demand and commitment rule-based 
fiscal policy have led to real GDP growth averaging close to 9 percent per annum over 
the four-year period ended 2006-07; growth in the last two years has averaged 9.3 
percent per annum (Mohan, Rakesh., 2008)"*^  The statistical analysis shows that the 
average real GDP growth in India during 1990-91 to 2007-08 has been 6.23 percent, 
while the compound aimual growth rate has been 4.7 percent during the same period. 
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Table-1 
Real GDP Growth 
1 Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
i 1996-97 
1997-98 
i 1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
(Percentage) 
Real GDP Growth 
5.3 
1.4 
5.4 
5.7 
6.4 
7.3 
8.0 
4.3 
6.7 
6.4 
4.4 
5.8 
3.8 
8.5 
7.5 
9.4 
9.6 
9.0 
6.23 
2.15 
34.45 
4.7 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Note: S.D=Standard Deviation, C.V=Coeflncient of variance, CAGR=Compound Annual Growth Rate. 
Figure-1 
Real GDP Growth 
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Source: Table-] 
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Table-2 
Gross Domestic Savings and Investment 
(Percentage) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
99-2000 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Gross Domestic 
Savings 
23.10 
22.03 
21.77 
22.53 
24.83 
25.15 
23.19 
23.13 
21.52 
24.20 
23.74 
23.45 
26.4 
29.7 
31.1 
34.2 
34.8 
37.7 
26.65 
5.01 
19.10 
2.8 
Gross 
Domestic 
Investment 
26.30 
22.55 
23.61 
23.09 
26.00 
26.90 
24.48 
24.60 
22.57 
25.33 
24.35 
23.13 
25.2 
28.2 
31.5 
33.8 
35.9 
37.5 
26.95 
4.63 
17.20 
2.21 
Source: CSO, National Income Accounts, Government of India. 
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Year 
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Gross 
Domestic 
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Source: Table-2 
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The sustained acceleration in real GDP growth of the Indian economy has been 
associated with a secular up trend in domestic savings and investment over the 
decades. Gross domestic savings has moved up from an average of 9.6 percent of GDP 
during 1950s to 17.5 percent during 1970s, and further to 23.4 percent during 
1990s.Gross domestic savings improved marginally from 23.5 percent in 2001-02 to 
37.7 percent in 2007-08.Similarly, the domestic investment rate has increased 
continuously from 10.8 percent in 1950s to 24.5 percent in 1990s. The gross domestic 
investment increased from 28.2 percent in 2003-04 to 37.5 percent in 2007-08 (Table-2 
& Figure-2). The remarkable feature of these trends in saving and investment rates 
show that India's economic growth has been financed predominantly by domestic 
savings. The recourse to foreign savings_ equivalently, current account deficit_ has 
been rather modest in the Indian growth process. However, the two decades, 1960s and 
1980s, when the current account deficit increased marginally towards 2 percent of 
GDP, were followed by significant balance of payments and economic crises 
(Mohan,Rakesh.,2008)^l 
The average of gross domestic savings and investment is 26.65 and 26.95 
percent respectively during 1990-91 to 2007-08. The co-efficient of variance of 
savings is found to be 19.10 percent which is higher than the co-efficient of variance of 
investment which is 17.20 percent during the same period. The standard deviation of 
savings and investment is 5.01 and 4.63 respectively, meaning thereby deviation in 
gross domestic saving is higher than gross domestic investment, and CAGR of gross 
domestic savings and gross domestic investment is 2.8 and 2.21 percent respecfively 
reflecting marginal difference in their annual growth pattern during the same period. 
However, Government's ability to invest has been declining continuously since 
the late 1980s because of its deteriorating fiscal position. What is encouraging, of 
course, is the increase in private corporate sector investment levels subsequent to the 
1991 reforms. The reforms have therefore succeeded in encouraging higher level of 
private investment as envisaged. But fiirther increases are constrained by declining 
public investment levels. Today concentration is now on the rapid deterioration of the 
fiscal balance both at central and state levels. The key deterrent for achieving higher 
economic growth in the country lies in its deteriorating fiscal performance. The key 
threat to substantial economic growth and to economic security is the substantial 
declme in investment expenditure made by the Government. The growing fiscal 
imbalances of the 1980s spilled over to the external sector and were also reflected in 
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inflationary pressures. Along with a repressive and weakening financial system, this 
rendered the growth process of the 1980s increasingly unsustainable. The external 
imbalances were reflected in a large and unsustainable current account deficit, which 
reached 3.2 percent of GDP in 1990-91. As the financing of such a large current 
account deficit through normal sources of finance became increasingly difficult, it 
resulted in an unprecedented external payment crisis in 1991 with the foreign currency 
assets dwindling to less than $ 1 billion. The financing problem was aggravated by the 
fact that the deficit was largely financed by debt flows up to the late 1980s, reflecting 
the policies of the time, which preferred debt flows to equity flows. Indeed, equity 
flows were almost negligible till the early 1990s. Moreover, a significant part of the 
debt flows during the late 1980s was of a short-term nature in the form of bankers' 
acceptances; such flows could not be renewed easily in view of the loss of confidence 
follo\ving the balance of payments crisis. In response to the balance of payments crisis, 
a programme of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment was put in 
place. Fiscal consolidation constituted a major plank of the policy response to the 
macroeconomic crisis; however, public sector savings continued to deteriorate during 
the 1990s, and even turned negative over the five-year period 1998-2003 owing to 
sharp deterioration in savings of the Government administration. The progress on 
fiscal correction was mixed during the 1990s at the central level. While there was some 
reduc;tion in the Centre's fiscal deficits up to 1996-97, the process was reversed over 
the riext few years under the impact of the industrial slowdown and the Fifth Pay 
Commission award. Furthermore, fiscal consolidation, which was envisaged to be 
achieved through revenue enhancement and curtailment in current expenditure growth, 
was however, brought through compression of capital expenditures from 5.6 percent of 
GDP in 1990-91 to 3.1 percent in 1996-97, with consequenfial effects on growth and 
infrastructure constraints in ensuring years. 
In view of the deterioration in fiscal deficits over the period 1997-98 to 2002-
03 and rising public debt, and its adverse impact on public investment and growth, a 
renewed emphasis was laid on improving the health of public finances on a durable 
basis. In order to achieve this objective, fiscal consolidation has been guided by the 
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 2003 at the Centre level. 
Since 2002-03, significant gains have been witnessed in the fiscal consolidation 
process at the Centre, partly as a result of the implementation of the rule-based fiscal 
polic:y at the Centre. A major factor contributing to the durability of the fiscal 
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consolidation process under way in India in recent years has been the buoyancy in the 
revenues accompanied by some reprioritization of expenditure with a focus on 
outcomes, unlike the expenditure compression strategy in most other countries as also 
the experience in India in the 1990s. The revenue augmenting strategy encompassed 
moderating the tax base and broadening the tax base through expansion in the scope of 
taxes, specifically service tax, removal of exemptions, some improvement in tax 
administration with a focus on arrears recoveries. Reflecting these measures, the tax-
GDP ratio of the Centre has steadily risen from 8.2 percent in 2001-02 to 11.4 percent 
in 2006-07, and 11.7 percent in 2007-08 (Chapter 4, Table-3). The entire increase in 
tax revenues was mainly on account of the buoyancy in direct taxes. On the 
expenditure front, while the total expenditure of the Centre declined from its recent 
peak of 17.0 percent of GDP in 2003-04 to 14.1 percent in 2006-07, the capital outlay 
rose from 1.2 percent to 1.6 percent of GDP. The movement in key deficit indicators 
reflects the progress made so far in fiscal consolidation. The fiscal deficit of the Centre 
and the States taken together has declined from 9.9 percent of GDP in 2001-02 to 6.4 
percent in 2006-07 led by a reduction in the revenue deficit from 7.0 percent of GDP to 
2.1 percent during the same period. Apart from the quantitative improvement, a salient 
feature of the fiscal consolidation under way has been some qualitative progress made 
as reflected in the reduction in the proportion of revenue deficit to gross fiscal deficit. 
As a result, the dissavings of the Government declined from (-) 6.0 percent of GDP in 
2001-02 to (-) 1.3 percent in 2006-07. The savings of the departmental enterprises at 
0.6 percent in 2006-07 were unchanged from those in 2001-02(Mohan, Rakesh., 
2008/^ 
However, India's persistently large fiscal imbalances raise three concerns. 
First, the upward trend in the interest burden on public debt threatens the sustainability 
of the current macroeconomic stance. In particular, it threatens the current mix of 
growth and inflation. Assuming that real interest rates are equal to the GDP growth 
rate, solvency requires that in the long-run the primary (non-interest) public sector 
surplus be sufficient to finance the interest service on net outstanding public sector 
liabilities. This would avoid an explosive situation in which new debt is issued to cover 
the interest payments on the mounting stock of old debt. Because a large share of the 
public debt has been contracted at interest rates well below current ones, and this debt 
will take time to mature and be rolled over at the higher current rate, India is far fi-om 
such a situation. However, in the absence of a serious adjustment in India's tax or 
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spending patterns, this situation will eventually materialize forcing either inflation to 
increase or growth to decline. Secondly, from a public finance angle, servicing the 
country's public debt puts large claims on public resources, which reduce the 
government's capacity to spend on key development activities. In addition, it also 
creates a need for higher taxation, which undermines efficiency. Third, the large fiscal 
imbalances pose a risk to macroeconomic stability as the financial sector is further 
liberalized. Since a large portion of the outstanding public debt stock carries interest 
rates well below current market rates, the overall interest bill will increase as these 
obligations mature and have to be rolled over at the higher current market rates. This 
convergence of the average rate to the marginal rate will have a sizeable impact on 
public fmances (Prasad, C.S., 2005)^^ 
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CHAPTER-3 
FISCAL REFORMS IN 
INDIA 
FISCAL REFORMS IN INDIA 
3.1 Rationale of Fiscal Reforms: 
India was a latecomer to economic reforms, embarking on the process in 
earnest only in 1991, in the wake of an exceptionally severe balance of payments 
crisis. The need for policy shift had became evident much earlier, as many countries in 
east Asia achieved high growth and poverty reduction through policies which 
emphasized greater export orientation and encouragement of the private sector. India 
took some steps in this direction in the 1980s, but it was not until 1991 that the 
government signaled a systemic shift to a more open economy with greater reliance 
upon market forces, a larger role for the private sector including foreign investment, 
and a restructuring of the role of Government (Ahluwalia,M.S.,2002)'. 
After a period of relatively robust economic performance in the late 1980s, the 
Indian economy entered into a period of unprecedented liquidity crisis during 1990-91. 
This crisis was the combined effect of a number of events coinciding. These included 
collapse of the Soviet Union that had emerged as India's major trading partner. The 
Gulf war that erupted in January 1991 worsened the balance of payments crisis not 
only with rising oil prices but also by causing a virtual stop-page of remittances from 
Indian workers in the Gulf These events coupled with political uncertainty prevailing 
in the country led international credit rating agencies to lower India's rating both for 
short and long-term borrowings. The erosion of international confidence in the Indian 
economy not only made borrowings in international markets difficult but also led to 
outflow of deposits of non-resident Indians with Indian banks. These developments 
togetiiier brought the country to the verge of default with respect to external payments 
liability which could be averted by resorting to borrowings from the IMF under the 
stand-by arrangements and contingency and compensatory financing (CCF) and by 
mortgaging gold to the Bank of England. This was complemented by emergency 
measures to restrict imports (Kumar, Nagesh., 2002) . 
The origin of the crisis is directly attributable to the cavalier macro 
management of the economy during the 1980s which led to large and persistent 
macroeconomic imbalances. The fiscal situation which was under strain throughout the 
1980,s, reached a critical situation in 1990-91. The unabated growths of non-plan 
expenditure and poor returns from investments made in the public sector have been the 
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main contributory factors in the fiscal crisis. There has been a steady decline in the 
share of capital formation in the Central Government expenditure. The gross savings of 
the Government which turned negative for the first time in 1984-85, continued to 
remaio so. The fiscal imbalance also manifested in a sharp increase in internal debt and 
resultant increase in interest payment. These problems, infact, were very much there 
for years destroying the capacity of the economy to cope with any internal or external 
shocks. In the 1970s, the Indian economy was strong enough to bear much larger and 
more sustained oil shocks. But by 1990 the situation had changed so much that minor 
oil shock made disproportionately large impact on the economy and a macroeconomic 
crisis erupted in the form of unsustainable fiscal and current account deficits and 
accelerating inflation. The year 1991-92 was one of the toughest year for the Indian 
econcmy. All the macroeconomic indicators became adverse. The overall economic 
growth slumped to a mere 1.1 percent. The gross fiscal deficit stood at 8 percent of the 
GDP and the revenue deficit on the current account at 3.5 percent in 1990-91. Prices 
shot up to 17 percent, an all time high level. In the external sector, the balance of 
payments with as little as $1.1 billion foreign reserves or barely enough to meet two 
weeks' import bill became precarious. The shortage of foreign exchanges apart from 
inducing import squeeze for industrial production led the country by June 1991 to face 
a hard option of defaulting on international commitments such as debt servicing or 
accepting IMF structural adjustment and stabilization programme. The government 
decided to adopt in June 1991 a programme of macroeconomic stabilizafion to restore 
viability to fiscal balances and the balance of payments. At the same time it undertook 
a far reaching programme of structural reforms involving bold initiatives in external 
trade, exchange trade, industrial policy and so on, all aiming at moving the country to a 
higher growth trajectory through infusing efficiency and international competitiveness. 
It als(3 aimed at integrating the Indian economy with the global system and enhancing 
its robustness through wider access to better technology and benchmarking with the 
global performers. The reform process was comprehensive. The initial reforms focused 
on fiscal reforms, policy paradigm shift from physical control regime to the one 
relying more on market forces and trade related reforms. Subsequently reforms were 
extended to cover financial sector and to put in place law and regulatory framework 
compatible with a market system. The full impact of the reform measures edges into 
view over a long span of time (Sarma, A. & Gupta, M., 2002) . 
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In India, over the last several years, public debate with respect to fiscal policy 
reforms has proceeded at three distinct levels: at the microeconomic level, where 
discussion has centered on the base and structure of tax rates and the distribution of 
Government expenditures across alternative end uses; at the administrative level, 
where concern has been expressed with respect to the quality of Govenmient 
expenditures, the delivery of its services and the inefficiencies inherent within its tax 
collec;ting bureaucracies; and at the aggregate, macroeconomic level, where attention 
has focused on the size of the Government's fiscal deficits (and its various 
counterparts) and the implications this carries for real interest rates, inflation, 
investment and growth(Mishra,V.,2001)'*. 
Fiscal reforms were the integral and perhaps the most critical part of the 
macroeconomic stabilization and reforms initiative taken by the Government after the 
1991 economic crisis. The fiscal consolidation measures taken immediately after the 
crisis situation yielded significantly positive results in terms of reduction in fiscal 
deficit, control in expenditure and marked changes in the fiscal system particularly in 
the financing pattern of the deficits through reduction in monetization. However, the 
continued structural imbalances in terms of falling tax buoyancy, nature of fiscal 
correction in terms of reduction in investment expenditure, increased interest burden 
owing to borrowing at market related rates, impact of enhanced salary of Government 
employees, compulsions of increased defence expenditure etc. were some of the major 
factoi'S which reversed the situation such that at the end of the decade the combine 
fiscal deficit of Centre and States was almost at the same level as was at the beginning 
of th(; reform measures. The emerging situation has led economist to suggest that the 
second generation of reforms should constitute a program of action aimed at 
preventing another major economic crisis and should stimulate rapid economic growth 
in the country during the new century. Infact, in the strategy outlined by the Finance 
Minister in his budget speech in February, 2000, declaring the next 10 years as 'India's 
decade of development' one of the elements is to establish a credible framework of 
fiscal discipline. Many economists in their surveys have even warned that unless 
substantial fiscal consolidation is achieved continued fiscal deficits pose India's 
greatest risk to future destabilization (Deshmukh, H., Chaudhari,K., Powar,Y., 
Parh£ir,A & Shejwal,A.,2006)^ 
The primary objective of the fiscal reforms as announced in the Union Budget 
1991-92, was essentially to achieve a reduction in the size of deficit and debt in 
82 
relation to GDP. It was envisaged that this would be achieved through revenue 
enhancement and curtailment in current expenditure growth while enlarging spending 
on investments and infrastructure so as to provide momentum to the growth process. 
Thesfj measures were also intended to curb the pre-emption of institutional resources 
by the Government and simultaneously to provide a level-playing field to the private 
investors. Accordingly, fiscal reforms in India were initiated in three distinct but 
interrelated areas: 
(i) Restoration of fiscal balance; 
(ii) Restructuring of public sector; and 
(iii) Strengthening of the fiscal-monetary coordination. 
The strategy for restoring fiscal balance comprised tax and non-tax reforms, 
expenditure management and institutional reforms. Public sector restructuring mainly 
involved disinvestment of Government ownership. Contemporaneously, the steps 
towards improving fiscal-monetary coordination encompassed deregulation of 
financial system, elimination of automatic monetization, and reduction in pre-emption 
of institutional resources by the Government. At the sub-national level, fiscal 
adjustments began as a consequence of the deterioration in State's finances also. 
A. RBI's Perspectives on Fiscal Reforms: 
RBI's approach to fiscal reforms is that while RBI agrees on the need to 
eliminate the revenue deficit, and agrees on a nominal limit for fiscal deficit, what is 
even more important is the mode of financing the fiscal deficit and the use that the 
resources so raised are put to. In addition, RBI focuses on fiscal empowerment which 
was clearly articulated around 2000 in the Annual Report of the Board of Directors of 
the F!EI. Exclusive focus on fiscal deficit may tend to reduce the role of the 
Government, and consequently, it will not be in position to aid the process of growth, 
in particular, inclusive growth. Re-prioritization of expenditure may be achieved 
throujgh reduction or elimination of subsidies and deployment of resources thus 
released to the more needy sectors. Higher level of resources may also be available 
throuj^ h reduction in tax exemption. Indian economy requires structural transformation 
and investment in social and financial infrastructure, RBI should strive for an 
appropriate level of fiscal activity particularly because public goods have to be 
provided and that would enable RBI to maintain fiscal discipline and macro-stability 
rather than aim for a mechanical reduction in fiscal and revenue deficits at a lower 
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level of fiscal activity. In the light of financial turbulence across the world in the recent 
period, the relevance of the fisc in the management of the macro economy has become 
even, more important. When RBI have not seen such financial turbulence in our 
country, it is important to remember that when all else fails, it is only the fiscal that has 
to take the hit and come to the rescue. One of the rating agencies says "India's 
monetary management is conservative and prudent, together with its low external debt 
position and relative ease in local currency funding, this helps alleviate its fiscal 
wealoiess". The important point here is if RBl's policy is helping to alleviate fiscal 
weal':ness, how can it be conservative? It perhaps needs to be described as 
"appropriate" (Reddy,Y.V.,2008)^ 
B. The Quality of Fiscal Stabilization: 
In recent years, we have become progressively more aware of the fact that a 
given reduction in the fiscal deficit may be genuine and of good quality or of a largely 
cosmetic kind and of poor quality. The economic effects of the two are likely to be 
widely divergent. Unfortunately, cosmetic changes are often easier and politically less 
costly to make. This fact, coupled with the realization that the time horizon that is most 
important to policy makers often leads to a preference for cosmetic over genuine 
adjustment. Policy makers tend to follow the line of least resistance. A reduction of 
certain magnitude in the fiscal deficit is in most cases, not the result of a single policy 
decision as would be, say, a devaluation or an increase in interest rates but the 
summation of many specific policy decisions, both on the revenue side and on the 
expenditure side (Vito,Tanzi.,1993) .A high quality fiscal stabilization must be 
associated with measures that individually are efficient, durable, and equitable. In 
other words, these measures must not introduce avoidable distortions; they must not 
self-destruct in the near future; and they must not eliminate expenditures that are 
important for economic or social reasons when alternatives are available. The public 
spending to be reduced must be the one that contributes the least to the efficiency and 
fairness of the economic system. On the revenue side, and broadly in order of 
preference but not in order of facility of introduction, the following measures could be 
chosen: First, the broadening or the introduction of a general consumption tax, 
possibly one with characteristics of a value-added tax. Value-added taxes are now 
important sources of revenue in a relatively efficient way and with relatively short 
lags, liecond, the Government should ftiUy explore the revenue possibility of excise 
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taxes. These excises should be imposed on commodities with inelastic demand, or on 
those whose consumption generates substantial negative externalities. Third, important 
changes can be introduced to the personal income tax. Personal income taxes 
contiibute still very little to total revenue in developing countries. If basic changes are 
made, the threshold of the tax can remain generous, and high marginal tax rates can be 
cut, without much revenue loss and with potential gains in work effort and tax payers' 
comjjliance. For taxes on corporations, similar considerations apply. Corporate income 
taxes are often eroded by excessive incentives and complex laws. In particular 
circumstances, and especially when the rate of inflation is high, alternative forms of 
taxing corporations may need to be introduced. The next measures, which especially in 
the short run can be very important from a revenue point of view, is the rising of public 
utility prices and the introduction of user charges for particular services provided by 
the ]3ublic sector, such as higher education and health. The real prices at which 
electricity, water, telephone, transportation and other public sector services are sold 
normally fall, at times quite drastically, during inflationary periods. This fall increases 
the demand for these services. Because of losses experienced by the public enterprises, 
it becomes difficult to expand capacity. Enterprises have also difficulties in providing 
the iunds necessary for operation and maintenance, especially in view of the more 
intensive utilization of their plants. Thus, capacity will decline and the quality of the 
service will deteriorate. The greater is the fall in the real tariffs charged by the public 
enterprises, and the greater is the demand response to that fall, the greater will appear 
to be the need to expand investment in those activities. Thus, an artificial justification 
for capacity expansion will be created especially at a time when the resources to satisfy 
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that (Expansion are sharply reduced (Ibid) . A correction of these prices will thus: 
i. generate more revenue; 
ii. reduce the need for additional investment to expand capacity by lowering 
demand; and 
iii. by reducing overuse, it will reduce maintenance costs. 
Finally, imports can be made to generate larger revenues either by dismantling 
quotas and other quantitative restrictions and replacing them by import duties or by 
removing the excessive erosion of the import tax base created by incentives and special 
exemptions, and by introducing a minimum tax on all imports. In both cases the 
additional revenue would be accompanied by improved efficiency. 
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On the expenditure side, a variety of step can be taken: First, and most 
importantly, unproductive investment projects must be eliminated. The argument often 
heard that investment must be protected during adjustment is simply misguided. While 
productive investment is an important source of growth and must be protected, 
unproductive investment especially if associated with imported machinery and capital 
equipment is a major burden on the economy. In most developing countries the 
investment budget is padded with many politically motivated and unproductive 
investments which can, and should be eliminated. Unlike consumption expenditure, it 
may contribute little to the welfare of the country's citizen (Ibid)^. Furthermore, if it is 
obtained with foreign credit, it becomes a long-term drag on the economy. Hence, 
unproductive investment must be the first area where cuts should be made. Some of the 
savings from this source could be allocated to operations and maintenance expenditure, 
whic:h would increase the efficiency of the existing capital structure and would permit 
that structure to support a higher level of income. 
A second area where reductions could be made is in the wage bill of the public 
sector. During stabilization many countries have in fact, attempted to reduce the wage 
bill of the public sector. However, policy makers have generally preferred to reduce 
real wages rather than public employment. There is evidence, from some countries, 
that cuts in real wages have been accompanied by expansions in public sector 
employment. Since the marginal cost of hiring extra workers falls with the fall in real 
wageis and since adjustment often increases unemployment in the short run pressure is 
put on the government to be the employment of last resort. Such a policy does not have 
much chance for success in reducing the wage bill over the long run and it is likely to 
increase the inefficiency of public sector employees, especially at a time when the 
public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy. The cut in 
real Avages, unless they were high to start with, almost guarantees that the efficiency of 
the public sector will fall. Furthermore, a drastic fall in real wages guarantees that they 
will bounce back as soon as the Government is no longer be able to withstand the 
pressure of public sector unions (Ibid)'". In other words, excessive reduction in real 
wages will increase fiscal tension. The reduction in real wages, at a time of high 
unemployment, will generate pressures on the Government to increase its 
unemployment. In many developing countries the public sector is clearly overstaffed. 
Therefore, fiscal stabilization that hopes to reduce the wage bill permanently must 
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reduce in some cases quite considerably, the number of public employees. This may 
require privatizing some activities. 
The third important area for reduction, although a politically difficult one, is 
defence expenditure. Defence expenditure remains excessive in developing countries. 
Unfortunately, this spending has been able so far to withstand the downward pressures 
in public expenditure that accompany stabilization programmes (DeMsai, P&H.Lorie., 
1989)". Fourth, many countries engage in various forms of unproductive expenditure, 
from the building of monuments to the subsidization of unnecessary activities. In many 
devfjloping countries, for example, a large number of public cars (often expensive 
ones) are purchased. In many of these countries the enforcement of useless regulations 
also requires substantial public sector spending. In conclusion, in most countries there 
is scope for pruning the budget of many of these activities. Subsidies must be closely 
scrutinized. Those which are essential, because of social objectives, or because of 
significant externalities, should be protected. But generalized subsidies, provided 
through the artificial reduction in the prices of products of general country, should be 
eliminated. Many subsidies, even when defended on the grounds that they protect the 
poor, just subsidies the middle classes. 
C. The Sequencing of Fiscal Reforms: 
A fundamental and common conflict that arises in adjustment programmes is 
the one between the need to achieve quick results and the time necessary to develop, 
legislate, and implement sound policies. The need for quick results is often promoted 
by: (a) the precariousness of the economic situation; (b) the fear that if changes are not 
made; immediately, they will not be made; and (c) by arrangements with international 
institutions which are often time constrained. While changes in interest rates, in 
exchange rates, and in other areas of economic policy can be made relatively quickly 
and often do not require legislative approval, fiscal reforms, that include tax reform, 
public sector reorganizations including privatization, reform of public expenditure 
programmes, and so forth, require time and, in many countries, must be legislated. As 
a consequence, countries have often gone for 'quick fixes' that is for fiscal reforms that 
reduce the fiscal deficit in the period immediately ahead with policy changes that are 
neither durable nor efficient. Common elements of these 'quick fix' solutions have 
been: 
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a) sharp reductions in public sector real wages to levels below their likely long 
run equilibrium; 
b) sharp and indiscriminate cuts in investment expenditure without much 
assurance that the projects that are eliminated are least productive; 
c) sharp cuts in expenditures on operation and maintenance leading to a faster 
deterioration of the existing capital infrastructure and to reduce capacity 
utilization; 
d) emergency tax legislation , including the temporary introduction of very 
distortionary taxes such as those on exports and financial instruments, and of 
temporary surtaxes on import duties, income taxes, and others; 
e) excessive increase in some excises; 
f) anticipation of tax payments, sometimes by providing discounts for anticipated 
payments to tax payers, thus reducing further tax collection; 
g) tax amnesties; 
h) quick sales of some assets; 
i) delay in making payments; 
j) various imaginative maneuvers aimed at 'parking' the deficit in part of the 
public sector not covered by the programme. 
Most of the above measures are either self-destructuring, or of questionable 
quality, or both. They are not the kind of measures that will result in durable 
stabilization. They will cause a rise in fiscal tension, increasing uncertainty and 
sending negative signals to investors, thus discouraging capital repatriation, or 
encouraging capital flight. Given the measured fiscal deficit, the expected rate of 
return on private investment is likely to be negatively related to the degree of fiscal 
tension while private investment is positively related to the expected rate of return. 
Ther(jfore, a deficit reduction achieved through these means should not be expected to 
bring about an improvement in economic conditions. Such a reduction can only be 
justified if it is clearly armounced and believed to be a transitory step towards a more 
durable and higher quality package. Unfortunately, these measures often exhaust the 
political will of the Government to make the more basic reforms or are seen as the only 
way to reduce the fiscal deficit. Sustainable fiscal policy requires, almost by definition 
measures that will not put additional impediments on the efficient allocation of 
resoui'ces. It must involve good macroeconomists working in close cooperation with 
public finance specialists experienced in both policy and administration. 
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3.2 Reasons of Fiscal Reforms: 
Any review or assessment of fiscal sector reforms should perhaps be seen in the 
backdrop of certain operational features of the Indian fiscal system which have 
resulted in a slow and less satisfactory outcome. The complexity of the fiscal issues 
interlinked with all other macro-variables, deeply entrenched systemic elements of 
administration, historically strengthened rigidities of expenditure pattern, democratic 
constraints on unpopular fiscal and tax measures, and above all political uncertainties 
made fiscal reforms, the most challenging task for all shades (different political 
parties) of Governments notwithstanding a near consensus on the need of such reform. 
There are following reasons of fiscal reforms: 
i. The growth of the economy slowed down substantially in 1991-92, partly 
because of a slowdown in agriculture and partly because of a deceleration in 
industrial growth, 
ii. Balance of payment, which emerged in 1990-91, had reached crisis proportions 
by June 1991. The first sign of the current payments crisis became evident in 
the second half of 1990-91, when the gulf war led to a sharp increase in oil 
prices, 
iii. Inflation, which had began to accelerate in 1990-91, reached a peak level of 
16.7 percent in August 1991. 
iv. Fiscal imbalances were reflected in growing budget deficits mainly because of 
escalating non-plan expenditure in the face of sluggish revenue growth. 
Increasing budget deficit on the revenue account indicated danger signal 
\'. Primary deficits accumulate into debt, unless offset by an excess of growth 
over interest rate. The ratio of revenue deficit to fiscal deficit indicates the 
extent to which borrowing is used for current expenditures. 
Fiscal profligacy was seen to have caused the balance of payments crisis in 
1991 and reduction in the fiscal deficit was therefore an urgent priority at the start of 
the reforms. The need for comprehensive fiscal reforms in India was apparent during 
the late 1980s, as there was rapid deterioration in Government finances. During this 
period, the expenditure of the Central Government rose much faster than its revenue 
leading to a steep rise in the Centre's fiscal deficit to GDP ratio. A closer analysis of 
the Central Government finances reveals that a widening of about two percentage 
points of GDP in gross fiscal deficit (GFD) emanated from the revenue deficit which 
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widened from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1980-81 to 3.3 percent in 1990-91. The key factor 
behind the worsening of revenue and fiscal deficit was increase in interest payments 
which registered a rise of almost two percentage points of GDP over the same period. 
This reflected a vicious cycle of widening deficit, larger borrowings, increasing debt 
stocks, higher interest payments and further widening of deficit. The debt stock of the 
Central Government over the eighties increased by around 14 percentage points of 
GDP to reach 55.3 percent of GDP in 1990-91. In respect of State Governments, 
though the revenue deficit widened by almost two percentage points of GDP, the rise 
in fiscal deficit could be contained at below one percentage point of GDP mainly due 
to compression in capital expenditure. The main factor behind the widening of revenue 
deficit of the States was the increase in non-interest revenue expenditure. The rise in 
interest payments was, however, of a lower order as they had limited and restricted 
access to borrowed resources. The sharp increase in revenue deficit of the Central 
Government and the emergence of such deficits in State finances were the most 
won-isome developments in the fiscal scenario during the 1980s. Reflecting these 
developments, there was a sharp increase in the outstanding liabilities of both Central 
and State Governments as rafio to GDP from 41.6 percent and 16.7 percent 
respectively in 1980-81 to 55.3 percent and 19.4 percent respectively in 1990-91. The 
growing size of liabilities eventually generated a considerable debt-service burden, 
with interest payments as ratio to GDP rising from 1.8 percent to 3.8 percent in case of 
the Centre and from 0.9 percent to 1.5 percent in case of State during the same period. 
The underdeveloped nature of the Government securities market and the heavy 
dependence of small saving collections on the level of income resulted in an implicit 
upper ceiling on Government's access to the market resources. This necessitated a 
large order of monetary accommodation from Reserve Bank of India with its attendant 
monetary implications. The outstanding net Reserve Bank credit to the Government as 
ratio to GDP rose from 11.4 percent as at end-March 1981 to 15.6 percent as at end-
March 1991. In order to partially abate the inflationary pressure emanating from 
growing monetization of fiscal deficit, discrete upward changes in cash reserve ratio 
(C!RR) were necessitated. A large and growing fiscal deficit of the Government had 
macroeconomic implications in terms of sustainability of growth process. The 
mounting fiscal deficit in the eighties was increasingly financed by the draft of 
financial surpluses of the households through statutory preemptions of resources from 
the financial sector at sub-market clearing rates. The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), 
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which represents statutory investments by banks in Government securities, was raised 
to its peak level of 38.5 percent by 1990. Furthermore, the tendency of automatic 
monetization of fiscal deficit compromised effectiveness of monetary policy and 
fuelled inflation. With both CRR and SLR approaching their statutory upper limits at 
the time of the onset of unprecedented macroeconomic crisis of 1991, and given the 
deleterious macroeconomic consequences of high fiscal deficit, the only option 
available was to adopt a quick fiscal restructuring programme along with other 
macroeconomic and institufional reforms (Kapila,U.,2004) . 
Deterioration of the fiscal situation and increased dissaving of Government 
administration by the latter half of the 1990s renewed the urgency for improving public 
finances at both Centre and State levels, particularly, in view of the need to benchmark 
Indian codes and practices to international standards in the aftermath of its 
membership to G-20 groups of the countries. The strategy of fiscal consolidation 
initiated in the early nineties was a mix of measures towards revenue augmentation 
through tax reforms and expenditure compression (Mohan, R.,2008) . The need for 
"fiscal adjustment now"(Pinto,Brian & Zahir, Farah,2004)''' arises not because a crisis 
is imminent but because postponing reform is likely to result in an unmanageable debt 
and interest burden by the end of the Tenth Plan period notwithstanding the current 
low interest rates and burgeoning reserves. In contrast, a phased adjustment beginning 
now and focusing on a relatively small set of reforms is likely to yield substantial, 
positive benefits over the same horizon and be more condusive to long-run growth and 
poverty reduction. By "adjustment" is not meant an immediate, drastic cut in the fiscal 
deficit. The only way to do so give the extraordinary high level of interest payments 
would be to cut capital expenditure even more, which would be imdesirable. Instead, 
the advocated focus is on revenue mobilization and indirecting "non-merit subsidies" 
towards capital and development expenditure. A key factor in the fiscal deterioration 
during the Ninth Plan period has been the significant reform induced losses in revenue 
(both indirect tax revenue and financial repression revenue), and also the Government 
inability to adjust public spending (as interest payments take up to increasing share of 
the budget). Debt dynamics worsened over 2002-03 despite the record low interest 
rates. The reason for this and the inadvisability of gambling on the persistence of low 
interest rates are spelled over. Second, it demonstrates that Government debt dynamics 
are showing signs of being unsustainable. The primary deficit (non-interest fiscal 
deficit) is large and real interest rates have converged to growth rates. Third, the 
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Reserve Bank of India's policy of building up reserves and sterilizing them(to cushion 
a.gainst external shocks and keep inflation low, respectively), coupled with constraints 
on Government spending(because of fiscal deficits and public debt) has resulted in low 
public and private investment, putting long-run growth in jeopardy relative to the 
levels needed for rapid poverty alleviation. Moreover, while higher reserves sheet of 
tlie Government and the RBI has weakened. Fourth, projections show that postponing 
fiscal adjustment will push the debt burden to unmanageable levels by the end of the 
Tenth Plan period; but a phased adjustment that begins immediately will lower deficits 
and greatly improve spending composition. 
3.3 Objectives of Fiscal Reforms: 
Indian economy needed substantial reforms to overcome the crises. To 
implement a programme of macro-economic stabilization, number of structural 
njforms of trade, industry and public sector were initiated. Structural reforms were 
necessary to reverse various unhealthy economic trends and tendencies. Without such 
n;forms, Indian economy could not have been brought back on the track of growth and 
development. The reforms have embraced almost all aspect of the country's economy. 
These reforms fall under two basic categories: 
a. Liberalization measures; and 
b. Macro-economic reforms and structural adjustments. 
Various measures taken together aim at modernizing the country's industrial 
sj'stem, removing unproductive controls, encouraging private investment including 
foreign investment and integrating India's economy with global economy. All round 
opening up of the country's economy has been the aim of the various reforms, which 
were initiated (Mahajan,V &Mahajan,M.,2003)'^ Govemments all over the world have 
been using fiscal measures to regulate their economic and business activities in order 
to achieve their objectives. 
Following are the main objectives of fiscal sector reforms in India to enhance 
the stability and efficiency of the economy: 
i. The immediate aim of fiscal policy reforms was to improve the fiscal balance 
in order to eliminate the inflationary pressure emanating from the budget 
deficit; 
ii. To stop further accumulation of public debt; 
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iii. To reduce the level of subsidies in the economy and eliminate open-ended 
cross-subsidization; 
iv. To direct Government expenditure towards providing essential public services 
of a high quality, and finally to restore the Government's capacity to make 
strategic investments in infrastructure and human resources, and look after the 
weak and the less privileged (Prasad,C. S.,2005)'^ . 
V. A key objective of the reform process was the augmentation of non-tax revenue 
by way of enhancement of user charges and returns on Government 
investments through restructuring of public sector undertakings (PSUs). The 
intention of restructuring PSUs was to improve their efficiency and thereby 
enhance the capacity to generate returns on Government investments. 
3.4 Fiscal Reform Measures: 
While a move towards fiscal adjustment was discernible in the pronouncements 
made as a part of long-term fiscal policy announced in the mid-1980s, a 
C(3mprehensive fiscal reform programme at the Central Government level was initiated 
only at the beginning of the 1990s as part of the economic adjustment programme 
initiated in 1991-92. Fiscal reforms at the Centre covered: 
A. Tax Reforms 
B. Expenditure Reforms 
C. Restructuring of Public Sectors 
D. Fiscal-Monetary Coordination 
E. Institutional Measures 
A. Tax Reforms: 
There have been major changes in tax systems of countries with a wide variety 
oi' economic systems and levels of development during the last two decades. The 
motivation for these reforms has varied from one country to another and the thrust of 
reforms has differed from time to time depending on the development strategy and 
philosophy of the times. In many developing countries, the immediate reason for tax 
reforms has been the need to enhance revenues to meet impending fiscal crises. Such 
reforms, however, are often ad hoc and are done to meet immediate exigencies of 
revenue. In most cases, such reforms are not in the nature of systemic improvements to 
enhance the long run productivity of the tax system. One of the most important reasons 
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for recent tax reforms in many developing and transitional economies has been to 
evolve a tax system to meet the requirements of international competition. The 
ti-ansition from a predominantly centrally planned development strategy to market 
based resource allocation has changed the perspective of the role of the state in 
development. The transition from a public sector based, heavy industry dominated, 
import substituting industrialization strategy to one of allocating resources according 
to market signals has necessitated systemic changes in the tax system. In an export-led 
open economy, the tax system should not only raise the necessary revenues to provide 
the social and physical infrastructure but also minimize distortions. Thus, the tax 
system has to meet the requirements of a market economy to ensure international 
competitiveness (Rao, G.M & Rao,K.R., 2006)'^ 
Tax reforms are needed to promote efficient growth. A transparent and simple 
tax regime contributes to improving the business and investment climate that is so 
essential for the private sector to expand employment opportunities. Improving tax 
collection is an essential element for financing prioritized public investment and public 
expenditure. Deepening of tax reforms will not only strengthen public governance, it 
^^ 'ill lead to increasing revenue collection. Increase in revenue collection are necessary 
for India to be able to finance those programs that are crucial to broadening 
inclusiveness, including social spending for health, education, sanitation and 
strengthening social safety nets. Moreover, increasing tax collection will be 
instrumental towards effectively strengthening the budget as the Government's 
pirincipal policy instrument to effectively pursue its policy objectives including 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (Schaefer,Ursula.,2007)'^. 
The Government of India constituted a Committee of experts under the 
chairmanship of Raja J.Chelliah to examine the structure of direct and indirect taxes 
through its Resolution dated August 29, 1991.The terms of reference of the Committee 
were to examine and make recommendations on the following matters: 
i. Ways of improving the elasticity of tax revenues, both direct and indirect, and 
increasing the share of direct taxes as a proportion of total tax revenues and of 
GDP. 
ii. Making the tax system fairer and broad-based, with necessary rate adjustments, 
particularly with regard to commodity taxation and personal taxation. 
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iii. Rationalization of the system of direct taxes with view to removing anomalies, 
improving equity and sustaining economic incentives, 
iv. Identifying new areas for taxation. 
V. Ways of improving compliance of direct taxes and strengthening enforcement, 
vi. Simplification and rationalization of customs tariffs with a view to reducing the 
multiplicity and dispersion of rates and to eliminate exemptions which have 
become unnecessary, 
vii. Reducing the level of tariff rates, keeping in view the need for mobilizing 
resources to facilitate fiscal adjustment and the objective of promoting 
international competitiveness, 
viii. Simplification and rationalization of the structure of excise duties for better tax 
compliance and administration, 
ix. The scope of extending the MOD VAT Scheme. 
x. Any other matter related to the above points or incidental thereto. 
The Committee submitted its Report in three installments. 
• An Interim Report in December 1991; 
• Final Report Part-I in August 1992; and 
• Final Report Part-II in January 1993. 
These Reports contained recommendations for restructuring and rationalization 
of personal income tax, corporate income tax, wealth tax, excise duties, import tariff, 
tax administration and enforcement machinery. Based on the overall direction 
pi-escribed by the Tax Reforms Committee (TRC), tax reforms introduced by the 
Government since mid-1991 are geared to build a structure which is simple, relies on 
moderated tax rates but with a wider base and better enforcement. Historically, rates of 
income tax in India have been quite high, almost punitive. For example, in 1973-74, 
the maximum marginal rate of individual income tax was as high as 97.7 percent. 
When high rates proved counter-productive from revenue angle, the Government 
initiated a series of rate reductions with the result that the top rate declined to 54 
percent (including surcharge of 8 percent) in 1990-91. Consequent upon the 
recommendations of the TRC, the number of income tax rates was reduced and the 
rates themselves were scaled down. The 1992-93 budget fixed the maximum marginal 
rate at 44.8 percent (including surcharge of 12). The 1994-95 budget abolished the 
surcharge of 12 percent and therefore the maximum marginal rate of tax became 40 
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percent on incomes over Rs. 1, 20,000. The maximum marginal rate of personal 
income tax was further reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent in the 1997-98 Budget. 
In another significant move, it was made applicable to incomes above Rs. 1, 50,000. 
The 1994-95 budget abolished the distinction between widely-held domestic 
companies and closely-held domestic companies and introduce a single tax rate of 40 
percent for all types of domestic companies. In the same budget, the taxes on corporate 
income were unified at 46 percent for widely held companies and 55 percent for 
branches of foreign banks. It is noteworthy that no surcharge is applicable on the 
income of foreign companies. A major reform of excises was implemented to make it 
more closely resemble a value-added tax and address its major problems. Meanwhile, 
the manufacturing sector thus far excluded, and, for the first time, some services. Of 
particular importance also were the decisions to: 
• Shift most excise rates from specific to ad-valorem to increase buoyancy; 
• Reduce the number of rates; and 
• Simplify the system by relying on invoices for value determination. 
These reforms considerably simplified and modernized India's tax system and 
made it possible for the Central Government to begin to focus its effort on improving 
ta:x administration. 
The 1995-96 budget further reduced peak excise duties. It did not reduce 
corporate tax rates further but it continued the emphasis on simplification, lower rates 
and greater buoyancy. To strengthen compliance, the authorities proposed tax 
d(;duction at source for fees for professionals, technical services and service contracts, 
and interest income on time deposits. Further, significant tax reforms were introduced 
in the 1996-97 Budget. Several tax measures have been taken to continue to broaden 
the tax base, reduce rates, and improve tax administration. This has been particularly 
important in the case of excise and corporate taxation. Regarding excise taxes, the 
Finance Minister emphasized the need to move to a more transparent and simple four-
rate excise tax structure-zero, a lower rate of excise duty on goods of mass 
consumption, a single normal rate on all other goods, and a higher rate on luxury items 
in year or two. In the meantime, the MODVAT has been extended to the textile fabrics 
sector with a special tax incentives package (excise and customs duties have been 
reduced on important inputs) to boost the sector. A mandatory penalty for evasion of 
excise duty or misuse of MODVAT credit scheme on account of fraud, collusion etc., 
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v/as also introduced. Excise duties were raised on several items, including all 
petroleum products except on LPG and Kerosene. On the import duty side, the basic 
duty rate on a number of items was reduced to 30 or 40 percent. Progress was also 
made in unifying import duty rates on similar items, in order to avoid disputes arising 
out of mis-classification and multiplicity of rates. The noteworthy development for 
company income tax was the reduction of a surcharge on corporate tax from 15 percent 
to 7.5 percent and the introduction of a "Minimum Alternative Tax" (MAT) on 
companies' book profits to bring into the tax net some 1,000 companies currently 
under the zero-tax bracket or benefiting from excessive exemptions. Finally, the tax on 
long-term capital gains for domestic companies has been reduced from 30 percent to 
20 percent to bring it in line with that for foreign companies. The scope of the long 
term capital gains tax exemption was widened to include investment in shares issued 
by public companies in specified sectors. Regarding personal income tax, the budget 
has reduced the income-tax rate for the first bracket from 20 percent to 15 percent. 
Allowances were also granted for various deductions (interest payments on owner-
occupier mortgages, health insurance, and fiscal incentives for saving schemes). 
The 1997-98 budget introduced sharp cuts in income tax rates with a view to 
stimulate saving and investment and encourage higher tax compliance. Personal and 
corporate tax rates were reduced and rationalized to bring them to internationally 
comparable levels. The top marginal personal income tax rate was cut from 40 to 30 
p(jrcent. The surcharge on companies was completely abolished and the tax rate for 
domestic companies was reduced from 40 percent to 35 percent. The tax rate on 
foreign companies was scaled down from 55 to 48 percent. The 1999-2000 budget 
undertook a major overhaul of indirect taxes by reducing the multiplicity of rates, 
rationalizing the rate structure. In a landmark move, the Finance Minister announced in 
his 1999-2000 budget a triple rate excise structure. In other words, the excise duty 
reform involved reduction of 11 major ad valorem duty rates to 3, viz. a central rate of 
16 percent, a merit rate of 8 percent and a demerit rate of 24 percent. The initiative of 
the Finance Minister to rationalize the rate structure of excise system was widely 
appreciated. Reduction of the peak protective customs duty resumed after a hiatus of 
thi3 two years, with a reduction of the peak tariff from 45 percent to 40 percent. The 
seven major ad valorem rates of basic customs duty were winnowed to five (5 percent, 
15 percent, 25 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent). To reduce dispersion, a basic duty 
of 5 percent was imposed on a number of commodities (including project imports) 
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whiich earlier enjoyed duty exemption (but were exempted from the 4 percent special 
additional duty). This provided some minimal protection to these items. 
The basic principles guiding the tax proposals in the Union Budget 2001-02 
we;re the need for revenue buoyancy, further simplification of the tax regime and more 
effective tax compliance. In the area of direct taxes, the emphasis was on retention of 
stability in tax rates, widening of the tax base and rationalization and simplification of 
th(! tax structure. All surcharges were abolished except the Gujarat earthquake 
sui'charge of 2 percent imposed on all non-corporate and corporate assesses except 
foreign companies. The ongoing process of reducing rates, rationalizing the tax 
regime, and simplifying procedures, was carried forward in the sphere of indirect taxes 
also. The important initiatives adopted during the year were the following: 
i. Peak level of customs duty reduced from 38.5 percent to 35 percent with 
abolition of surcharge on customs duty. Customs duty reduced on specified 
textile machines, information technology, telecommunications and 
entertainment industry, 
ii. Excise duty structure rationalized to a single rate of 16 percent CENVAT 
(Central Value Added Tax) in 2000-01. The budget for 2001-02 replaced 
earlier three special rates of 8 percent, 16 percent, and 24 percent by a single 
rate of 16 percent. 
The Task Force on Direct Taxes presented its consultation paper to the 
Government on November 2, 2002. The discussion paper on indirect taxes was 
presented on November 25, 2002. The consultation papers were made public to 
facilitate an informed discussion on tax policy. After taking into account the response 
on the discussion papers, the Task Forces submitted their final reports to the 
Government in December 2002. The Task Forces made important recommendations on 
toning up tax administration to put in place a system that is simple, effective and at par 
with international standards. The main recommendations on direct taxes related to 
raising of exemption limit of personal income tax, rationalization of exemptions, 
abolition of concessional treatment to long-term capital gains, and abolition of wealth 
ta>;. In respect of indirect taxes, the main recommendations related to widening of the 
ta>: base, removal of exemptions, expansion in the coverage of service tax etc. 
Acicordingly, the tax rates were significantly rationalized and progressively brought 
down to the levels comparable to some of the developed economies. The key tax 
relbrms have been: 
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i. Lowering of the maximum marginal personal income tax rate from 60 percent 
in 1980-81 to the present level of 33 percent (inclusive of 10 percent surcharge 
on aimual income of above Rs. 8.5 lakhs, announced in the Union Budget 
2003-04); 
ii. Widening of the tax base by way of a series of steps including introduction of 
presumptive taxes, adoption of a set of six economic criteria for identification 
of potential tax payers in urban areas and taxation of services; 
iii. Reducing the corporate tax rate on both domestic and foreign companies to the 
current level of 35 percent and 40 percent, respectively, from a level of 65 
percent and 70 percent in 1980-81; 
iv. Unification of tax rates on closely held as well as widely held domestic 
companies; 
v. Rationalization of capital gains tax and dividend tax; 
vi. Progressive reduction in the peak rate of customs duty on non-agricultural 
products from a level of more than 300 percent during the period just prior to 
reforms to the level of 25 percent as announced in the Union Budget 2003-04; 
and 
vii. Reduction of 11 major ad-valorem excise duties to three viz., central rate of 16 
percent, merit rate of 8 percent and demerit rate of 24 percent in year 1999-
2000, introduction of a uniform 16 percent CENVAT effective from 2000-01, 
while retaining special excise duties on specified goods and in Union Budget 
2003-04 rationalization of excise rate structure by proposing a 3-tier structure 
of 8 percent, 16 percent and 24 percent which are, however, not applicable to 
goods attracting specific duty rates. 
In the area of direct taxes, the budget for 2005-06 carried forward the process 
initiated in the previous budget. In personal income tax, the tax rates were revised for 
various tax brackets conferring gain to all taxpayers through higher exemption limits 
and scaling up, even as standard deduction was withdrawn. In another significant 
move, neutrality of taxes between various forms of savings was achieved through a 
general rebate on savings in any approved instrument up to Rs.l lakh. Budget of 2005-
06 introduced two new taxes: a fringe benefit tax targeted at those benefits enjoyed 
collectively by the employees and not attributable to individual employees, which were 
to be taxed in the hands of employer; and a tax on banking cash transactions 
(withdrawals) over a certain threshold in a single day. Taking a leaf out of the 
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international best practices, corporate income tax was reduced to 30 percent, albeit 
with a higher surcharge of 10 percent and reduced depreciation allowance that was a 
better approximation to the replacement life-value. Further, the withholding tax on 
technical services was reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent. To facilitate large 
taxpayers, new large taxpayer units (LTUs), providing single window service, were 
proposed to be estimated. Adhering to the pre-announced commitment to align 
customs duties to ASEAN levels, budget of 2005-06 reduced peak customs duty on 
non-agricultural products to 15 percent with steeper reductions for capital goods and 
raw materials and corrections for inverted duty structures. 
The Union Budget of 2006-07 kept the tax rates moderate and stable, and no 
chanjge in the rates of personal income tax or corporate income tax was proposed. 
Similarly, no new taxes were imposed. There were, however, some marginal revisions 
in certain tax rates. The rate under minimum alternate tax (MAT) was increased from 
7.5 percent of book profits to 10 percent. Long-term capital gains arising out of 
securities and subject to securities transaction tax (STT) were also included in 
calculating book profits. MAT-paying companies were allowed the credit for MAT 
over seven years instead of the five years allowed earlier. Adjustment of MAT credit 
was also allowed while calculating interest liability. As regards indirect taxes, the 
objective of bringing about a moderate, rational and simplified tax structure and to 
align it with ASEAN levels was further by reducing the peak rate of customs duty on 
non-agricultural products from 15 percent to 12.5 percent with a few exceptions. 
In the budget of 2007-08, the peak rate of custom duty on non-agricultural 
product was reduced from 12.5 percent to 10 percent, with few exceptions. In the case 
of excise duties, the following important changes were announced: 
• To improve competitiveness of the small scale sector, the exemption limit for 
SSI sector was raised from Rs 1 crore to Rs 1.5 crore; and 
• Ad valorem component of excise duty on petrol and high speed diesel was 
reduced from 8 percent to 6 percent. 
The number of services liable for taxation was raised from 3 in 1994-95 to 6 in 
1996-97, and then gradually to 100 in 2007-08. In the 2007-08 budget, certain services 
were specified as taxable services, scope of some of the specified taxable services was 
changed, threshold limit for small service providers was increased and certain 
exemptions were announced. Continuing the policy of lower import tariff, the Finance 
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Minister in his 2008-09 budget speecli announced reduction in import duty on project 
impor: from 7.5 percent to 5 percent. After successive downward revisions, the peak 
rate of import duty on non-agricultural products stands at 10 percent. Domestic 
companies and firms pay 30 percent and foreign companies 40 percent tax on their 
profits. 
Tax reforms are generally supposed to raise the tax revenue to GDP ratio across 
countries. Normally tax revenue is expected to rise in response to a reduction of tax 
rate from some higher level. The concern with tax rationalization has been reflected in 
the a]3pointment of a nimiber of committees to review the tax system in the last few 
years. The Advisory Group on Tax Policy and Tax Administration for the Tenth Plan, 
2001 recommended deletion of a number of exemptions and deductions which have 
become redundant and are not in harmony with a modem tax regime. Similarly, the 
Expert Committee to Review the System of Administrative Interest Rates and Other 
Related Issues, 2001 recommended the withdrawal of tax concessions available on 
small savings. Furthermore, the Task Force on Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes, 2002 
has reiterated the need to withdraw exemptions and concessions to widen the tax base. 
An assessment of tax reform measures in India has shown significant improvement 
(compared to pre-reform status) in tax structure in terms of 'economic neutrality', 
equity, revenue predictability (actual/budget ratio), administrative effectiveness etc. 
but (ieterioration in revenue adequacy (tax buoyancy) and revenue stability. 
B. Expenditure Reforms: 
Fiscal policy sets growth, stability and equity as the goals where public 
expenditure management is one of the main operating instruments in pursuing these 
goals. In this pursuit, public expenditure management plans to achieve intermediate 
targets set for overall expenditure control, strategic resource allocation as per the 
policy priorities and efficient, effective and responsive operational management of 
expenditure. It is the expenditure policy which, in the ultimate sense is responsible for 
the success or failure of the whole fiscal policy stance. Expenditure management 
through appropriate prioritization and control is important for any government. The 
tension between containing the deficit and providing adequate outlays for the relevant 
heads makes expenditure prioritization an even more important issue in India than 
what it is in many other countries. There is need for more schools, hospitals, roads. 
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hydroelectric and multipurpose irrigation projects, etc, on the other hand, and sticking 
to fiscal prudence on the other. 
During recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the roles of 
expenditures and expenditure management in fiscal adjustment and in the pursuit fiscal 
policies over the medium term. There is also recognition that a prerequisite to the 
pursuit of sustainable fiscal policies, the quality of expenditure needs to be improved 
(EPW Research Foundation., 2001)'^. Expenditure management, in its broad 
perspective includes three major elements: 
i. Resource allocation; 
ii. Resource utilization; and 
iii. Resource utilizing accounting. 
Expenditure policy is a by product both in intent and outcome, of the working 
of these three inter-related phases. Expenditure policies aim at dealing both with the 
above mentioned structural issues, as well as with the immediate concerns that are 
addressed as a part of the overall annual budgetary policy (Mathur, B.P.,1999) . Some 
of the major expenditure reduction/management policies undertaken during the 1990s 
after the initiation of the economic reform by the Central Government were in the 
foll(3wing manner. Immediately after the balance of payments crises, the stabilization 
package was adopted in 1991 to restore fiscal discipline. The successful reduction in 
fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP during 1991-92 could be attributable to: 
• The decision to abolish the export subsidies; 
• To increase the fertilizer prices; and 
• Steps taken to keep non-plan expenditure (including defence expenditure) in 
check. 
The expenditure reform to be as important as tax reform though the focus of 
expienditure reform was rather limited. It remained confined to "a continuous 
monitoring of performance" of welfare expenditures administered by states with the 
objective of bringing about significant improvements in cost-effectiveness. During 
1992-93 several other measures were also adopted. They are as follows: 
• The budgetary support of the central plan was maintained at the nominal level 
of the previous year budget estimate; 
• Non-plan revenue expenditures were controlled; 
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• The decontrol of phosphatic and potassic fertilizers checked the expenditure on 
fertilizer subsidies; 
• As a part of expenditure control strategy and in order to regulate the level of 
borrowing from RBI, fiscal deficit, ceiling were prescribed for the quarters 
ending June, September, and December 1992; and 
• The existing expenditure control mechanisms were strengthened. 
During 1994-95 steps were also taken to control the growth of expenditure. They 
are as follows: 
• Reduction of posts at various levels; and 
• Cut in the overall expenditure on consumption of petrol/diesel, on telephone, 
restricting the purchase of vehicles. 
It was recognized that further steps needed to be taken for more effective 
financing through user charges. The first major discussion on expenditure reduction 
and its management began in 1997-98 with the release of a Discussion Paper on 
SulDsidies by the Government of India entitled "Government Subsidies in India" to 
generate debate and initiate a more open approach to subsidies. Another important step 
tov/ards fiscal discipline was taken when the financing of the budgetary deficit through 
the ad-hoc treasury bills was discontinued. The Union Budget for 1999-2000 
recognized the importance of adoption of a medium term fiscal correction target of 
eliminating revenue deficit and bringing down fiscal deficit to 2 percent of GDP in 
four years. It was announced that an Expenditure Reform Commission was to be set up 
to examine the entire gamut of expenditure in an imbiased way, free of any 
de])artmental interests. To promote transparency and curb the grov^h of contingent 
lialDilities, the budget constituted Guarantee Redemption Fund, with an initial corpus of 
Rs„50 crores and later the State Governments were also encouraged to set up similar 
funds. The Union Budget for 2000-01 proposed a number of a policy measures with 
the objective of checking the momentum of built in expenditure growth owing to the 
large proportion of precommitted expenditure in total expenditure: 
• Subjecting all norms for creation of post and fresh recruitment in Government 
budgeting; 
• Redeployment of surplus staff and making Voluntary Retirement Scheme 
(VRS) more effective; 
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• All subsidies to be reviewed in line with the cost- based user charges wherever 
feasible; and 
• Budgetary support to autonomous institutions and encouragement to PSUs 
would be reviewed and they will be encouraged to generate internal resources. 
During the course of the year, the Government took a series of measures for 
controlling growth in non-plan non-developmental expenditure. Expenditure 
mzinagement, broadly speaking, featured as one of the major objectives of the 
Government in the Union Budget 2001-02. The objectives as stated in the Budget 
sp(;ech, mainly referred to three aspects- stringent expenditure control of non-
productive expenditure, rationalization of subsidies and improvement in the quality of 
the; expenditure. Further, as an institutional arrangement, the Government constituted 
an Expenditure Reform Commission (ERC) to look into various areas of expenditure 
coiTection. Areas identified by the ERC include, inter alia, creation of a national food 
security buffer stock and minimization of cost of buffer stock operations and 
rationalization of fertilizer subsidies through dismantling of controls in a phased 
mamner. It also included optimizing Government staff strength by a ban on the creation 
of new posts for two years, introduction of voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) and 
redeployment of surplus staff in various Government departments and autonomous 
institutions, to which the Government provides budgetary support through grants. With 
a \iew to promoting transparency and curbing the growth of contingent Government 
lialjilities, a Guarantee Redemption Fund has been set up as a part of expenditure 
management strategy. Steps undertaken in the light of above proposals included: 
i. Dismantling of the administered price mechanism (APM) in the petroleum 
sector and the Oil Pool Account effective from April 2002; 
ii. Restriction on fresh recruitments to 1 percent of the total civilian staff strength 
over the 4 years beginning fiscal 2002-03; and 
iii. Introduction of a new pension scheme of defined contribution for new recruits 
in the Budget of 2003-04. 
To carry the process of reducing the growth in non-developmental expenditure, 
the Government set up an Expenditure Reforms Commission in February, 2000. The 
main terms of reference for the Commission are as follow: 
i. To suggest a road map for reducing the functions, activities and administrative 
structure of the Central Government; 
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ii. To review the framework of all subsidies, both explicit and implicit, examine 
the economic rationale for their continuance and make recommendations for 
making subsidies transparent and suggest measures for maximizing their 
impact on the target population and minimize cost; 
iii. To review the framework for determination of user charges of departmental and 
commercial activities: suggest an effective strategy for cost recovery; 
iv. To review the adequacy of staffing under Central Government Ministries, 
attached offices etc; 
V. To review the procedure for setting up of Government funded autonomous 
institutions and their pattern of funding and suggest measures for effecting 
improvement and reducing budgetary support to their activities; and 
vi. To consider any other relevant issue concerning expenditure management in 
government and make suitable recommendation. 
Expenditure reforms in the context of liberalization have two aspects: 
i. Consideration so as to reduce the quantum of expenditure; and 
ii. Restructuring with a view to changing the composition of Government 
expenditure, i.e. shift towards growth-inducing expenditure on infrastructure 
and human resource development and reduction in unwarranted subsidies 
(Prasad, C.S., 2007)^'. 
C. Restructuring of the Public Sector Undertakings: 
The state dominated heavy industries based on Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy of 
projected industrialization which India has pursued since the mid-fifties, required not 
onJy a high rate of domestic savings and investment but also a large share for the 
puljlic sector in total investment. However, the public sector's own savings 
performance has been quite disappointing. Though public sector savings have been 
less than public investment throughout the planning period, this gap widened 
considerably during the 1980s. The share of public sector in gross domestic savings 
declined from over 20 percent at the beginning of the decade to only 8 percent by 
1989-90. In plan financing, while the Sixth Plan (1980-81 to 1984-85) envisaged that 
ov<;r 46 percent of the public sector plan outlay would be financed by own resources of 
the public sector, the actual contribution turned out to be only 37 percent. Similarly, 
during the Seventh Plan (1985-86 to 1989-90) only 27 percent of the public sector plan 
outlay was financed from own resources as against a target of over 41 percent. There 
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were 246 Central Government public enterprises as on March 31, 1991, out of which 
236 enterprises were in operation. These 236 enterprises yielded a net profit of Rs. 
2368 crores in 1990-91, implying a rate of return of only 2.3 percent on Rs. 101, 797 
crores capital employed. Of this, only 69 crores came from all the non-oil public 
enterprises put together. The record of the State level enterprises is worse. The 
departmental commercial undertakings of all States and Union Territories together 
reported a net loss of Rs. 1885 crores in 1990-91. Of the two major types of non-
departmental undertakings, the State Electricity Boards reported a combined loss of 
Rs. 4169 crores while the State Road Transport Corporation reported a loss of Rs. 470 
crores. Thus, instead of generating a surplus, all public enterprises put together 
generated a net loss of some Rs. 4176 crores. Pervasive inefficiencies and poor 
financial performance in PSEs have remained a major obstacle to industrial 
de '^elopment and international competitiveness. Inefficiency and lack of dynamism 
ha '^e resulted from cost-plus pricing and distribution controls. Many public sector 
enterprises have been de facto monopolies, protected from competition. A soft budget 
constraint-easy access to budget funds and/or credit from the financial sector- has 
allowed sick PSEs to survive. Ambiguous relationships with Government supervisory 
authorities were not conducive to efficiency. These enterprises have also been 
constrained by multiple objectives, lack of managerial autonomy and overstaffing 
pressures in relation to operational needs. They have constituted a serious drain on 
Government resources. Reformists argue for a far more concrete exit policy and for 
refarms to be undertaken at the State level where public enterprises are even less 
efficient and less profitable than at the national level, and where the effect on limited 
resources is more serious. The reforms aim to increase efficiency and reduce the losses 
that so many public enterprises impose on the Government budget. It is recognized that 
the budget should not support sick enterprises but it should not even provide the funds 
for their expansion. Rather, these should come from their own funds or from the 
capital market. 
The 20 December 1991 speech by the Prime Minister elaborated policy on the 
public sector following the July 1991 new industrial policy. The demand for reform of 
public sector enterprises seems to be more on pragmatic than ideological grounds. As 
the economic environment is being made more conducive to cost and quality 
considerations and attempts are being made to foster competition, pressures on 
performance orientation in the public sector are also mounting. The policy response in 
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the form of public sector reforms by the Central Government, however, has been slow. 
Under structural reforms the Government has decided to give greater managerial 
autonomy to public enterprises to enable them to work efficiently. In addition to this, 
two other key elements of the Government's strategy for public enterprise reform are 
the; promotion of increased private sector competition in areas where social 
considerations are not paramount and partial disinvestment of equity in selected 
enterprises. 
During the reform period, there has been a distinct change in the public 
perception in favour of reducing the size of public sector and improving private 
participation. With these imderlying objectives, a two-pronged strategy was adopted by 
the: Central Government- reduction in budgetary support to the PSUs, and privatization 
of existing PSUs. Public sector restructuring had two -fold objectives- to provide fiscal 
support to the Government in terms of additional resources and to improve the 
efficiency of these enterprises. Given the need to expand activities such as educational, 
health and medicine, it was envisaged that substantial additional resources could be 
generated through a programmed disinvestment of some PSUs. With disinvestment, 
private shareholders are expected to enhance discipline by their monitoring. Managers, 
who act as agent of the shareholders, are forced to act in their interests by increasing 
the value of the firm. This would transform the PSUs on more efficient lines. The 
strategy towards public sector enterprises reform encompasses a judicious mix of 
str(;ngthening strategic units, privatizing non- strategic ones through gradual 
disinvestment or strategic sale and devising viable rehabilitation strategies for weak 
units. The latest policy announced in the budget speech 2000-01 by the Finance 
Minister had the following as main elements: 
i. Restructure and revive potentially viable PSUs; 
ii. Close down PSUs which cannot be revived; 
iii. Bring down Government equity in all non-strategic PSUs to 26 percent or 
lower, if necessary; and Fully protect the interest of workers. 
During the last two years, financial restructuring of 20 PSUs has been 
approved by the Government. As a resuh, many PSUs have been able to restructure 
their operations, improve productivity and achieve a turnaround in performance. Even 
so, a large number of procedural as well as policy issues continue to constrain the 
progress on disinvestment process. In the area of PSEs following steps were taken by 
the Government: 
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(I) The system of monitoring has been strengthened with Memorandum of 
Undertakings (MOUs). The MOUs are being claimed in official circles as 
major instruments of the rollback of State involvement in the running of the 
public enterprises by citing statistic such as the following: During 1990-91, 23 
public enterprises signed MOUs with their administrative ministries, of which 
14 were evaluated as excellent, 8 as good and 1 as poor. In 1991-92, 71 
enterprises signed MOUs while in 1992-93, 120 enterprises were identified for 
this purpose (Mookherji,Dilip.,1993) . A major objective assessment of the 
situation, therefore, calls for a cleaner break with the old traditional culture of 
running the PSEs through back seat driving. The experience with the MOUs in 
the past has not been very positive. A change of attitude in the new era of 
liberalization may lead to some improvement in the results in the years to 
come, but much more is needed than MOUs to distance the Government from 
the actual running of the PSEs. 
(II) Moving from sale of equity to the surpluses and deficits of PSEs, according to 
the economic survey, 2000, the ratio of pre-tax profit to capital employed of 
central public sector undertakings rose from an average of 3.5 percent during 
1990-93 to 8.0 percent during 1995-98. This aggregate profitability measures is 
misleading, since the enterprises whose profits are aggregated included State 
oil and petroleum monopolies. In addition, at least for those enterprises that are 
competing with private enterprises, their post-tax return has to be compared 
with similar returns for their private counterparts. Be that as it may, if we 
measure PSE performance by the deficit in their plan expenditure (mainly on 
investment) relative to their net internal resources, the deficit of the Central 
Government PSEs (CPSEs) as a ratio of GDP has halved from 3.0 percent in 
1990-91 to a budget estimate of 1.5 percent in 1999-2000. The factors 
contributing to the decline are the fall in PSEs investment from 4.8 percent of 
GDP in 1990-91 to 3.4 percent in 1999-2000 and the growing importance of 
petroleum and telecom enterprises, which now account for nearly half the 
investment and generate more than two-thirds of the net internal resources of 
CPSEs. In other words, government support (through loans and financing of 
losses) of CPSE has declined sharply as a proportion of GDP. 
(III) The programme of divestment in PSUs had slippages due to pricing problems 
and sluggishness of the capital market in the late 1990s. Targets set for 
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divestments could not be achieved in most of the years (barring 1991-92, 1994-
95 and 1998-99) during the decade of the 1990s. Since 1991-92, Government 
equity has been divested in 48 units and strategies sale was undertaken in 
another 16 units. Of the total amount of Rs.78, 300 crores could targeted be 
mobilized through divestments/strategies sale, Rs. 30, 917 crores could be 
realized up to March 31, 2002. Initially the Government (with the exception of 
Modem Foods) sold only minority stakes in different PSUs. However, since 
2000, the Government began strategies sales as these were judged to be 
revenue enhancing and signaled commitment to enhanced efficiency that 
transfer of management could bring about. To establish a systematic policy 
approach to disinvestments and privatization and give fresh impetus to 
strategies sale of identified PSUs, the Government has established a new 
department for disinvestment. During its existence, the disinvestment 
commission issued eleven reports containing recommendations on fifty-eight of 
the sixty-four PSEs referred to it. The recommendations in only thirteen cases 
were or are being implemented. The "Disinvestment Fund", set up in 1996 on 
the advice of the commission to use the sale of proceeds for restructuring PSEs 
and to finance voluntary retirements of excess staff, is not yet operational. 
(IV) Some steps have been taken towards the marketisation of the PSEs. An 
important aspect of marketisation is corporatization. A major example of 
corporatization can be seen in the telecommunications sector. A beginning was 
made in the 1986 by setting up a new corporate entity, i.e. the Mahanagar 
Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL). The company made a profit of Rsl.4 billion in 
the very first year of its operation. This has now raised expectation. 
The loss making sick PSEs have been brought under the ambit of Board 
for Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR) which was already with the 
sick private sector units. The economic survey of 1998-99 reported that 
between its inception in May 1987 and the end of November 1998, BIFR 
received 3441 references, of which 2404 were registered and 452 were 
dismissed as non-maintainable under the Sick Industries Company Act of 1985. 
It recommended winding up of 606 and rehabilitating another 637 and declared 
214 as no longer sick. Out of the 225 PSEs that were referred, it registered 157, 
recommended closing down 29 and rehabilitating 50, and declared 6 to be no 
longer sick. The Government policy of marginal disinvestment of the equity of 
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public sector enterprises has been dominantly governed by the compulsions of 
financing the fiscal deficits. The whole disinvestment approach is so 
incremental and so thinly spread that it fails to address the basic issue of how to 
improve the very low returns on the capital invested in the public sector. Not 
much has been done to bring about effective changes in the functioning of these 
enterprises. The approach of disinvestment is based on the assumption that the 
induction of private shareholders will alter the corporate culture in these 
enterprises and provide them a stronger commercial orientation in response to 
normal shareholder expectations. This is a tall assumption indeed. 
The 1991-92 Budget earmarked $67 million for the National Renewal 
Fund (NRF). The International Development Agency promised over $166 
million during 1992-93 and the same amount in 1993-94. The NRF is expected 
to provide assistance to firm's undertakings modernization and technological 
upgrading of existing capacities to cover the costs of retraining and 
redeployment of employees. The fund would also provide compensation to 
employees affected by restructuring or closure of industrial units in both the 
private and public sectors. A social safety net would be provided for workers 
through allocating funds to finance employment generation schemes in the 
organized and unorganized sectors. The willingness of the Government to form 
strategic alliances has been demonstrated in the case of Maruti Udyog Ltd. an 
automobile joint venture with Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan. This unit 
was originally set up in the early 1980s with Suzuki having a 40 percent stake 
and the Government of India the remaining 60 percent. Later, as part of the 
policy of encouraging foreign investors to increase their shareholding, Suzuki 
was allowed to increase its share holding to 50 percent by purchase of fresh 
equity and also to acquire greater management control. 
(V) The disinvestment programme made some progress during 2001-02 with the 
strategic sale process of some public sector undertakings gaining momentum; 
nevertheless the actual proceeds were lower than the targeted amount. In 2002-
03, the disinvestment process remained below expectations. A major challenge 
facing the programme of public sector restructuring has been the closing down 
of persistently loss making and non-viable public sector undertakings (PSUs) 
so that the profitability of the other public enterprises could be a major source 
of resources generation to provide budgetary support. The stage is set for 
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reforms in the PSUs by restructuring of potentially viable PSUs and improving 
the profitability and efficiency of the viable units. Priorities in reforms include 
raising return on investments in PSUs and infusing professionalisation in 
management. 
On the whole the reforms of PSUs including privatization and phasing out of 
unviable units have not gathered as much momentum as had been hoped for. 
Disinvestment has been piecemeal and the funds so raised are being used to reduce 
budget deficits, rather than strengthening the PSUs. As Bimal Jalan points out: ' the 
sale of public sector enterprises would be of little help unless macroeconomic 
environment is improved and it is quite probable that if macroeconomic stabilization is 
successful, disinvestment of equity in public sector enterprises may not be 
necessary'(Jalan, Bimal.,1991)^ .^ 
D. Fiscal-Monetary Coordination: 
Fiscal policy and monetary policy are the two arms of macroeconomic policy, 
aimed at growth, equity and macroeconomic stability. While fiscal and monetary 
policies have common objectives, the instruments used differ. Fiscal policy resets upon 
instruments such as government expenditure, taxes and borrowing. Monetary policy 
influences the level of economic activity through actions that impinge on the cost of 
funds and the availability of overall liquidity in the system. Effective macroeconomic 
mimagement presupposes a well-knit and coordinated fiscal and monetary policy 
enviroimient, since fiscal policy continues to have a close bearing on the conduct of 
monetary policy. A high fiscal deficit impedes the effective use of monetary policy 
insitruments. The growing fiscal deficit during the pre-reform period was increasingly 
financed through the pre-emption of institutional resources at sub-market rates by 
progressive increase in SLR and monetization by the Reserve Bank. These 
developments eventually resulted in crowding out of private investment, growing 
financial repression and imposed constraints on the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, 
the efforts towards better monetary-fiscal coordination were aimed at elimination of 
automatic monetization by the Reserve Bank and movement away from financial 
repression through the reduction in statutory pre-emption of banks and long-term 
resources to allow a level-playing field to private investors. During the 1990s, the 
Reserve Bank undertook a series of steps towards deepening and widening the 
Government securities market. Some of the major steps in this direction included 
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aligning of coupon rates on Government securities with market interest rates, 
introduction of an auction system, introduction of primary dealers and setting up of 
E>elivery versus Payment (DvP) system. Furthermore, following the 'Supplemental 
i^.greement' between the Government of India and Reserve Bank in September 1994, 
the abolition of ad hoc treasury bills was made effective from April 1997, thereby 
n;placing the automatic monetization of deficit by a system of ways and means 
advances (WMA) to meet only the temporary mismatches in cash flows of the Central 
Grovemment. Concomitant to these measures, statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was 
reduced to 25 percent by 1997 and cash reserve ratio (CRR) was reduced in phases to 
4,75 percent by November 2002. These measures resulted in the emergence of an 
active, wide and deep Government securities market and paved the way for complete 
elimination of automatic monetization and substantial lowering of statutory pre-
einption of institutional resources by the Government. These developments were also 
reflected in the structural changes in the financing pattern of fiscal deficit during the 
reform period-with a marked shift towards market borrowings. Accordingly, the share 
of market borrowings, which constituted 26.9 percent of gross fiscal deficit (GFD) in 
the 1980s rose sharply to 59.1 percent in the latter half of the 1990s and financed about 
70 percent of the GFD by 2001-02. On the other hand, ad hoc treasury bills which 
financed a sizeable proportion of GFD, both in the 1980s and in the 1990s up to 1996-
97, no longer exist as a financing item with their replacement by WMA in 1997-98. 
Similarly, the share of external finance which was around 10 percent in the 1980s also 
cEime down sharply to an average of 2.9 percent during 1997-98 to 2001-02. The share 
oj' other liabilities has been relatively stable and averaged around 40.0 percent, both, in 
the 1980s as well as in the 1990s. In case of State Governments, the fiscal gap is 
financed by way of loans from the Centre, small savings and market borrowings. Like 
the Central Government, the share of market borrowings in financing GFD of States 
hcis steadily increased. The financing pattern of the GFD indicates that, on an average, 
the share of loans from the Centre and small savings declined from 51.9 percent and 
37.1 percent, respectively, in the 1980s to 47.5 percent and 36.6 percent, respectively, 
during the 1990s. The share of market borrowings arose from 11.0 percent to 15.8 
percent between these two periods. The growing reliance on market borrowing for 
financing the fiscal deficit has been accompanied by restraint to reserve money growth 
and moderation of inflationary pressure. This has also had the effect of raising interest 
payments. In order for the strategy to finance fiscal deficit through borrowings at 
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market related rates to have a favorable macroeconomic impact, some discipline on 
gro^ vth of the fiscal deficit is necessary. In addition to borrowings to finance fiscal 
deficit, Governments, both at the Centre and State levels, also avail WMA from the 
Reserve Bank to bridge short-term mismatches in revenue and expenditure. 
E. Institutional Measures: 
As an institutional mechanism to promote the conduct of prudent and 
accountable fiscal policy, the Central Government introduced in the Lok Sabha in 
December 2000 the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill (FRBM), 
2000. Emphasizing the importance of the Bill, the Economic Survey, 2000-01 
observed, "The introduction of FRBM, 2000 in Lok Sabha in December, 2000 is a 
historic step in our fiscal history. It shifts the emphasis of fiscal management from a 
purely short term perspective to a longer time horizon for conduct of prudent and 
accountable fiscal policy. Introduction of rule based budget management practices will 
also enable the economic agents and the community at large to take informed 
decisions. Besides, its enactment is likely to be seen as a demonstration of our 
country's resolve to maintaining macro-economic stability. Placing limits on the 
Central Government borrowings, debt and deficits and emphasizing greater 
transparency in fiscal operations would also greatly facilitate effective conduct of 
monetary policy". The Bill provided for a legal and institutional framework to: 
i. eliminate revenue deficit 
ii. bring down fiscal deficit; 
iii. contain the growth of public debt; and 
iv. stabilize debt as a proportion of GDP within time frame. 
The Bill, covering only the finances of the Central Government, defined the 
principles of fiscal responsibility in terms of budgetary deficit. Government 
borrowings and public debt. The Bill stresses on inter-generafional equity in fiscal 
management and long-term macroeconomic stability. The original Bill introduced in 
the Parliament (17 December 2000) had envisaged a complete elimination of revenue 
deificit and reduction of the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio to 2 percent by the Central 
Government by end-March 2006. The Bill also envisaged a reduction in total liabilifies 
of the Centre to not more than 50 percent of GDP by March, 2011.Under borrowing-
related norms, the Bill proposed to prohibit certain types of borrowings from RBI. 
Similarly, under debt-related norms, it proposed to prescribe a limit on the debt stock. 
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Thus, the Bill envisaged that within a period of 10 financial years, the total liabilities 
(including external debt at current exchange rate) would not exceed 50 percent of the 
estimated GDP. The Bill was referred to Parliament's Standing Committee on Finance 
(November 2001) which watered down the proposals of the original Bill and suggested 
doing away with numerical ceilings and a time frame for achieving the targets of 
revenue and fiscal deficit. Based on the Parliamentary Committee's recommendations, 
a Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act was passed in August 2003. The 
Act stipulates that, 'Government shall take appropriate measures to reduce fiscal 
deficit and revenue deficit so as to eliminate revenue deficit by 31 March 2008,' and, 
'Government shall by rules specify, annual targets for reduction of fiscal and revenue 
deficit.' Subsequently, through an amendment the target date for elimination of 
revenue deficit has been shifted to 2008-09. At the time of the presentation of the 
budget for 2004-05 in the Parliament, the Finance Minister laid down the targets for 
the reduction of revenue deficit, fiscal deficit and outstanding liabilities for three years. 
Statements as required under FRBM Act presented with the budget of 2005-06 shows 
that none of the targets for 2004-05 have been met. While the target for 2004-05 for 
revenue deficit as percentage of GDP was 2.5 percent and fiscal deficit was 4.4 
percent, it ended up with 2.7 percent and 4.5 percent respectively. For 2005-06, the 
targets of revenue deficit of 1.8 percent and fiscal deficit of 4 percent have been scaled 
up to 2.7 percent and 4.3 percent respectively. The Finance Minister has advanced the 
argument that the Twelfth Finance Commission award has been largely responsible for 
not meeting the deficit reduction targets. It appears that the objective of fiscal prudence 
as envisaged in the FRBM Act is not going to be met. Highlighting the importance of 
FRBMA, the Economic Survey, 2006-07 noted, "FRBMA is an important institutional 
expression to ensure fiscal prudence and support for macroeconomic balance. With the 
enactment of the FRBMA, the traditional annual budgeting moved to a more 
meaningful medium-term fiscal planning framework. According to the rules, revenue 
deficit is to be reduced by an amount equivalent to half percent or more of the 
estimated GDP at the end of each financial year and eliminated by March 31, 2009. 
Fiscal deficit is to be reduced by an amount equivalent to 0.3 percent or more of the 
estimated GDP at the end of more financial year and reduced to no more than 3 percent 
of the estimated GDP by the financial year ending on March 31,2009". The Indian 
Government's lackadaisical approach to the FRBM Act, enacted after great dithering, 
typically reflects characterisfics of a soft as described by Gunnar Myrdal (1968). The 
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Go^'emment needs to take hard decision in the interest of the long-term fiscal health of 
the economy. One time tested rule of fiscal finance is that no borrowing should be 
rescirted to for current consumption and all borrowings should be for investment and 
capital projects only. The Parliament should legislate to this effect to keep a check on 
an extravagant Executive (Mathur,B- P.,2005) . 
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CHAPTER-4 
TAX AND EXPENDITURE 
REFORMS 
TAX AND EXPENDITURE REFORMS 
4.1 Tax Reforms in India: 
Tax policy in India has evolved as an important component of fiscal policy that 
played a central role in the planned development strategy. In particular, tax policy was 
the principal instrument for transferring private savings to public consumption and 
investment (Bagchi & Stem, 1994)'. Tax policy was also used to encourage savings 
and investments, reduced inequalities of income and wealth, foster balanced regional 
development, encourage small-scale industries on the assumption that they are 
employment intensive, and influence the volume and direction of economic activities 
in the country. 
The evolution of tax policy within the framework of an industrialization 
strategy based on the public sector, heavy industry, and import substitution has had 
several implications. First, tax policy was directed to raise resources for the large and 
increasing requirements of public consumption and investment irrespective of the 
efficiency implications it entailed. Second, the objective of achieving a socialistic 
pattern of society, combined with the large oligopolistic rents generated by the system 
of licences, quotas, and restrictions, necessitated steeply progressive tax structure in 
both direct and indirect taxes. Third, the pursuit of a multiplicity of objectives 
enormously complicated the tax system with adverse consequences on efficiency and 
horizontal equity. It also opened- up large avenues for evasion and avoidance of taxes. 
The disregard for efficiency considerations was a part of the import substituting 
industrialization strategy. Fourth, not only did all of this require differentiation in tax 
rates based on arbitrary criteria, but plan priorities also legitimized selectivity and 
discretion in tax policy and administration. Once selectivity and discretion were 
accepted as legitimate, it mattered little whether these were exercised as intended. This 
provided enough scope for the special interest groups to influence tax policy and 
administration. Fifth, the influence of special interest groups, changing priorities, and 
the lack of an information system and scientific analysis led to ad hoc and often, 
inconsistent calibration of policies. Finally, the poor information system was the cause 
of selective application of the tax system as well as its effect (Rao, M.G. & Rao, R.K, 
2006)^ 
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Taxation in the developing countries traditionally has two objectives. The first 
aim provides the tax concessions and incentives to stimulate private enterprises. The 
second purpose is the mobilization of resources to finance public expenditure. The 
political and economic ideology of the developing countries and its socio-economic 
progress depends largely on its government's ability to generate sufficient revenues to 
spend on essential and basic public services_ health, education, transportation, 
communication and components of the economic and social infrastructure. Most of the 
governments in the developing countries are directly involved in economic activities 
through their ownership, control of public corporations and state trading corporations. 
Tax levies on public corporations and private individuals to enable the Government to 
finance the capital and recurrent expenditure. In recent years the problems of fiscal 
deficit and public expenditure are rising greatly in excess of public revenue, resulting 
from a development programmes, external shocks, debt burdens, falling inflation, 
growing trade balance and declining investment rate. Consequently cutting 
Government expenditure mostly on social services and raising revenue through 
efficient tax collection for developmental activities of the nation. Development of 
social services is also important to achieve higher productivity. 
Reforming the tax system is critical to achieve fiscal consolidation, minimize 
distortions in the economy and to create stable and predictable market environment for 
the markets to function. Not surprisingly, the wave of tax reforms across the world that 
began in the mid 1980s accelerated in the 1990s motivated by a number of factors. Tax 
reforms and movements in tax rates in India validate the Laffer curve relationship 
between tax rate and tax collections particularly in the current decade. The tax 
si:ructure evolved in the event of large resource requirement during the initial decades 
after independence was characterized by multiplicity of tax rates which were increased 
tC' very high levels across all the taxes. Analysts viewed such a tax structure as a 
hindrance in achieving the full potential of the economy. The need for large scale tax 
reforms became increasingly imperative during the 1980s which is considered to be the 
decade of tax reforms. 
Indian tax reforms have passed through five phases since independence: 
• First Phase: The first phase witnessed tax reforms based on the 
recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Commission 1954. 
119 
• Second Phase: The second phase was guided by the Nicholas Kaldor's 
recommendations of 1957. 
• Third Phase: The third phase was ushered in by the recommendations of the 
Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee of 1971, (Wanchoo Committee). 
• Fourth Phase: The fourth phase started with the new economic policy of 
V.P.Singh through the Union Budget for 1985-86, and 
• Fifth Phase: The most important phase of tax reforms was introduced during 
the 1990s based on the recommendations of the Tax Reforms Committee, 
1991-93 (Chelliah Committee) (Thimmaiah,G., 2002)1 
Tax reforms are undertaken by governments to mobilize more revenue in 
the long run. Even in the short run, governments expect revenue neutrality from tax 
reforms. Indian tax reforms were mainly guided by these revenue considerations all 
through the five phases of tax reforms. But during the first two phases though the 
Gcivemment of India experienced a sudden increase in the revenue from both direct 
and indirect taxes, after a few years the revenue yield from direct taxes started losing 
its buoyancy. So the third phase of tax reforms was intended to increase the revenue 
buoyancy by reducing the marginal tax-rates of direct taxes. This started showing 
positive results. The fourth phase continued the tax rate cut measures which did not 
show consistently positive results. Even the fifth phase of tax reforms is not showing 
consistently encouraging results in terms of their revenue impact. 
If the mid-1980s saw the launch of modem tax reform in India, the 1990s 
witnessed its fruition. Shortly after coming to power in mid-1991, the Narasimha 
Rao/Manmohan Singh Congress Government made comprehensive tax reforms as one 
of its main reform planks. The Tax Reforms Committee (TRC), chaired by the 
country's leading public finance authority, Raja.J.Chelliah, was swiftly established and 
it quickly gave an Interim Report (December 1991), followed by a two-part Final 
Report (August 1992 and January 1993). Taken together, these three volumes of the 
Chelliah Committee Report constitute the finest treatment of tax policy and reform 
issues in India in the past Thirty years. The Report provided an excellent combination 
of lucid, theoretical analysis, empirical supporting evidence and practical policy 
recommendations. The broad approach of the Committee in formulating its 
recommendations relating to tax reforms was that the rates of tax should be moderate 
and the tax base should be widened so that the tax reform measures were not only 
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revenue neutral in the short-run but would also be elastic in the long run. The most 
important recommendations of the Committee may be grouped under the following 
measures: 
i. Tax-rate cut measures encompassing almost all taxes; 
ii. Measures for widening the tax base, particularly the tax base of personal 
income tax (PIT); 
iii. Adodemization of indirect taxes by gradually replacing both central excise and 
states' sales tax by a two-tier VAT; and 
iv. Simplifying assessment and compliance procedures so as to reduce the cost of 
compliance. 
The Chelliah Committee recommended tax rate cuts to promote tax honesty 
and corporate savings. At the same time the Committee recommended measures to 
widen the tax base such as imposition of presumptive tax and introduction of tax on 
estimated income. The presumptive tax on hard-to-tax income groups was introduced 
in 1993. But the revenue yield has been unimpressive. Tax on estimated income has 
also been introduced in the form of tax on the value of services such as on contractors, 
transport operators etc., with some success. The recent one-in-six criteria approach 
seems to be bringing in a number of income earners into the tax net. 
No doubt, as a consequence of all these measures the number of income tax 
payers has increased to 23 million and the revenue from direct taxes has increased at a 
much faster than that of indirect taxes to constitute a larger proportion of total tax 
revenue. But the annual rates of growth of revenue from major direct taxes of the 
Central Government have been fluctuating from year to year. 
The Central Government levies four main taxes viz., personal income tax, 
corporation tax, custom duties and Union excise duties. These taxes account for almost 
total tax proceeds of the Central Government. Custom duties had remained the major 
source of the revenues of the Central Government for a long time. During the early 
1970s the Union excise duties had become the major source of Central Government 
revenue. In fact, from the time the Government decided to give protection to industries 
during the fourth decade of the 20"* centaury, the importance of custom duties as a 
source of revenue started declining during world war-II and the post-war period, 
restrictions were imposed on imports of various consumer goods. This policy made it 
difficuh to collect large proceeds from customs duties. When the process of economic 
planning begins, imports increased, but their heavy taxation was ruled out due to their 
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strategic importance in the country's development. In the whole of the planning period 
capital equipment, necessary raw materials, food grains and petroleum constituted 
more than 90 percent of the country's imports and the Government could not impose 
heavy duties on them. With some progress in the industrial sector, the Central 
Government attempted to expand the base of excise duties, and as a consequence some 
time back it became the major source of its revenue. However, with time the relative 
position of these taxes changed considerably. In 1990-91 proceeds from the Union 
excise duties, custom duties, corporation tax and personal income tax were 42.62 
percent, 35.89 percent, 9.28 percent and 9.4 percent respectively, of the total revenue, 
while in 2000-01 proceeds were 36.33 percent, 25.21 percent, 18.93 percent and 17.0 
percent respectively, and in 2006-07 these taxes accounted for 24.9 percent, 18.3 
percent of the total tax proceeds respectively (Table-5,6,8 & 9 on page numbers 138, 
141, 145 & 147 respectively). 
A. Direct Tax Reforms: 
The direct tax structure of 1973-74 was the product of two decades of tax 
policy changes to bring about 'a socialistic pattern of society' and raise tax revenues to 
finance a public investment led strategy of plaimed economic development. The 
Taxation Enquiry Commission Report of 1954 (GOI, 1954) emphasized the need to 
raise more revenues through higher taxes, including through greater progressivity of 
direct taxes. Its recommendations were largely implemented. This approach gained 
further impetus from Kaldor's (1956) prescriptions, which ushered in a set of 
'integrated direct taxes' including an expenditure tax, a wealth tax and gift tax in 
addition to the already present taxes on income, capital gains and estates 
(Acharya,Shankar., 2005)^ 
In ensuring years the scope of these taxes was expanded and the rates were 
in<Jxorably raised. One gets a flavour of the prevailing tax ideology of the times from 
perusing the budget speeches of those years. Thus, Indira Gandhi, presenting the 
budget for 1970-71, stated, "Taxation is also a major instrument in all modem societies 
to achieve greater equality of incomes and wealth. It is, therefore, proposed to make 
our direct tax system serve this purpose by increasing income taxation at higher levels 
as well as by substantially enhancing the present rates of taxation on wealth and gift". 
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/. Personal Income Tax: 
In the budget for 1974-75 the Finance Minister Y.B.Chavan reversed his earlier 
stance and implemented the recommendation by reducing the top marginal income tax 
rate to 70 percent and surcharge to 10 percent. Simultaneously, however, the wealth 
tax rates were increased. In 1976-77, the marginal rate was further reduced to 66 
percent, and the wealth tax rate was reduced from 5 percent to 2.5 percent. In 1979-80, 
the income tax surcharge was increased, and the wealth tax rate returned to a 
maximum of 5 percent. A major simplification and rationalization initiative, however, 
came in 1985-86, when the number of tax brackets was reduced from 8 to 4, the 
highest marginal tax rate was brought down to 50 percent, and wealth tax rates came 
down to 2.5percent. 
The last wave of reforms in personal income tax was initiated on the basis of 
the recommendations of the Tax Reforms Committee (TRC). Under the reforms, there 
were only three tax brackets of 20, 30, and 40 percent, starting in 1992-93. Financial 
assets were excluded from the wealth tax, and the maximum marginal rate was reduced 
to 1 percent. Further reductions came in 1997-98, when the three rates were brought 
down, further to 10, 20, and 30 percent. In subsequent years, the need for revenue has 
increased to a general surcharge and additional surcharge of 2 percent dedicated to 
primary education, the latter applicable on all taxes. 
A major problem that has haunted the tax system and reduced the tax base is 
the generous tax preferences. The Advisory Group on Tax Policy and Tax 
Administration in its Report listed the personal income tax preferences, and the Task 
Force on Tax Policy and Tax Administration also made a detailed list of these 
concessions (GOI, 200 la)^. The tax preferences included the incentives and 
concessions for savings, housing, retirement benefits, investment in and return from 
certain types of financial assets, investments in retirement schemes, and income of 
charitable trusts. These preferences have not only distorted the after-tax rates of return 
on various types of investments in unintended ways but have also significantly eroded 
the tax base. 
The process of moderation of personal income tax was continued the budget of 
1994-95. The personal tax exemption limit was raised from Rs.30, 000 to Rs. 35,000. 
Besides, the surcharge of 12 percent on non-corporate incomes was withdrawn. 
Personal tax rates were not changed, but there was a widening of tax slab. The personal 
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income tax rates were not altered in the budget for 1995-96 so that the full effect of 
earlier rate reductions into higher revenue realizations. The exemption limit was, 
however, raised from Rs.35, 000 to Rs.40, 000. The 1997-98 budget introduced sharp 
cuts in income tax rates at 10, 20, and 30 percent and have remained stable since 1997-
98, with some changes in the associated tax brackets. A surcharge of 5 percent of the 
income tax payable was imposed in 2002-03 in the wake of the Kargil war and was 
discontinued the following year. It was replaced, however, with a separate 10 percent 
surcharge imposed on all taxpayers with taxable incomes above Rs. 850,000; the level 
was raised to Rs.l million in the 2005-06 budgets. Further, all taxes are topped up by a 
2 percent education cess _ a surcharge dedicated to an education fund from 2004-05 
onward. Although the income exemption limit has remained at Rs.50, 000 since 1998-
99, the generous standard deduction and the exemptions on dividends and interest on 
government securities up to specified limits have effectively increased the threshold 
substantially. The 2004-05 budget did not raise the exemption limit but provided that 
those with incomes under Rs.l00,000 need not pay the tax. The budget still retained 
the existing tax brackets, however, which gave rise to a peculiar problem_ those with 
taxable incomes above Rs.l00, 000 were left with lower after-tax incomes than those 
with incomes marginally lower than Rs.l00, 000, requiring an ad hoc correction. The 
budget for 2005-06 raised the exemption limit itself to Rs.l00, 000, abolished the 
standard deduction, and made marginal changes in the tax brackets. The exemption 
limit was increased to Rs.l35, 000 for women and to Rs.l85, 000 for senior citizens. 
Savings in vanety of instruments including pension funds up to Rs.l00, 000 were 
made deductible from taxable income. The budget for 2007-08 raised income tax 
collections and better tax compliance by individuals allowed the Government to raise 
the basic exemption limit for all assesses from Rs.l00,000 to Rs.l, 10,000 similar 
increase in exemption limits were provided to women assesses and senior citizens. 
The Income Tax Act has a provision to assess the value of identifiable 
perquisites provided by companies to their employees and to include the same in the 
taxable income of the individual. The budget for 2005-06 goes a step further and 
classifies a range of other expenses by the company, which provide indirect perquisites 
to the entire group of employees but are not directly assignable to any single employee. 
A specified proportion of each of these benefits is to be taxed at a rate of 30 percent 
through a fringe benefits tax, to be paid by the employer. 
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//. Corporation Tax: 
Following the recommendations of the TRC, the distinction between closely 
held and widely held companies was done away with and the tax rates were unified at 
40 percent in 1993-94. In 1997-98, the corporate rate was further reduced to 35 
percent, and the 10 percent tax on dividends was shifted from individuals to 
companies. Since then the measures adopted have lacked direction. The dividends tax 
rate was increased to 20 percent in 2000-01, then reduced again to 10 percent in 2001-
02 and levied on shareholders rather than the company. The policy was reversed once 
again in 2003-04, with the dividend tax imposed on the company. 
The major corporate tax preferences are investment and depreciation 
aiUowances. Tax incentives were also provided for businesses locating in 
underdeveloped areas. As a result, some companies planned their activities to take ftiU 
advantage of the generous concessions and fully avoid the tax. This form of tax 
avoidance by "zero-tax" companies was minimized by the introduction of a minimum 
alternative tax (MAT) in 1996-97. Even as companies can take advantage of the tax 
preferences, they are required to pay a tax on 30 percent of their book profits. In 
subsequent years, a provision was incorporated allowing these companies paying a 
MAT to take a partial credit against income tax liabilities in the following years. Since 
the MAT meant that a lot of the other preferences accorded in the tax statute like 
accelerated depreciation were not available to business units, the partial credit 
mechanism sought to dilute the impact of the MAT on business units that were liable 
for the MAT only sporadically. 
While tax reforms were calibrated on the basis of a consistent theoretical 
framework until the mid-1990s, some of the subsequent changes were ad hoc. The 
prime example is the decision to introduce the MAT instead of phasing out tax 
preferences. Setting the tax rate on corporate profits higher than the highest marginal 
rate on personal income is another example. Similarly, to improve tax compliance and 
create an audit trail, a securities transactions tax was introduced in April 2004 and tax 
of 0.1 percent on all cash withdrawals above Rs. 25,000 from current accounts of 
commercial banks was introduced in April 2005. These measures, however, are 
retrograde. The former hinder the development of stock market and discriminates 
against investments in shares. The latter penalizes small and medium-size firms, which 
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have to withdraw large amounts of cash just to pay the salaries of their employees 
(Arbalaez, Burman, & Zuluaga 2002) . 
The structure of corporate incomes taxes has remained stable since 1997-98, 
when the rate was reduced to 35 percent. In 2005-06, the corporate income tax was 
reduced to 30 percent on domestic companies. A surcharge of 10 percent (without any 
conditions regarding installed capacity increases) is also chargeable. The depreciation 
rate has been reduced to 15 percent in the case of general plant and machinery, but 
initial depreciation is set at 20 percent, thereby reducing the overall benefit of lowering 
corporate income tax rates. 
B. Indirect Tax Reforms: 
/. Union Excise Duties: 
After independence, excise duties were levied on selected goods to raise 
revenue. Over the years, as the revenue requirement increased, the list of commodities 
subject to tax was expanded. In the initial years, for reasons of administrative 
convenience, the taxed commodities tended to be raw materials and intermediate goods 
rather than final consumer goods (GOI, 1977) . As pressure to raise revenue increased, 
final consumer goods were included. In 1975-76 the tax was extended to all 
manufactured goods. 
By this time the structure of excise duties was complex and highly 
distortionary. Some commodities were subject to specific duties and others to ad 
valorem taxes; on the latter alone there were twenty-four different rates ranging from 2 
to 100 percent (tobacco and petroleum products were taxed at even higher rates). The 
process of converting specific duties to ad valorem rates was more or less completed 
by 1993-94. The number of rates did not decrease, however, which led to several 
classification disputes. In effect, the excise duty became a manufacturers' sales tax 
administered on the basis of goods cleared from the warehouse. "Cascading" from the 
tax resulted not merely from its preretail nature but also because it was levied not only 
on final consumer goods but also on inputs and capital goods. The tax system was 
complex and opaque, and a detailed analysis showed significant variation in the 
effective rates (Ahmad & Stem, 1983)^ . 
Although the Indirect Tax Enquiry Report issued in 1977 provided a detailed 
analysis of the allocative and distributional consequences of the Union excise duties, 
its recommendations were not implemented for almost a decade. The recommendations 
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included converting specific duties into ad valorem taxes, unifying rates, and 
introducing an input tax credit to convert the cascading manufacturers' sales tax into a 
manufacturing stage value-added tax (MANVAT). The interesting part of the reform 
was that there was virtually no preparation and the introduction of modified value-
added tax (MODVAT) was a process of "learning by doing". This was a strange 
(jombination of taxation based on physical verification of goods with provision of an 
input tax credit. The coverage of the credit mechanism also evolved over time. It began 
with selected items, with credit based on a one-to-one correspondence between inputs 
a.nd outputs. It was only by 1996-97, that it covered a majority of commodities in the 
excise tariff and incorporated comprehensive credit. Nowhere else in the world can one 
find VAT introduction so complicated in its structure, so difficult in its operations, and 
so incomplete in its coverage. In fact, the revenue from the tax as a ratio of GDP 
declined after the introduction of MODVAT. The Tax Reform Committee, 1991 
identified many items which were outside the excise could be considered for levying 
excise duty. Some of the identified items included: butter and cheese, skimmed milk 
powder, spices, fertilizers, feature films, wood pulp, umbrellas, bicycles, toys and 
s]5orts goods, buttons, vaccum flasks. The declining ratio of the Union excise duties to 
GDP since reforms were introduced is truly a matter of concern as the loss of revenue 
has been a constraint in further reducing import duties. Although the ratio has been 
stagnant at 3.3 percent for several years, that is significantly lower than the ratio in 
1991-92 (4.1 percent). Union excise duty collections by commodity, highlights some 
interesting features with implications for both efficiency and equity of the tax system. 
One of the most important features is the commodity concentration. Three-fourth of all 
Union excise duties are paid by just five groups of commodities_ petroleum products, 
chemicals, basic metals, transport vehicles, and electrical and electronic goods. One 
would normally except this concentration to decrease as manufacturing diversified. 
This increased concentration imposes a disproportionate tax burden on different sector 
of the economy. Moreover, this type of commodity concentration does not allow 
objective calibrafion of policies regarding excise duties as the Finance Ministry would 
not like to lose revenue from this lucrative source. Another important feature of the 
pattern of excise revenue collections is that the overwhelming proportion is paid by 
commodity groups that are in the nature of intermediate products used in the 
production of goods or services that are not subject to excise. A striking feature of 
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excise duty collections is that, as in the case of corporate income taxes, a predominant 
proportion is paid by public sector enterprises. 
In 1997-98 budget the excise duty changes were aimed at reducing dispersion 
in rates. The scheme of excise duty concession for the small scale units was simplified. 
Further reforms of the excise duties came with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the TRC. The measures included gradual unification of rates and 
greater reliance on account-based administration. In 1999-2000, eleven tax rates were 
merged into three, with a handful of "luxury" items subject to an additional non-
re;batable tax (6 and 16 percent). The three rates were merged into a single rate in 
2000-01 to be called a central VAT (CenVAT), along with three special additional 
excises of 8, 16, and 24 percent for a few commodities. Further, the tax base was 
widened; some exemptions were replaced by a tax at 8 percent. Some simplification of 
the tax on the small-scale sector was also attempted. Small businesses could either take 
an exemption or pay tax at a concessional rate of 60 percent of tax due, with access to 
the tax credit mechanism. This option, however, was withdrawn from the budget of 
2005-06. 
II. Custom Duties: 
Contrary to the general patterns seen in low-income countries, where an 
OA'erwhelming proportion of revenues is raised from international trade taxes, revenue 
from this source was not very large in the initial years of independent India, largely 
because imports were restricted (Chelliah,1986)"'. In addition, high and differentiated 
tajriffs, with rates varying with the stage of production (lower rates on inputs and 
higher rates on finished goods) and income elasticity of demand (lower rates on 
necessities and higher rates on luxury items) not only resulted in high and widely 
varying effective rates of protection, but provided large premiums for inefficiency and 
caused unintended distortions in the allocation of resources. 
By the mid-1980s, the tariff rates were very high and the structure was quite 
complex. The Government's Long-Term Fiscal Policy (LTFP) presented in the 
Parliament in 1985-86 emphasized the need to reduce tariffs, apply fewer and more 
uniform rates, and reduce and eventually eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports. 
The reforms undertaken, however, were not comprehensive. Rationalization in the 
rates was attempted for specific industries such as capital goods, drug intermediates, 
amd electronic goods. In fact, contrary to the LTFP recommendations, the tariffs were 
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rai.sed for revenue reasons, and the weighted average rate increased from 38 percent in 
1980-81 to 87 percent in 1989-90 (GOI,1991)". Thus, by 1990-91, the tariff structure 
ranged from 0 to 400 percent. More than 10 percent of imports were subjected to 
tariffs of 120 percent or more. Wide-ranging exemptions, reflecting the influence of 
various special interest groups on tax policy, often granted outside the budgetary 
prcicess, further complicated the system and made it ad hoc. 
The reform of import duties in earnest began in 1991-92 when all duties on 
non-agricultural goods above 150 percent were reduced to this level. This 'peak' rate 
was lowered over the next four years to 50 percent, and then to 40 percent in 1997-98, 
30 percent in 2002-03, 25 percent in 2003-04 to 15 percent in 2005-06. The peak rate 
of custom duty on non-agricultural products was reduced from 12.5 percent in 2006-07 
to 10 percent in 2007-08, with few exceptions. Along with relaxation of quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exchange rate depreciation, the change in the tariffs 
constituted a major change in the foreign trade regime in the country. 
The number of major duty rates was reduced from twenty-two in 1990-91 to 
four in 2003-04. Of course, some items are outside these four rates, but 90 percent of 
the; customs is collected from items under the four rates. At the same time, a special 
additional duty was imposed on goods imported into the country on the rationale that if 
the commodity was domestically produced and sold interstate, it would have attracted 
the tax rate of 4 percent. This duty was abolished in January 2004, only to be 
reintroduced in 2005-06. Thus, the direction of reforms was not always consistent, but 
overall the thrust has been to reduce the rates and reduce their dispersion. However, 
tariff rates still vary with the stage of processing, and this practice has caused very 
high effective rates of protection on assembly of consumer durables and luxury 
consumption items. 
III. Service Tax: 
An interesting aspect of the tax system in India is that except for a few 
specified services assigned to the States such as the entertairmient tax, passengers and 
goods tax, and the electricity duty, the services were not specifically assigned to either 
the; Centre or the States. This omission violated the principle of neutrality in 
constimption as it discriminated against the goods component of consumption. Because 
sei^ vices are relatively more income elastic, the tax system is rendered less progressive 
when these are not taxed. An even more important argument for taxing services is to 
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enable a coordinated calibration of a consumption tax system on goods and services 
because services enter into goods production and vice versa. 
Although there was no specific authority to tax services, the Central 
Go\'emment levied taxes on three services in 1994-95: insurance other than life 
insuirance, stock brokerages, and telecommunications. The list was expanded in 
succeeding years and now includes more than eighty services. The initial 5 percent tax 
rate was increased to 8 percent in 2003-04 and to 10 percent in 2004-05 and 2005-06. 
At ipresent service tax rate is 12 percent. The Expert Group on Taxation of Services 
recommended extending the tax to all services, providing an input tax credit for both 
goods and services, and eventually integrating the services tax with the CenVAT 
(GOI,2001b)^ .^ With these reforms, the tax system can effectively be called a 
manufacturing-stage VAT. The exceptions were to be two small lists_ one, a list of 
exempt services, and the other, a negative list of services, where the tax credit 
mechanism would not cover taxes paid on these services. The recommendation on the 
levy of general taxation of services has not been implemented, and the tax continues to 
be levied on selective services. However, the recommendation pertaining to the 
extension of input tax credit for goods entering into services and vice versa has been 
implemented. 
The main reasons for the imposition of the service tax have been as follows: 
i. The growth in the service sector during the period of last one decade or so has 
been spectacular. Now services account for more than 55 percent of GDP. At 
the same time, their contribution to the Government exchequer has not all been 
commensurate. In 2006-07, revenue from service tax accounted for only 8 
percent of the Union tax revenue and contributed 0.9 percent of GDP. 
ii. Considerations of efficiency and equity also strongly govern the inclusion of 
services under taxation. With discriminatory taxation of goods and services, 
efficiency in resource allocation is bound to suffer. This is because resources 
move from taxed to non-taxed sectors. In the absence of service taxation equity 
suffers since services are consumed more by the high income households, 
iii. If services are not taxed, traders cannot claim VAT on their service input. This 
is likely to cause cascading, distort choice and encourage business to develop in 
house services. 
130 
4.2 Trend and Composition of Revenue Receipts: 
The receipts are broadly classified into revenue receipts and capital receipts. 
The former can be further classified into tax revenue and non-tax revenue and latter 
into debt-creating receipts and non-debt creating receipts. There are following main 
sources of revenue receipts: 
Revenue Receipts 
Tax Revenue Non-Tax Revenue 
Direct Taxes 
i 
Indirect Taxes 
Personal 
Income Tax 
Corporation 
Tax 
r 
Custom 
Duties 
i 
Union Excise 
Duties 
Service 
Tax 
Table-1 
Revenue Receipts of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Revenue Receipts 
(Rs. in Crores) 
28035 
33083 
37037 
43591 
52296 
54954 
66030 
74128 
75453 
91083 
110130 
126279 
133886 
149485 
181482 
192605 
201306 
230834 
Revenue 
Receipts as % of 
GDP 
10.08 
10.63 
10.45 
10.34 
10.28 
9.66 
10.11 
9.91 
8.86 
8.99 
9.27 
9.23 
8.79 
8.59 
9.37 
9.15 
8.87 
9.4 
Percentage 
change in 
Revenue 
Receipts 
-
18.0 
11.95 
17.69 
19.96 
5.08 
20.15 
12.26 
1.78 
20.71 
20.91 
14.66 
6.02 
11.65 
21.40 
6.12 
4.51 
14.66 
131 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
C A G R 
263813 
305991 
347462 
434387 
486422 
161729.2 
130488.4 
80.68 
13.26 
9.6 
9.7 
9.7 
10.5 
10.4 
9.65 
0.62 
6.43 
-0.25 
14.28 
15.98 
13.5 
25.0 
11.97 
14.01 
6.32 
45.09 
NA 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
From Table-1 it is clear that revenue receipts has increased during the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 28035 crores to maximum of Rs. 486422 
crores. The average of revenue receipts is Rs. 161729.2 crores in the given periods. 
The standard deviation, the coefficient of variance and the CAGR of revenue receipts 
(Rs. crores) are 130488.4, 80.68, and 13.26 percent respectively during the same 
period. Revenue receipts as percent of GDP from 1985-86 to 1989-90 is based on 
different series of National Account Statistics (NAS) with base year 1980-81. But 
revenue receipts as percent of GDP from 1990-91 onwards are based on new series of 
NAS with 1993-94 as base year released by Central Statistical Organization (CSO). 
From Table-1 it is clear that revenue receipts as percent of GDP was 10.08 percent in 
1985-86 which reached to 10.28 percent in 1989-90. During the post-reform period, 
revenue receipts as percent of GDP has gone down from 10.11 percent in 1991-92 to 
8.87 percent in 2001-02 and then increased to 9.7 percent in 2005-06. This growth was 
due to the revenue led strategy of the Government for achieving the targets set under 
the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 and the rules made there 
under. Thereafter, a slight improvement in the revenue receipts GDP ratio owes to the 
macroeconomic policy frame in 2007-08 which facilitated the implementation of some 
of the key points in the fiscal reform agenda included those articulated in the Kelkar 
Task Force Reports on direct and indirect taxes. During 1985-86 to 2007-08 the 
average, standard deviation, coefficient of variance and the CAGR of revenue receipts 
as a percent of GDP are 9.65, 0.62, 6.43, -0.25 percent respectively. If we analyze the 
growth rate of revenue receipts, much fluctuations are found. The periods 1991-92, 
1994-95, 1995-96, 1999-2000, 2006-07 show a greater change in revenue receipts. But 
the periods 1990-91, 1993-94 1997-98, 2000-01 and 2001-02 show the minimum 
growth rate in revenue receipt. The average, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variance of percentage change in revenue receipts are 14.01, 6.32, 4.5.09 percent 
respectively during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08.During the process of implementing 
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reforms to augment revenue receipts, some measures like reforms of excise and custom 
duties were revenue-negative and resulted into declined in the share of revenue 
receipts in total receipts of the Central Government. A number of reform measures 
were further undertaken in the regime of taxation which included reduction in the peak 
rates of custom duties and rectifying anomalies like inverted duty structure (on the 
recommendations of Long Term Fiscal Policy of 1985), reduction in personal and 
corporation tax rates, rationalizing excise duties with a movement towards a median 
CENVAT rate (on the recommendations of Tax Reform Committee, 1991) and 
introduction of State-level VAT since April, 2003 for achieving a non-cascading self-
enforcing and harmonized commodity taxation regime. Despite numerous measures 
initiated by the Government, a disquieting picture of shortfalls in revenue is quite 
visible. 
A. Trend and Composition of Tax Revenue: 
The trends in tax revenue in India, focusing on the changes in the level and 
composition of tax revenue since 1991, has not shown any appropriate increase_ a 
reduction in custom duties has not been offset by any internal indirect taxes. 
Table-2 
Trend of Tax Revenue of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Tax Revenue(Rs. 
in Crores) 
21140 
24319 
28015 
33751 
38399 
42978 
50069 
54044 
54473 
67454 
81939 
93701 
95672 
104652 
128271 
Tax Revenue as % of 
Revenue Receipts 
75.40 
73.50 
75.64 
77.42 
76.80 
78.20 
75.82 
72.90 
71.51 
74.05 
74.40 
74.20 
71.45 
70.00 
70.67 
Percentage change in 
Tax Revenue 
19.7 
15.0 
15.1 
20.4 
13.7 
11.9 
16.4 
7.9 
0.7 
23.8 
21.4 
14.3 
2.1 
9.3 
22.5 
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2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
C A G R 
136658 
133532 
158544 
186982 
224798 
270264 
351182 
403872 
121074.31 
104609.1 
86.40 
13.24 
70.95 
66.28 
66.91 
70.87 
74.46 
77.78 
80.84 
83.02 
74.05 
4.03 
5.45 
-0.05 
6.5 
-2.2 
18.7 
17.9 
20.2 
20.2 
29.9 
15.00 
14.8 
7.86 
53.10 
NA 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
From Table-2 it is clear that tax revenue has increased during the period 1985-
86 to 2007-08 from minimum of Rs. 21140 crores to maximum of Rs. 403872 crores. 
The average of tax revenue is Rs. 121074.3 crores in the given periods. The S.D, C.V 
and CAGR of tax revenue in Rs. crores are, 104609.1, 86.40, and 13.24 percent 
respectively during the same period. Table-2 shows that in 1985-86, it was 
approximately 75 percent of revenue receipts. Tax revenue as percent of revenue 
receipts was increased by 78.20 percent in 1990-91 and it reached to 80.84 percent in 
2006-07. It was budgeted at 83.02 percent in 2007-08. Table-2 shows that from 1985-
86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of tax revenue as a percent of 
revenue receipts are 74.05, 4.03, 5.45 and -0.051 percent respectively .The budget for 
1990--91 expressed a firm determination for improved tax compliance. Besides, it 
stressed the importance of improving tax-GDP ratio, promoting savings and 
investment and rationalizing the tax system to render it more equitable. There was 
rationalization of customs and excise tariff, abolition of Gold Control Act, personal 
and corporate tax reforms were other important measures proposed in the budget 1990-
91. 
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Table- 3 
Tax-GDP Ratio 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Gross Central Taxes* as % of 
GDP 
10.3 
10.5 
10.6 
10.5 
10.6 
10.1 
10.3 
10.0 
8.8 
9.1 
9.4 
9.4 
9.1 
8.3 
8.9 
9.0 
8.2 
8.8 
9.2 
9.7 
10.2 
11.4 
11.7 
9.74 
0.93 
9.56 
-0.23 
Net Central Taxes** as % of 
GDP 
7.6 
7.8 
7.9 
8.0 
7.9 
7.6 
7.7 
7.2 
6.3 
6.7 
6.9 
6.8 
6.3 
6.0 
6.6 
6.5 
5.9 
6.5 
6.8 
7.1 
7.5 
8.5 
8.6 
7.16 
0.77 
10.74 
-0.31 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Note: *- Before transferring States' share in Central taxes. 
•* - After transferring States' share in Central taxes. 
The primary objective of tax policy in developing countries is to mobilize 
resources for the public sector to finance welfare and developmental plans. The extent 
to which tax policy is used for this purpose is a matter of interest for national policy 
makers and foreign aid donors. Foreign governments and international organizations 
usually assess the efforts made by receipt countries to raise resources domestically. 
Level of taxation in a country is traditionally judged in terms of the ratio which taxes 
bear to some measure of national income. This ratio is called tax-GDP ratio and 
change in it is determined by variations in both the numerator (total tax revenue) and 
the denominator (National income). Trends in taxation in a country or a group of 
countries are analyzed mainly in terms of this ratio, and the composition of tax 
revenues. The latter may change owing to variations in tax-GDP ratio. In a situation 
where huge investments are required for building social and economic infrastructure, 
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we need to raise the tax-GDP ratio. The Central Government has not been able to 
achieve this objective of tax reforms. 
From TabIe-3, it is clear that gross tax revenue as percent of GDP has declined 
over the period. It was 10.3 percent of GDP in 1985-86. In 1990-91, when the process 
of economic reforms was initiated, gross central taxes accounted for 10.12 percent of 
GDP. However, as a result of tax reforms introduced since then, this percentage started 
falling and it became as low as 8.2 in 2001-02. Stating the reasons for this fall of more 
than 2 percentage points, the Twelfth Finance Commission noted, "The impact of these 
reforms on direct and indirect taxes was diametrically opposite. While the direct taxes 
showed, even with the lower rates, a rising tax-GDP ratio, this ratio for the indirect 
taxes kept sliding down. The indirect taxes had a larger share in the total tax revenues 
of the Centre and the fall in the indirect tax to GDP ratio could not be compensated by 
a rise in the direct taxes. As a result, the overall Central tax-GDP ratio fell" (TFC, 
2004)''. Of late, however, recovery is noticeable in the tax-GDP ratio at the level of 
Central. Government (Table-3). Tax revenue (Net to Centre) as percentage of GDP was 
lowest in 2001-02, it was 5.9 percent. After that it increases from 6.5 percent in 2002-
03 to 8.5 percent in 2006-07. It was budgeted at 8.6 percent in 2007-08. The statistical 
analysis shows that the average of gross central taxes as percent of GDP and net 
central taxes as a percent of GDP is 9.74 and 7.16 percent respectively during 1985-86 
to 2007-08. The S.D of gross and net central taxes as a percent of GDP is 0.93 and 
0.77 respectively, meaning thereby deviation in gross central taxes as a percent of GDP 
is found to be higher than net central taxes as a percent of GDP. The co-efficient of 
variance of net central taxes as a percent of GDP is found to be 10.74 percent which is 
higher than co-efficient of variance of gross central taxes as a percent of GDP which is 
9.56 percent during the same period. 
I. Trend and Composition of Direct Taxes: 
Central taxes accounted for about two-third of total tax collections in India. Tax 
collection (or gross tax revenues) of the Central Government are different from its net 
tax revenues because a part of the proceeds from taxes is transferred to State 
Governments under tax sharing arrangements of the Constitution. The relative 
significance of various taxes in Central revenues has undergone major changes since 
independence. 
136 
Table-4 
Direct Taxes of Central Government 
Year 
1985-36 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992--93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(6.E) 
Average 
S.D 
CV 
CAGR 
Direct Taxes (Rs.in 
Crores) 
5563 
6236 
6742 
8783 
9924 
11030 
15207 
18132 
20298 
26966 
33563 
38891 
48274 
46595 
57958 
68306 
69197 
83085 
105090 
132181 
165202 
230174 
267490 
64125.52 
72214.61 
112.61 
18.91 
D T as % of 
GDP 
2.0 
2.0 
1.90 
2.08 
2.04 
1.94 
2.33 
2,42 
2.36 
2.66 
2.83 
2.84 J 
3.17 
2.68 
2.99 
L 3.25 
3.05 
3.4 
3.8 
4.2 
4.6 
5.6 
5.7 
3.04 
1.10 
36.13 
4.70 
Percentage 
change in D T 
17.13 
12.1 
8.1 
30.3 
13.0 
11.1 
37.9 
19.2 
11.9 
32.9 
24.5 
15.9 
24.1 
-3.5 
24.4 
17.9 
1.3 
20.07 
26.48 
25.77 
24.9 
39.3 
16.21 
19.61 
10.58 
54.49 
NA 
Gross Tax 
Revenue(Rs. in 
Crores) 
28670 
32838 
37665 
44474 
51,636 
57,577 
67,361 
74,636 
75,742 
92,297 
111224 
129762 
139220 
143797 
171752 
188603 
187060 
216266 
254348 
304958 
366152 
471512 
548122 
165029.2 
141400 
85.68 
13.31 
DT as % 
GTR 
19.6 
19.0 
17.9 
19.9 
19.4 
19.2 
22.8 
24.3 
26.8 
29.2 
30.2 
30.0 
34.7 
32.4 
33.7 
36.2 
37.0 
38.4 
41.3 
43.3 
45.1 
48.8 
48.8 
31.22 
10.02 
32.08 
4.91 
Source: Economic Survey, 
Note: DT-Direct Tax, GTR-Gross 
Various issues. Government of India. 
Tax Revenue. 
In the wake of reforms initiated in the early 1990s, rates of both corporate and 
personal income tax were substantially reduced. Following better compliance, the 
decline in the relative share of direct taxes has been reversed. From Table- 4 it is clear 
that direct taxes has increased during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of 
Rs. .'5563 crores to maximum of Rs. 267490 crores. The average of direct taxes is Rs. 
64125.52 crores in the given periods. During the same period S.D, CV and CAGR of 
directs taxes are Rs. 72214.61, 112.61and 18.91 percent respectively. Direct taxes as a 
percentage of Centre's total tax collections rose from 19.2 percent in 1990-91 (pre-
reform period) to 34.7 percent in 1997-98. The figure stood at 48.8 percent in the 
2006-07 budgets (Table- 4). From 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, CV and 
CAGR of direct taxes as percent of gross tax revenue are 31.22, 10.02, 32.08 and 4.91 
percent respectively. Direct taxes as percent of GDP was 2 percent in 1985-86 and 
1986-87, further it declined in 1987-88. From 1991-92 to 1996-97 it was 3 percent of 
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GDP. During 1997-98 to 2002-03 it was above 3 percent of GDP. Further it increased 
from 4.2 percent of GDP in 2004-05 to 5.6 percent of GDP in 2006-07 and is budgeted 
at 5.7 percent in 2007-08. The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of direct taxes as percent 
of GDP are 3.04, 1.10, 36.13 and 4.70 percent respectively during the period 1985-86 
to 2007-08. 
The highest growth in direct taxes was found in the year 1991-92, 1994-95 and 
2006-07 which were 37.9 percent, 32.9 percent and 39.3 percent respectively. It 
becomes negative in the year 1998-99 i.e. -3.5 percent. During 1985-86 to 2007-08, the 
average, S.D and C.V of percentage change in direct taxes are 19.61, 10.48 and 54.49 
percent respectively. 
(a) Trend of Personal Income Tax: 
Personal income tax is levied on the incomes of individuals, Hindu families, 
unregistered firms and other associations of people. For taxation purpose income from 
all sources is added. However, apart from the deduction of necessary professional 
expenditures, rebate on account of life insurance premium, provident fund, etc. was 
earlier allowed. This rebate was, however, abolished in the Budget 2005-06. 
Table-5 
Personal Income Tax of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Personal Income 
Tax (Rs. in 
Crores) 
2511 
2879 
3192 
4241 
5004 
5371 
6731 
7888 
9123 
12025 
15592 
18231 
17097 
20240 
25654 
31764 
32004 
36866 
41387 
PIT as % of 
GTR 
8.8 
8.8 
8.5 
9.5 
9.7 
9.4 
10.1 
10.6 
11.9 
13.0 
14.0 
14.2 
12.6 
14.0 
14.9 
17.0 
16.9 
17.0 
16.3 
PIT as % of 
GDP 
0.9 
0.93 
0.90 
1.01 
1.03 
0.94 
1.03 
1.05 
1.06 
1.19 
1.31 
1.33 
1.12 
1.16 
1.32 
1.51 
1.40 
1.5 
1.5 
Percentage 
change in PIT 
30.2 
14.7 
10.9 
32.9 
18.0 
7.3 
25.3 
17.2 
15.7 
31.8 
29.7 
16.9 
-6.2 
18.4 
26.7 
23.8 
0.8 
15.19 
12.26 
PIT as % of 
DT 
45.13 
46.16 
47.34 
48.28 
50.42 
48.69 
44.26 
43.50 
44.94 
44.59 
4645 
46.87 
35.41 
43.43 
44.26 
46.50 
46.25 
44.37 
39.38 
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2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
49268 
63629 
85561 
98774 
25870.96 
26655.81 
103.03 
17.69 
16.2 
17.4 
18.1 
18.0 
13.34 
3.37 
25.27 
3.84 
1.6 
1.8 
2.1 
2.1 
1.30 
0.35 
27.32 
3.65 
19.04 
29.14 
34.46 
15.44 
19.11 
10.31 
55.15 
NA 
37.27 
38.51 
37.17 
36.92 
43.74 
4.22 
9.65 
-1.03 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India 
Table-5 shows that personal income tax has increased during the period 1985-
86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 2511 crores to maximum of Rs. 98774 crores. 
The average of personal income tax is Rs. 25870.96 crores in the given periods. During 
the same period S.D, C.V and CAGR of personal income tax are Rs. 26655.81, 103.03 
and 17.69 percent respectively during the same period. In 1985-86, personal income 
tax accounted for almost 8.8 percent of the Central tax collections. However, the 
relati\'e contribution declined over the years and was less than one-tenth (9.4 percent) 
in 1990-91. After the tax reforms initiated since early 1990s, the share of personal 
income tax in gross tax revenues of the Central Goveniment increased sharply. In the 
2007-08 budget it was estimated at 18.0 percent (Table-5). During the period 1985-86 
to 2007-08 the average of personal income tax as a percentage of gross tax revenue is 
13.34 percent. The S.D and C.V of personal income tax as a percentage of gross tax 
revenue are 3.37 and 25.27 percent respectively. The CAGR is 3.84 percent during the 
same period. Personal income tax shows the upward trend as percent of GDP. From 
period 1985-86 to 2007-08, the average, S.D and C.V of personal income tax as a 
percent of GDP are 1.30, 0.35 and 27.32 percent respectively. The CAGR of personal 
income tax as a percent of GDP is 3.65 percent during the given period. 
Personal income tax as percent of direct taxes has increased from 45.1 percent 
in 1985-86 to 50.4 percent in 1989-90. However, h declined to 35.41 percent in 1997-
98 then it reached to 44.4 percent in 2002-03. After that it again started declining. 
During the period 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of personal 
income tax as a percentage of direct taxes are 43.74, 4.22, 9.65 and -1.03 percent 
respectively. If we analyze the growth rate of personal income tax, much fluctuation is 
there in cyclic order. The periods 1988-89,1991-92,1994-95,1995-96,1999-2000,2000-
01,2005-06,2006-07 show greater change in income tax revenues. The probable 
reasons for these upward trends in personal income tax could be reduction of rates and 
duty rationalization, etc. The period 1997-98 shows the negative change in income tax 
139 
revenue (Table-5). The average, S.D and C.V of annual growth rate of personal income 
tax during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08 are 19.11, 10.31 and 55.15 percent 
respectively. 
(b) Trend of Corporation Tax: 
From Table-6 it is clear that corporation tax has increased during the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 2865 crores to maximum of Rs. 168401 
crores. The average of corporation tax is Rs. 37111.17 crores during the given periods. 
During the same period S.D, C.V and CAGR (Rs. crores) are 45964.53, 123.86 and 
20.18 percent respectively. Corporation tax is levied on the incomes of registered 
companies and corporations. In the case of corporation tax, the relative contribution 
was 10 percent in 1985-86 while in 1990-91 it was 9.28 percent. In the intervening 
period, however, moderate changes are noticeable in the proportionate share of 
corporation tax. As in the case of personal income tax, the proportionate share of 
corporation tax in Centre's gross tax revenues has increased sharply during the post-
1991 period. In the 2007-08 budget, h was estimated at 30.7 percent (Table-6). The 
average of corporation tax as a percentage of gross tax revenue is 16.89 percent during 
1985-86 to 2007-08. The S.D and C.V of corporation tax as a percentage of gross tax 
revenue during the same period are 7.10 and 42.03 percent respectively. The CAGR is 
6.05 percent. If we analyze the table we find that the highest change in corporation tax 
was seen in the year 1991-92 which was 47.20 percent over the previous period. The 
reasons for upward trends in corporation tax could be tax rate reduction and 
rationaUzation of duties, etc. The lowest change in this area was seen in the year 2001-
02 which was 2.56 percent, despite of rate reduction. This could be due to the fact that 
a lot of exemptions and deductions do remain making the tax structure complicated. 
From 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D and C.V and CAGR of percentage change 
in corporation tax are 20.53,12.10, 58.53 and 3.0 percent respectively. The corporation 
tax as percent of GDP has upward trend. It was 1.03 percent of GDP in 1985-86 
reached to 1.20 percent in 1991-92. In the year 2006-07 it was 1.87 percent of GDP 
and is budgeted at 3.6 percent of GDP in 2007-08. The average, S.D and C.V of 
cor})oration tax as a percent of GDP are 1.65, 0.78 and 58.53 percent respectively 
during 1985-86 to 2007-08. The CAGR of corporation tax as a percent of GDP is 5.78 
percent in the given period. Table-6 shows that, corporation tax as percent of direct 
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taxes of the Central Government has increased. In 1985-86 it was 51.56 percent, 
declined to 48.37 percent in 1990-91. In 1998-99 it reached to 52.64 percent. In 2006-
07 it was 62.69 percent and is budgeted at 62.95 percent in 2007-08. The average, S.D, 
C.V and CAGR of corporation tax as a percent of direct taxes are 52.85, 5.61, 10.62 
and 1.06 percent respectively during 1985-86 to 2007-08. 
Table-6 
Corporation Tax of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Corporation tax(Rs. 
in Crores) 
2865 
3160 
3433 
4407 
4729 
5335 
7853 
8899 
10060 
13822 
16487 
18567 
20016 
24529 
30692 
35696 
36609 
46172 
63562 
82680 
101277 
144306 
168401 
37111.17 
45964.53 
123.86 
20.18 
CT as % of 
GTR 
10.01 
9.64 
9.13 
9.92 
9.17 
9.28 
11.67 
11.93 
13.29 
14.98 
14.83 
14.42 
14.38 
17.06 
17.87 
18.93 
19.57 
21.35 
25.0 
27.1 
27.7 
30.6 
30.7 
16.89 
7.10 
42.03 
6.05 
CT as % of 
GDP 
1.03 
1.02 
0.97 
1.05 
0.97 
0.94 
1.20 
1.19 
1.17 
1.36 
1.39 
1.36 
1.31 
1.41 
1.58 
1.70 
1.61 
1.87 
2.3 
2.6 
2.8 
3.5 
3.6 
1.65 
0.78 
47.59 
5.78 
Percentage 
change in CT 
12.09 
10.30 
8.64 
28.37 
7.31 
12.81 
47.20 
13.32 
13.09 
37.40 
19.28 
12.62 
7.80 
22.55 
25.13 
16.30 
2.56 
26.12 
37.66 
30.07 
22.49 
42.4 
16.69 
20.53 
12.10 
58.53 
3.0 
CTas%ofDT 
51.56 
50.67 
50.92 
50.18 
47.65 
48.37 
51.64 
49.08 
49.56 
51.26 
49.12 
47.74 
41.46 
52.64 
52.96 
52.26 
52.91 
55.58 
60.48 
62.55 
61.30 
62.69 
62.95 
52.85 
5.61 
10.62 
1.06 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Note; CT-Coq5oration Tax. 
It is noteworthy that both personal and corporate income taxes were 
rationalized due to economic reforms initiated in 1991. The number of rate categories, 
as well as the marginal income tax rates, was substantially reduced. 
II. Trend and Composition of Indirect Taxes: 
The principal indirect taxes levied in India are custom duties, excise duties, 
service tax and sales tax or VAT. Now the excise duties have emerged as the biggest 
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source of revenue. Under the Constitution, the Central Government has exclusive 
power to levy customs duties and excise duties on commodities other than alcoholic 
liquors and narcotics. From a modest beginning in 1994-95, service tax grown into a 
significant source of revenue. The States have been allocated exclusive jurisdiction 
over the excise on alcoholic liquors and taxes or sale or purchase of goods, except 
newspapers. From Table-7 it is clear that indirect taxes has increased during the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08 from minimum of Rs. 23107 crores to maximum of Rs. 279190 
crores. The average of the indirect tax revenue is Rs. 100180.9 crores during given 
periods. The S.D, C.V and CAGR of the indirect tax revenue (Rs. crores) are, 
69284.37, 69.15 and 10.81 percent respectively. 
Unlike direct taxes, rate cuts have been important factors in reducing the 
indirect tax collection, as there was no commensurate gain in terms of base expansion 
or better compliance. It was expected that the sharp cut in custom duties from peak rate 
of more than 300 percent in the period just prior to reforms to about 30 percent in 
2002-03 would lead to a net fall in custom duty collections. Fall in excise duty 
collections, however, came as a surprise as the rate cuts were expected to boost growth 
in industrial output. The less than expected buoyancy in the excise tax seems to follow 
from slower than expected growth in industrial output during the major part of the 
reform period. The rising share of services in overall GDP which largely falls outside 
the tax net and progressive extension of MOD VAT could have affected buoyancy 
estimates. Ideally, credit extended to inputs under VAT system needs to be neutralized 
through increase in tax rates on end products. Instead tax rates have been scaled back 
leading to fall in excise tax collection. Another important reason for reduced revenue 
collection from both custom and excise duties are that the reductions in rates were not 
accompanied by removal of concessions and exemptions. 
A comparison of alternative buoyancy estimates with respect to GDP and 
actual base indicates that though there was a marked decline in buoyancy in case of 
both customs and excise during the reform period, the fall was partly made up by the 
pickup in imports in case of customs and some base expansion or better compliance in 
respect of excise. In the case of custom duties, the decline in buoyancy in terms of 
imports was much more than in terms of GDP. On the other hand, in case of excise 
duty there was hardly any divergence between its buoyancy in terms of manufacturing 
output( which is the base for excise tax) and that in terms of GDP. 
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Table-7 
Indirect Taxes of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Indirect 
Taxes(Rs. In 
Crores) 
23107 
26602 
30924 
35691 
41712 
46546 
52059 
56434 
55392 
65328 
77661 
88918 
89741 
97202 
112450 
118681 
116125 
131284 
147294 
170936 
199348 
241536 
279190 
100180.9 
69284.37 
69.16 
10.81 
Indirect taxes 
as % of GDP 
8.31 
8.55 
8.73 
8.47 
8.58 
8.19 
7.97 
7.54 
6.45 
6.45 
6.54 
6.50 
5.89 
5.58 
5.81 
5.64 
5.11 
5.33 
5.3 
5.4 
5.6 
5.8 
5.9 
6.68 
1.28 
19.17 
-2.47 
Indirect taxes as 
%ofGTR 
80.71 
81.12 
82.22 
80.35 
80.87 
80.93 
77.39 
75.68 
73.18 
70.78 
69.82 
69.06 
64.46 
67.60 
65.47 
62.93 
62.08 
60.70 
57.91 
56.05 
54.44 
51.22 
50.93 
68.52 
10.30 
15.034 
-2.21 
Percentage 
change in 
Indirect 
Taxes 
-
15.13 
16.25 
15.42 
16.87 
11.59 
11.84 
8.40 
-1.85 
17.94 
18.88 
14.50 
0.93 
8.31 
15.69 
5.54 
-2.15 
13.05 
12.19 
16.05 
16.62 
21.16 
15.58 
12.18 
6.49 
53.26 
NA 
Direct taxes 
as % of 
Indirect 
Taxes 
24.07 
23.44 
21.80 
24.61 
23.79 
23.70 
29.21 
32.13 
36.64 
41.28 
43.22 
43.74 
53.79 
47.94 
51.54 
57.55 
59.59 
63.28 
71.34 
77.32 
82.87 
95.29 
95.80 
48.87 
23.39 
47.86 
7.31 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Reforms also entailed reduction in the rate categories and exemption regimes. 
In the case of Union excise duties, the principle of taxing the value added was adopted, 
first in the form of Modified VAT (MODVAT) and later as Central VAT (CENVAT). 
Thie impact of these reforms on direct and indirect taxes was diametrically opposite. 
While the direct taxes showed even with the lower rates, a rising tax-GDP ratio, this 
ratio of the indirect taxes kept sliding down. The indirect taxes had a large share in the 
total tax revenues of the Centre and the fall in the indirect tax to GDP ratio could not 
be compensated by a rise in the direct taxes. As a result, the overall Central tax-GDP 
ratio falls. During 1985-86 to 2007-08, the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of indirect 
taxes as a percent of gross tax revenue are 68.52, 10.30, 15.04 and -2.21 percent 
respectively. The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of indirect taxes as a percent of GDP 
are 6.68, 1.28,19.16 and -2.47 percent during the same period. 
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Table-7 shows the annual growth rate of indirect taxes of the Central 
Government. It has a declining trend over the period. The year 1993-94 and 2001-02 
show negative growth in indirect taxes. The highest growth was witnessed in the year 
1995-96 and 2006-07 which was 18.8 percent and 21.16 percent respectively. During 
the period 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D and C.V of annual growth rate of 
indirect taxes are 12.18, 6.49 and 53.26 percent respectively. Table-7 shows that direct 
taxes as a percent of indirect taxes has an increasing trend during 1985-86 to 2007-08. 
The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of direct taxes as a percent of indirect taxes during 
the same period are 48.87, 23.39,47.86 and 7.31 percent respectively. 
(a) Trend of Custom Duties: 
While using its Constitutional powers the Central Goverrmient levies duties on 
both imports and exports. From revenue point of view, the importance of export duty is 
limited. Over the years both export and import duties have not only been a source of 
revenue, they have also been employed as an instrument to regulate foreign trade. 
Precisely for this reason it has been a practice on the part of the Central Government to 
p]"ovide information about the purpose of each import duty in the budget. 
Custom duties perform two major functions. First, like any other tax they raise 
revenue needed by the Goverrmient, and second, they regulate foreign trade of the 
country, more particularly the imports. In pursuance of these objectives during the pre-
tax reform period India had become a country with the highest level of customs tariff 
in the world, with basic duties supplemented by 'auxiliary' and additional or 
countervailing duties. From Table-8 it is clear that custom duty has increased during 
the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 9526 crores to maximum of Rs. 
98770 crores. The average of custom duty is Rs. 36416.52 crores during the given 
periods. The standard deviation and coefficient of variance of custom duty (Rs. crores) 
are 23938.33 and 65.73 percent respectively in given period. The CAGR is 8.65 
percent during the same periods. 
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Table-8 
Union Custom Duty of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Custom Duty 
(Rs. in Crores) 
9526 
11475 
13702 
15805 
18036 
20644 
22257 
23776 
22193 
26789 
35757 
42851 
40193 
40668 
4842 
47542 
40268 
44852 
48629 
57611 
65067 
86327 
98770 
36416.52 
23938.33 
65.73 
8.65 
Custom Duty 
as%ofGTR 
33.27 
34.99 
36.43 
35.58 
34.97 
35.89 
33.09 
31.89 
29.32 
29.03 
32.15 
33.28 
28.87 
28.28 
28.19 
25.21 
21.53 
20.7 
19.1 
18.9 
17.8 
18.3 
18.0 
28.03 
6.64 
23.67 
-3.46 
Custom Duty 
as % of GDP 
3.43 
3.69 
3.87 
3.75 
3.71 
3.63 
3.41 
3.18 
2.58 
2.65 
3.01 
3.13 
2.64 
2.34 
2.50 
2.26 
1.77 
1.82 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
2.1 
2.1 
2.74 
0.74 
27.004 
-3.70 
Percentage 
change in 
Custom Duty 
35.29 
20.46 
19.41 
15.35 
14.12 
14.46 
7.81 
6.83 
-6.66 
20.71 
33.48 
19.84 
-6.20 
1.18 
19.06 
-1.81 
-15.30 
11.38 
8.42 
18.47 
12.94 
32.6 
14.41 
12.8 
12.76 
101.75 
NA 
Custom Duty 
as percentage 
of Indirect 
Taxes 
41.23 
43.14 
44.31 
44.28 
43.24 
44.35 
42.75 
42.13 
40.07 
41.01 
46.04 
48.19 
44.79 
41.84 
43.06 
40.06 
34.68 
34.16 
33.01 
33.70 
32.63 
35.7 
35.3 
40.42 
4.63 
11.46 
-1.28 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
During pre-independence days and even during the early post-independence 
period, custom duties formed the mainstay of Central tax revenues. However, the 
relative share of custom duties started declining from the early 1950s in view of a 
protective trade policy and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. The share of customs 
revenue in Centre's total tax collections dropped from 38.9 percent in 1950-51 to as 
low as 16.3 percent in 1970-71. After that customs revenue maintained an upward 
swing, accounting for 35.8 percent of Central taxes in the year 1990-91. This upward 
trend was attributable to a changed emphasis from physical to fiscal controls to 
regulate imports, a policy reiterated in the Long-Term Fiscal Policy, 1985. However, 
during the post-liberalization period, a sharp fall is noticeable in the relative share of 
custom duties in gross tax revenues of the Central Government. This is due to drastic 
reductions in the tariff rates across the rate categories including the peak rate in the 
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wake of WTO commitments and to become globally competitive (Sury, M.M., 
2007)'''.In the 2007-08 Budget the share of customs revenue was estimated at 18.0 
percent (Table-8). The average of custom duty as a percentage of gross tax revenue 
during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08 is 28.03 percent. During the same period the 
S.D, C.V and CAGR of custom duty as a percentage of gross tax revenue are 6.64, 
23.67 and -3.46 percent respectively. Custom duties as percent of GDP have declining 
trend. In 2007-08 it is budgeted at 2.1 percent of GDP. From 1985-86 to 2007-08, the 
average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of custom duty as a percent of GDP are 2.74, 0.74, 
27.004 and -3.70 percent respectively. Custom duties as percent of indirect taxes have 
declining trends. It was only increased in the year 1995-96 and 1996-97 which was 
46.04 and 48.19 percent of indirect taxes respectively. In 2007-08 it is budgeted at 35.3 
percent. The average of custom duty as a percentage of indirect taxes during the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08 is 40.42 percent. While the S.D, C.V and CAGR of custom duty as 
a percentage of indirect taxes are 4.63, 11.45 and -1.28 percent respectively during the 
same period. From Table it is clear that annual growth in custom duties have declining 
trend since 1985-86. It was highest in 1986-87 but declined continuously and reached 
to negative in 1993-94. It was highest in 1995-96. After that it again reached to 
negative in the years 1997-98, 2000-01 and 2001-02. In 2006-07 it increases to 32.6 
percent. The average, S.D and C.V of annual growth rate of custom duty during the 
period 1985-86 to 2007-08 are 12.8, 12.76 and 101.75 percent respectively.Unlike 
direct taxes, rate cuts have been important factors in reducing the indirect tax 
collections, as there was no commensurate gain in terms of base expansion or better 
compliance. It was expected that the sharp cut in the custom duties from a peak rate of 
more than 300 percent in the period just prior to reforms to about 30 percent in 2002-
03 would lead to a net fall in custom duty collections, which is evident from Table-8. 
(b) Trend of Union Excise Duties: 
An excise duty is in true sense a commodity tax because it is levied on 
production and has absolutely no connection with its actual sale. Thus in its form, it is 
very much different from a sales tax. However, from the point of view of tax shifting 
and the determination of incidence, there is little difference between an excise duty and 
a sales tax. From Table-9 it is clear that Union excise duties has increased during the 
period 1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 12956 crores to maximum of Rs. 
130220 crores. The average of Union excise duties is Rs. 54706.6 crores during given 
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periods. The standard deviation and coefficient of variance of Union excise duties (Rs. 
crores) are 35662.80 and 65.19 percent respectively. The CAGR is 10.90 percent 
during the same periods. 
Table-9 
Union Excise Duties of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Union Excise 
Duty(Rs. in 
Crores) 
12956 
14470 
16426 
18841 
22406 
24514 
28110 
30832 
31697 
37347 
40187 
45008 
47962 
53246 
61902 
68525 
72556 
82310 
90774 
99125 
111226 
117612 
130220 
54706.6 
35662.80 
65.19 
10.90 
Union Excise 
Duty as % of 
GTR 
45.25 
44.12 
43.67 
42.42 
43,44 
42.62 
41.79 
41.35 
41.88 
40.47 
36.13 
34.95 
34.45 
37.03 
36.04 
36.33 
38.79 
38.06 
35.68 
32.50 
30.37 
24.94 
23.75 
37.65 
5.79 
15.38 
-2.13 
Union Excise 
Duty as % of 
GDP 
4.6 
4.65 
4.64 
4.47 
4.61 
4.31 
4.30 
4.12 
3.69 
3.69 
3.38 
3.29 
3.15 
3.06 
3.20 
2.26 
3.19 
3.4 
3.3 
3.1 
3.1 
2.8 
2.8 
3.61 
0.70 
19.48 
-2.50 
Percentage 
change in 
Union Excise 
Duty 
16.19 
11.69 
13.52 
14.70 
18.92 
9.41 
14.67 
9.68 
2.81 
17.83 
7.60 
12.00 
6.56 
11.02 
16.26 
10.70 
5.88 
13.44 
10.28 
-9.19 
12.20 
5.74 
10.71 
10.55 
5.91 
57.41 
NA 
Union Excise 
Duty as 
percentage of 
Indirect Taxes 
56.07 
54.39 
53.12 
52.79 
53.72 
52.67 
53.99 
54.63 
57.22 
57.17 
51.75 
50.62 
53.44 
54.78 
55.05 
57.74 
62.48 
62.70 
61.6 
57.98 
55.98 
48.69 
46.64 
55.01 
3.97 
7.21 
0.09 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
In the post-independence period, a major change in the Indian tax system 
pertained to the phenomenal rise in the relative revenue significance of Union excise 
duties. In 1950-51, excise revenue accounted for a modest 16.8 percent of total Central 
tax collections: Rs. 68 crores out of Rs.404 crores. Within a span of 20 years, the 
proportionate share shoot up to 54.9 percent in 1970-71. It declined to 49.3 percent in 
1980-81. In 1990-91 it was recorded at 42.6 percent. In the 2007-08 budget, the 
contribution of excise duties in gross tax revenues of the Centre was estimated at 23.8 
percent (Table-9). The relative contribution of excise revenue has declined due to 
reduction in the average tax rates without a compensatory rise in the tax base, evasion, 
and litigation(Sury,M.M.,2007)'^ From 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average of Unioii 
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excise duties as a percent of gross tax revenue is 37.65 percent. During the same period 
the S.D, C.V and CAGR of Union excise duties as a percent of gross tax revenue are 
5.79, 15.37 and -2.13 percent respectively. 
Union excise duty as percent of GDP has a declining trend over the period. It 
fell from 4.6 percent of GDP in 1985-86 to 3.26 percent in 2000-01. In 2006-07 it 
further decreases to 2.8 percent of GDP. The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of Union 
excise duty as percent of GDP are 3.6, 0.70, 19.48 and -2.50 percent respectively. 
Union excise duty as percent of indirect tax increased from 56.07 percent in 1985-86 to 
62.70 percent in 2002-03. After that it starts declining and is budgeted at 46.64 percent 
of indirect taxes in 2007-08. The average of excise duties as a percent of indirect taxes 
is 55.01 percent during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08. The S.D, C.V and CAGR of 
excise duties as percent of indirect taxes are 3.97, 7.20 and 0.09 percent respectively 
during given periods. From the given Table, it is clear that annual growth of Union 
excise duties have a declining trend over the period since 1985-86 to 2007-08. Highest 
growth in excise duties was seen in 1989-90 and lowest was observed in the year 2004-
05(Table-9).The given Table also shows that the average, S.D and C.V of annual 
growth rate of excise duties are 10.55, 5.90 and 57.41 percent respectively during the 
period 1985-86 to 2007-08. 
(c) Trend of Service Tax: 
Service tax was introduced in 1994-95 on three services-telephone services, 
general insurance and share broking. Since then, every year the net has been widened 
by including more and more services under the tax net. As a result, the number of 
assesses has increased considerably over the years and so has been the revenue from 
this tax. It has been a buoyant source of revenue in recent years. The number of 
services liable for taxation was raised from 3 in 1994-95 to 6 in 1996-97, and then of 
gradually to 100 in 2007-08. In 2007-08, certain services were specified as taxable 
services, scope of some of the specified taxable services was changed, threshold limit 
for small service providers was increased and certain exemptions was announced. 
Revenue from service tax, as the combined outcome of expanding tax net, creeping 
rate, and buoyant service sector growth increased rapidly from a paltry Rs. 407 crores 
in 1994-95 to Rs. 37,484 crore in 2006-07 and is budgeted to increase to Rs. 50,200 
crores in 2007-08 (Table-10). The rate of service tax was increased from 5 percent in 
1994-95 to 8 percent on all the taxable services in 2003. As a major step towards 
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integrating the tax on goods and services, Budget for 2004-05 extended the credit of 
semce tax and excise duty across goods and services. To offset the negative revenue 
impact, the semce tax rate was increased from 8 percent to 10 percent. The present 
rate of service tax is 12 percent. 
TabIe-10 
Service Tax of Central Government 
Year 
1 yy4-9.^ 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
200.5-06 
2006-07 
2007-
08(B.E) 
Source: Rea 
Number of 
services 
3 
3 
6 
15 
26 
26 
26 
41 
52 
. 
Number of assesses 
3943 
4,866 
13,982 
45,991 
1,07,479 
1,15,495 
1,22,326 
1,87,577 
2,32,048 
60 1 4,03,856 
75 
84 
99 
100 
'ipt Budget, Unio 
7,40,267 
8,06,585 
918746 
-
n Budget, Government of 
Tax 
rate(percent) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
8 
10 
10 
12 
12 
India 
Revenue(Rs. in 
Crores) 
407 
o6z 
1,059 
1,586 
1,957 
2,128 
2,613 
3,302 
4,122 
7,891 
14,200 
23,055 
37484 
50200 
% of GDP 
0.04 
0.07 
0.08 
0.10 
0.11 
0.11 
0.13 
0.14 
0.2 
0.3 
0.5 
0.6 
0.9 
1.1 
Growth 
111.7 
22.8 
49.7 
23.3 
8.7 
22.8 
26.4 
24.8 
91.4 
80.0 
62.4 
62.6 
33.9 
III. Elasticity and Buoyancies of Tax Revenue: 
1^6 In the early 1960s, G.S.Sahota (1961) made the first systematic and 
comprehensive attempt to compute buoyancy and elasticity of the tax revenue. For the 
period 1951-52 to 1957-58, Sahota estimated the buoyancy of Union taxes at 2.39. The 
crucial elasticity coefficient for the same period was found to be at 0.61 for Union 
taxes. V. G. Rao (1979)'^  estimated the buoyancy and elasticity of all Central taxes at 
1.22 and 0.74 respectively for period 1960-61 to 1973-74. The computations of the 
Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee (1978)'^ also revealed poor elasticity of the 
indirect tax system, except import duties. For the Union excise duties, accounting for 
nearly half of Centre's total tax collections, the Committee estimated the buoyancy and 
elasticity coefficient at 1.31 and 0.75 respectively for the period 1963-64 to 1974-75.1. 
K. IChadye (1981)'^  estimated the buoyancy and elasticity coefficient of Central taxes 
to be 1.25 and 0.83 respectively for the period 1960-61 to 1978-79. M. M. Sury 
(1985)^ ° estimated buoyancy and elasficity of Union excise dufies for two sub-periods, 
1950-51 to 1964-65 and 1965-66 to 1980-81 separately. For the period 1950-51 to 
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1964-65, the buoyancy and elasticity coefficient turned out to be 3.02 and 1.86 
respectively. However, for the period 1965-66 to 1980-81, the values of both the 
buoyancy and elasticity coefficients were relatively low at 1.27 and 0.73. The 
buoyancy estimates of various Central taxes made by the Tenth Finance Commission 
(1995-2000) for the period 1983-84 to 1992-93 were as follows: Union excise duties 
(1.01), income tax (1.10), and corporation tax (1.31), and custom duties (1.38). The 
Eleventh Finance Commissions calculations showed, "The buoyancy of gross tax 
revenue of the Centre with respect to GDP works out to 0.91 during the 1990s, as 
compared to 1.15 in the 1980s. The slump in the buoyancy of Central taxes in the 
1990s occurred despite a smart rise in the growth of revenue from direct taxes, as the 
revenue growth from the two major indirect taxes_ customs and Union excise_ sharply 
decelerated. Tax reforms, while no doubt helping to introduce some rationality in the 
tax structure apparently had a dampening effect on the Centre's revenue, as the 
impressive growth of direct taxes could not fully compensate for the drop in customs 
and Union excise that took place in the post-reform period (Eleventh Finance 
Commission,2000) '^. 
For more recent periods, two estimates of buoyancy of tax revenue in India are 
noteworthy: one by the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07) and other by the Twelfth 
Finance Commission (2005-10). Tenth Plan estimated the buoyancy of Central tax 
revenue at 0.9, 0.8 and 1.26 for Eight Plan, Ninth Plan, and Tenth Plan respectively. 
Buoyancy of direct tax revenue of the Centre was estimated at 1.3, 1.3 and 1.5 for the 
three plans respectively. For the same plans, buoyancy estimates for other categories of 
taxes were as follows: Centre's indirect taxes (0.7, 0.6, 1.1); customs duties (0.9, 0.1, 
0.96); and excise duties (0.6, 1.0, 1.16). A buoyancy estimate of the Twelfth Finance 
Commission (2005-10) of gross central taxes for the period 1950-51 to 2001-02 was 
1.14 (Table-11a). 
The relatively high buoyancy of the tax system revealed by the foregoing 
estimates indicates the success of tax policy as a tool of resource mobilization in India. 
Hov/ever, the same studies show a relatively low elasticity of the tax system, indicating 
lack of inherent response of tax yield to changes in national income. Weakness of the 
elasticity characteristic of the tax system is generally attributed to tax administration 
and large scale tax evasion (Sury, M. M., 2007) . 
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Table-ll(a) 
Buoyancies and Elasticities 
Author 
G.S.Sahota(1961) 
V.G.Rao (1979) 
Indirect Taxation 
Enquiry 
Committee (1978) 
].K.Khadye(1981) 
M.M.Sury(1985) 
Tenth Finance 
Commisi)ion(1995-
2000) 
Eleventh Finance 
Commission(2000-
05) 
Tenth Five Year 
Plan(2002-07) 
Twelftii Finance 
Commission(2005-
2010) 
Period for which 
computations made 
1951-52 to 57-58 
1960-61 to 1973-74 
1963-64 to 1974-75 
1960-61 to 1978-79 
1950-51 to 1964-65 and 1965-
66 to 1980-81 
1983-84 to 1992-93 
1980-81 to 1989-90 and 1990-
91 to 1998-99 
8* Plan, 9* Plan and 10* Plan 
1950-51 to 2001-2002 
Tax group 
All Central taxes 
All Central taxes 
Union excise duties 
All Central taxes 
Union excise duties 
1 .Union excise duties 
2. Income tax 
3. Corporation tax 
4. Customs duties 
Central taxes: Gross 
revenues 
1. Central tax revenue 
2. Direct taxes 
3. Indirect taxes 
4. Customs 
5. Excise 
Central taxes: Gross 
revenues 
Buoyancy 
2.39* 
1.22 
1.3 
1.25 
3.02 and 1.27 
1.01 
1.10 
1.31 
1.38 
1.15 and 0.91 
0.9,0.8,1.26 
1.3,1.3,1.5 
0.7,0.6,1.1 
0.9,0.1,0.96 
0.6,1.0,1.16 
1.14 
Elasticity 
0.61 
0.74 
0.75 
0.83 
1.86 
0.73 
-
-
Source: Sury,M.M., Fiscal Policy Development in India 1947 to 2007. 
Note:* For the period 1953-54 to 1957-58. 
It is important to note that the growth of revenue from any tax may be viewed 
in twc' ways. One is the increase in tax receipts as a result of every increase in national 
income without any change either in the tax rates or in its coverage. It is known as the 
built-in-flexibility of the tax or simply the income elasticity of the tax. In the second 
case changes in rates and the coverage of tax are also taken into account. In this case 
the growth in tax revenue is the result of a process of both widening and deepening of 
the tax. The two together accounts for the total increase in the tax yield and is known 
as the buoyancy of the tax. The revenue yielding capacity of a tax structure is 
measured in terms of tax buoyancy and built in revenue flexibility. Tax buoyancy 
measures the total increase in tax revenue with respect to national income as a result of 
discretionary measures like increase in tax rates, introducing new taxes or increasing 
covf;rage of particular tax etc. tax buoyancy is also indicated by tax income ratio. The 
part of national income which is taken by taxes. 
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Ta?c buoyancy which is measured by tax-income ratio depends upon so many 
factors but the per capita income of the country is its main determinants. Tax-income 
ratio in India is much lower than in the economically advanced countries like USA, 
UK and Denmark etc. where it ranges from about 25 percent to 45 percent considering 
the fact that per capita income in India is much lower in comparison to those countries 
but such a high tax-income ratio may not be expected in India. In view of the 
increasing financial requirements for the planned economic development in the 
country tax-income ratio should at least range between 20-25 percent of national 
income. 
Table-ll(b) 
Buoyancies of Central Taxes 
S.NO 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
V 
vi 
vii 
viii 
ix 
Taxes 
Total tax to GDP 
Direct tax to GDP 
Corporate tax to GDP 
Personal tax to GDP 
Indirect tax to GDP 
Excise tax to manufacturing 
Excise tax to GDP 
Custom tax to import 
Customs tax to GDP 
1981 to 1993 
1.07 
1.07 
1.02 
0.92 
1.07 
0.96 
0.97 
1.20 
1.24 
1981 to 2001 
0.96 
1.19 
1.13 
1.23 
0.88 
0.83 
0.84 
0.77 
0.93 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance 2001-2002, RBI. 
Note: (i) Separate estimates for 1994-2004 were not attempted to ensure that adequate degree of freedom are available. 
(ii) All important tax reform measures were initiated since 1992-93, therefore, separate estimates have been made for 
period from 1980-81 to 2000-01. 
(iii) Tax buoyancy is defined as percentage change in tax collection as a ratio to percentage change in tax base i.e. (DX/X)/ 
(DYA') Where 'X' is the tax collection and 'Y' is the tax base. 
The decline in the tax to GDP ratio is explained by a combination of factors 
that led to a sharp fall in total tax buoyancy from 1.07 for the period 1981-93 to 0.96 
for 1981-2001, implying buoyancy could be less than unity during the post-tax reform 
period 1994-2001. While the buoyancy of direct taxes is estimated to be higher at 1.19 
for the period 1981-200las compared with 1.07 for the pre-tax reform period (1981-
1993),, The buoyancy of indirect taxes dipped considerably to 0.88 from 1.07 in the 
corresponding period (Table-1 lb). 
B. Trend of Non-Tax Revenue: 
A key objective of the reform process was the augmentation of non-tax revenue 
by way of enhancement of user charges and returns on Government investments 
through restructuring of PSUs. The intention of restructuring PSUs was to improve 
their efficiency and thereby enhance the capacity to generate returns on Government 
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investments. Table-12 shows that non-tax revenue has increased during the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 6895 crores to maximum of Rs. 82550 
crores. The average of revenue receipts is Rs. 161729.2 crores in the given periods. 
The standard deviation and coefficient of variance of non-tax revenue are 28234.64 
crores and 69.37 percent respectively. The CAGR is 13.07 percent. Table-12 shows 
that non-tax revenue as proportion of GDP recorded an improvement from 2.45 
percent in 1985-86 to 2.78 percent in 1992-93 and broadly at 2.95 percent in 2002-03, 
unresponsive to the impulses of fiscal reforms however, the need for restructuring of 
public sector undertakings is critical, encompassing a thorough rationalization of user 
charges and cost recoveries on the services rendered by the Government or entities in 
areas such as transport, power and irrigation. Non-tax revenue as percent of GDP had a 
declining trend from 2.79 percent in 2003-04 to 2.01 percent in 2006-07 and is 
estimated at 1.8 percent of GDP in 2007-08. The average of non-tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP is 2.54 percent. The S.D and C.V of non-tax revenue as a percent of 
GDP are 0.42 and 16.35 percent respectively. Non-tax revenue as percent of revenue 
receipts increased from 24.59 percent in 1985-86 to 33.66 percent in 2001-02. After 
2001-02, it has a declining trend. The average of non-tax revenue as a percent of 
revenue receipts is 25.95 percent. The S.D and C.V of non-tax revenue as a percent of 
revenue receipts are 3.94 and 15.19 percent respectively. The CAGR of non-tax 
revenue as a percent of revenue receipts is -0.07 percent. Growth rate of non-tax 
revenue was highest in the year 1986-87 (27.10 percent), 1992-93 (25.8 percent) and 
2001-02 (21.13 percent) but it had a negative growth in the year 1990-91 (-14.13 
percent), 2005-06(-4.92 percent) and is estimated at -0.78 percent in 2007-08.This 
decline in relative share of non-tax revenue was mainly due to reduction in interest 
receipts, debt swap scheme and a softening interest rate regime. Another reason for 
such decline was that the Central Government did not pay proper attention to non-tax 
sources for revenue generation. This issue was raised in the Ninth Five Year Plan when 
it observed, "sufficient attention has not been paid to realization of non-tax revenues. 
Areas from where non-tax revenues can be augmented are irrigation charges, royalties 
on mineral and revision of user charges on services rendered by the Government." The 
average of percentage change in non-tax revenue is 12.62 percent. The S.D and C.V of 
percentage change in non-tax revenue are 12.62 and 12.74 percent respectively. 
Neither the Centre nor the States paid adequate attention to non-sources for 
revenue generation. There is considerable scope for improving non-tax revenue, 
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particularly in States. The low growth of non-tax revenues is related to insufficient cost 
recovery through user charges and is responsible for the rising bill of 'implicit' 
subsidies. 
The trend in components of non-tax revenue reveal that increase in dividend 
and profits, and economic services, fully account for the improvement in Centre's 
collection of non- tax revenue, as growth in other components continued to be stagnant 
duiing the reform period. 
Table-12 
Non-Tax Revenue of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
Non-Tax Revenue 
(Rs. in Crores) 
6895 
8764 
9022 
9840 
13947 
11976 
15961 
20084 
22004 
23629 
28191 
32578 
38214 
44833 
53211 
55947 
67774 
72290 
76831 
81193 
77198 
83205 
82550 
40701.61 
28234.63 
69.37 
NTR as % of 
GDP 
2.45 
2.78 
2.52 
2.32 
3.86 
2.10 
2.44 
2.67 
2.54 
2.33 
2.37 
2.36 
2.50 
2.56 
2.73 
2.66 
2.97 
2.95 
2.79 
2.58 
2.15 
2.0 
1.8 
2.54 
0.42 
16.35 
Percentage 
change in NTR 
-
27.10 
2.94 
9.06 
41.7 
-14.13 
33.2 
25.8 
9.55 
7.38 
19.3 
15.56 
17.30 
17.32 
18.68 
5.14 
21.13 
6.66 
6.28 
5.67 
-4.92 
7.78 
-0.78 
12.62 
12.74 
100.92 
NTR as % of 
Revenue 
Receipts 
24.59 
26.49 
24.35 
22.57 
22.90 
21.79 
24.17 
27.09 
29.16 
25.94 
25.59 
25.79 
28.54 
29.99 
29.32 
29.04 
33.66 
31.3 
29.12 
26.53 
22.2 
19.15 
16.97 
25.92 
3.94 
15.19 
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CAGR 13.07 NA NA -0.07 
Source: Budget Documents of Government of India and Finance Account, Various issues. 
4.3 Trend and Composition of Capital Receipts: 
Those receipts of the Government which create hability or reduce financial 
assets may be called capital receipts. The main components of capital receipts are: 
i) Market Borrowings, 
ii) Small Savings, 
iii) Recoveries of Loan, 
iv) Provident Funds, 
v) Special Deposit, 
vi) Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), and 
vii) External Loans. 
These receipts totaled Rs.l, 94,099 crores in the 2007-08 budget (Table-13). 
From period 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average of capital receipts is Rs. 97406.43 crores. 
The standard deviation and coefficient of variance of capital receipts is 66880.72 and 
68.66 percent respectively in the given period. During the same period the CAGR of 
capital receipts is 12.24 percent. 
Table-13 
Capital Receipts of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Capital Receipts (Rs. in Crores) 
19315 
21572 
25408 
29878 
30020 
38997 
38528 
36178 
55440 
68695 
58338 
61544 
99077 
130064 
115707 
134184 
162500 
180531 
211333 
200391 
179549 
Capital Receipts as % of GDP 
6.95 
6.93 
7.17 
7.09 
6.17 
6.86 
5.90 
4.83 
6.45 
6.78 
4.91 
4.50 
6.51 
7.47 
5.97 
6.38 
7.09 
7.4 
7.67 
6.36 
5.01 
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2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
149000 
194099 
97406.43 
66880.72 
68.66 
12.24 
3.59 
4.12 
6.18 
1.15 
18.56 
-1.19 
Source: Budget Documents of the Government of India. 
Capital receipts have remained more than of 6 percent of GDP during 1980s 
and first half of 1990s (Table-13). Consistent with decline in deficit during the second 
half of 1990s, it came down to 5.9 percent of GDP before increasing to 6.98 percent 
during 2000-05. After that it again started declining and reached to 3.59 percent in 
2006-07 and is estimated at 4.12 percent of GDP in 2007-08 budget. From period 
1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of capital receipts as a percent 
of GDP are 6.18, 1.15, 18.56 and -1.196 percent respectively. However, the distinctive 
feature of the capital receipts has been its changing pattern over a period of time. 
While the share of market borrowings in capital receipts has been continuously rising it 
increased from 25.3 percent in 1985-86 to 77 percent in 2006-07. At the same time 
recoveries of loans as percent of capital receipts declined from 14.4 percent in 1985-86 
to 4.0 percent in 2006-07. The share of small savings increased till the second half of 
the 1990s and declined thereafter (Table-14). On the other hand, external assistance is 
no longer an important source of financing for the Government. This changing profile 
of capital receipts also had adverse impact on the Government finances, as both market 
borrovdngs and small savings are more expensive sources of capital receipts and 
invariEibly lead to higher interest burden in future if the returns on investment are not 
commensurate. 
Table-14 shows that the average of market borrowings(net), recoveries of loan, 
small savings, PSUs, provident ftinds, special deposit, and external loans(net) as 
percentage of capital receipts are 39.99, 13.45, 15.67, 3.85, 4.88, 10.90 and 6.53 
respectively. From the given table it is found that the standard deviation of market 
borrowings is highest i.e 17.83 percent while that of provident fund is lowest i.e 2.12 
percent among all of them. The coefficient of variance of PSUs is highest which is 
found to be 126.86 percent and the coefficient of variance of market borrowings is 
lowest which is found to be 44.58 percent. The CAGR of market borrowings, 
recoveries of loan, provident fund, and external loan are 5.14, -3.62, -2.77 and -3.98 
percent respectively. 
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Table-14 
Composition of Capital Receipt 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-9;) 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-
08(B.E) 
Averaj'e 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
MB(net) 
# 
25.3 
25.6 
23.1 
28.2 
24.7 
20.5 
19.5 
10.2 
52.2 
29.6 
58.3 
31.0 
32.8 
53.0 
53.6 
54.7 
55.9 
57.7 
42.1 
25.4 
59.2 
77.0 
60.1 
39.99 
17.83 
44.58 
5.14 
Recoveries 
of Loan 
14.4 
16.2 
16.5 
15.4 
16.6 
14.6 
15.6 
17.6 
11.2 
9.2 
11.2 
12.3 
8.4 
8.2 
8.8 
9.0 
10.1 
18.9 
31.8 
31.0 
5.9 
4.0 
2.4 
13.45 
7.18 
53.36 
-3.62 
SSs 
22.2 
15.2 
14.3 
18.3 
26.5 
21.3 
14.7 
12.1 
12.9 
21.0 
17.3 
19.8 
20.7 
25.4 
7.8 
6.2 
5.4 
-
-
-
-
-
1.0 
15.67 
7.12 
45.45 
NA 
PSUs 
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.9 
5.4 
0.1 
7.4 
0.6 
0.6 
0.9 
4.5 
1.5 
1.6 
2.2 
1.7 
8.0 
2.2 
0.9 
0.4 
19.6 
3.85 
4.89 
126.86 
NA 
(Percentage of Capital Receipts) 
PF 
2.6 
4.2 
4.6 
4.4 
5.8 
5.1 
5.9 
8.2 
6.7 
6.0 
8.4 
8.8 
8.5 
4.4 
5.7 
3.7 
2.6 
2.6 
2.3 
2.6 
3.1 
3.5 
2.6 
4.88 
2.12 
43.48 
-2.77 
Special 
Deposit 
5.2 
18.1 
17.2 
20.6 
26.5 
19.8 
17.3 
19.7 
13.7 
12.0 
9.1 
10.0 
8.0 
6.3 
5.6 
6.3 
5.0 
5.2 
0.1 
2.9 
0.3 
-
-
10.90 
7.45 
68.39 
NA 
External 
Loans(net) 
7.5 
9.4 
11.4 
8.2 
8.6 
8.2 
14.1 
14.7 
9.2 
5.2 
0.5 
4.9 
1.1 
1.5 
1.0 
5.6 
3.4 
6.6 
6.4 
7.4 
4.2 
5.7 
5.4 
6.53 
3.81 
58.30 
-3.98 
Source: Budget documents of the Government of India. 
Note: #: Comprising dated securities and 364-day Treasury Bills 
MEI: Market Borrowings, SS: Small Savings, PF; Provident Funds, PSUs: Public Sector Undertakings. 
4.4 Findings and Recommendations of Tax Reforms Committees: 
Immediately after independence, the Government of India opted for 
Government sponsored economic planning for increasing the pace of socio-economic 
development. This called for mobilization of huge financial resources for investment in 
the public sector. Accordingly the Government of India appointed the Taxation 
Enquiry Commission (TEC), in 1953, to suggest tax reform measures to raise more 
revenue. The TEC was guided by the need to promote the old philosophy of justice in 
taxation. The TEC recommended to increase the degree of progressivity of direct 
taxes, supplemented by measures to ensure effective enforcement of collection to 
reduce inequality of income. The TEC emphasized the need for raising more resources 
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through taxation for investment in the public sector with minimum disincentive for the 
private sector. The TEC tried to achieve this objective by recommending taxation of 
consumption of all classes to divert increased income from going to conspicuous 
consumption to public saving. The TEC assigned greater role to indirect taxes to 
achieve this objective. Even in the sphere of direct taxes, the TEC recommended for 
the reduction of exemption limit from Rs. 4200 to Rs. 3000; clubbing of incomes of 
husband and wife with family allowance and enlarging the number of income brackets 
to inject graduate progressivity. The TEC did not forget the need for tax incentives for 
new enterprises and recommended tax holiday as an effective means of encouraging 
private investment. These recommendations including those related to State 
Governments' taxes were implemented by the Government of India and the State 
Governments. 
But the Government of India was not satisfied with these recommendations. 
They m e^ded much more radical tax measures to achieve the goal of 'socialistic pattern 
of society'. So the Government invited Nicholas Kaldor (1956)^ '^  to recommend further 
tax refcirms. On his advice the Government introduced a set of 'integrated direct taxes' 
which included expenditure tax, wealth tax and gifts tax in addition to the already 
existing income tax, capital-gains tax and estate duty. The Government tried to 
convince the masses that the rich people were bearing a very high tax burden and 
therefore, the masses should also contribute to whatever extent possible through 
indirect taxes for the development efforts of the country. This philosophy led to 
frequent revision of rates and coverage of indirect taxes. Such unprecedented increase 
in indii^ ect taxation also gave a lever to the private sector, which was protected from 
foreign competition, to use it as an excuse for increasing the profit margin by pushing 
up prices. While the Government was lulled into complacency on the assumption that 
increased indirect taxation would reduce the consumption and bring down the price 
level and also that the system of integrated direct taxes would prevent evasion of direct 
taxes and reduce inequalities of income and wealth, in actual practice prices went on 
rising as and when the rates of indirect taxes were increased and the really rich and 
self-employed income earners and wealth-owners went on evading direct taxes. The 
system of direct taxes introduced on the advice of Kaldor encouraged the emergence of 
the bla.ck money phenomenon in India. These were the consequences of high rates of 
direct taxes with innumerable tax incentives and a complex system of indirect taxes 
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levied by the Central and the State Governments on the same base thereby creating a 
cascading effect on the prices. 
By 1970, the Government of India realized the futility of levying very high 
rates of direct taxes and appointed the Direct Taxes Enquiry Commission (DTEC) 
under the chairmanship of K.N.Wanchoo. The DTEC considered, inter alia, the 
problem of tax evasion and established the income on which tax was evaded for 1968-
69 at a figure of Rs.l, 400 crores. The amount of tax evasion for the same year was put 
at Rs. 470 crores. The Committee suggested various measures to fight the evil of tax 
evasion. Some of the measures suggested were as follows: reduction in tax rates, 
minimization of controls and licences, regulation of donations to political parties, 
creiating confidence among small tax payers, substitution of sales tax by excise duty, 
vigorous prosecution policy and compulsory maintenance of accounts. The Report of 
DTEC was milestone in the area of income tax rates. The Committee made a number 
of far-reaching suggestions for unearthing black money, preventing evasion and 
avoidance of taxes, and reducing arrears. One important recommendation of the 
Committee related to reduction in the rates of direct taxes which in its view were 
mainly responsible for tax evasion because they made tax evasion profitable and 
attractive. The rates of individual income tax were quite high till the year 1973-74. 
However, pursuant to the recommendations of the DTEC, the Government initiated a 
series of rate reductions in individual income tax. The marginal rate of tax was reduced 
from 97.7 percent in 1973-74 to 77 percent in 1974-75 and further down to 66 percent 
in 1976-75. It is noteworthy that DTEC had recommended a maximum marginal rate 
of 75 percent. 
Thus, the tax reform measures introduced in 1953 and 1956 failed to achieve 
th(j intended objectives mainly because they were based on wrong assumptions, 
namely, that high nominal tax rates would reduce inequalities of income and wealth 
and all forms of direct taxes levied simultaneously would reduce tax evasion. 
It may be observed that while the yield from indirect taxes showed buoyancy, 
th(; yield from direct taxes became unimpressive. Considering the tall objectives 
assigned to the direct taxes during 1956 and 1970 of tax reforms, they ended in failure. 
Realizing this failure, high marginal rates were brought down during the mid-1970s. 
The tax reforms which were initiated in the mid-1970s started yielding positive results. 
E\en then they did not form part of a comprehensive package of economic reforms. 
They were ad hoc in nature and the policy-makers assumed that except high rates of 
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taxes all other economic policies were appropriate and were working well. These 
assumptions were shattered by the unimpressive performance of the Indian economy 
under the Five Year Plan regime. Hence, in 1985 Rajiv Gandhi's Government 
attempted to introduce a set of new economic -policy reforms in which tax reforms 
were a part. 
The tax reform measures introduced in 1985-86 by the Union Finance Minister, 
V.P.Singh, included raising of exemption limit for personal income tax, reducing the 
number of slabs from 6 to 4, reducing marginal rate of income tax, abolishing 
compulsory deposit scheme and surcharge on income tax. Besides these, there were 
many other tax-relief measures such as removing the 20 percent ceiling on business 
expenditure incurred on sales promotion. He also announced a Long Term Fiscal 
Policy (LTFP) for the first time a long-term perspective for fiscal policy in which the 
Central Government recognized the deteriorating fiscal position as the most important 
challenge of the 1980s and set out specific targets and policies for achieving fiscal 
turnaround. It indicated a direction of change in tax policy required to promote growth, 
increase buih-in elasticity of the tax system, secure better tax compliance and move 
towards a more equitable distribution of the burden of financing the plan. LTFP 
outlining the possible reduction in corporate tax and rationalization of other axes in the 
following years. Subsequently, the recommendations of the Indirect Taxation Enquiry 
Committee of 1977 (Jha Committee), was accepted and reduced the rates of the 
Central excise duties and introduced modified value added tax (MODVAT), in place of 
Central excise duties on some selected commodities. There were very bold meastires 
(;onsidering the anti-reform lobby which was operating in the country. But the LTFP 
measures could not be implemented because of the political developments which 
P'ushed all economic reforms to the background. These political developments proved 
that political stability is an important prerequisite for implementing any meaningful tax 
reforms in a democracy. 
The foreign exchange crisis of 1991 paved the way for comprehensive 
economic reforms. Manmohan Singh, who became the Union Finance Minister, 
continued the tax rate reduction policy and subsequently accepted and implemented the 
ccimprehensive tax reform measures recommended by the Tax Reforms Committee of 
1991-93 (Chelliah Committee). The Committee identified its approach in the following 
words: "As is well known, our general approach is that the best results, in terms of 
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compliance, (and therefore, revenue), efficiency and equity are obtained through a 
system incorporating moderate rates on a broad base" (GOI, 1992b) . 
The broad approach of the Committee in formulating its recommendations 
relating to tax reforms was that the rates of tax should be moderate and the tax base 
should be widened so that the tax reform measures were not only revenue neutral in the 
short-run but would also be elastic in the long-run. The most important 
recommendations of the Committee may be grouped under the following measures: 
i. Tax-rate cut measures encompassing almost all taxes; 
ii. Measures for widening the tax base, particularly the tax base of PIT; 
iii. Modernization of indirect taxes by gradually replacing both Central excise and 
States sales tax by a two-tier VAT; andSimplifying assessment and compliance 
procedures so as to reduce the cost of compliance. 
The Chelliah Committee has been able to influence the Central Government to 
modernize the tax structure by replacing Union excise duties by MODVAT and 
eventually CENVAT. It has recommended to the Central Government to take 
necessary initiative to persuade the State Governments to modernize their tax 
structures by replacing the sales tax by VAT. The Chelliah Committee has globalized 
tl^ e Indian tax system which will facilitate reaping of benefits under WTO. Its 
recommendations have introduced an element of transparency into the operation of 
Indian tax system. Within the country, the Committee has created awareness among 
tax administers, tax policy-makers and economists that we should aim at realizing the 
dream of the framers of the Constitution to create one national common market by 
removing inter-state trade barriers and by harmonizing tax rates across the States. 
These are all intangible benefits which will be reaped by the country only in the long-
run. Thus the long-run benefits of the Chelliah Committee recommendations are 
positive though the short-run revenue implications are not so impressive (Thimmaiah, 
G, 2002)2^ 
At the time of presenting the first batch of supplementary demands for grants to 
Parliament in July 2002, the Finance Minister had proposed setting up of two task 
foixes to recommend measures for simplification and rationalization of direct and 
indirect taxes. Accordingly, two task forces were set up in September 2002 under the 
chairmanship of Vijay Kelkar, Adviser to Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs. 
The Task Force on Direct Taxes presented its consultation paper to the Government on 
November 2, 2002. The discussion paper on indirect taxes was presented on November 
161 
25, 2002. These consultation papers were made public to facilitate an informed 
discussion on tax policy. After taking into account the response on the discussion 
papers, the Task Forces submitted their final Reports to the Government in December 
2Ci02. These Task Forces made important recommendations on toning up tax 
administration to put in place a system that is simple, effective and at par with 
international standards. 
The main recommendations on direct taxes related to raising of exemption limit 
of personal income tax, rationalization of exemptions, abolition of concessional 
treatment to long-term capital gains, and abolition of wealth tax. In respect of indirect 
ta}ies, the main recommendations related to widening of the tax base, removal of 
exemptions, and expansion in the coverage of service tax. 
In the last few years, various study groups and task forces have focused on the 
ta}c reforms in the tax system at the Central level. The Advisory Group on the Tax 
Policy and Administration for the Tenth Plan and the Kelkar Task Force (KTF) reports 
on direct and indirect taxes and more recently the KTF on the implementation of the 
FFLBM Act have comprehensively examined the tax system and made important 
recommendations for reform.(GOI (2001a, 2002a, 2002b,2004b)^^ All these are in 
conformity with the direction set by the TRC in 1991 and 1993, which called for 
broadening the tax base, reducing the rates, minimizing rate differentiation, and 
simplifying the tax systems. While there are differences on specific recommendations, 
these newer force reports share broad agreement on the direction and thrust of reforms 
and on the need to reform tax administration and the tax information system (TIN). 
Tax reform in India has made enormous progress in the last thirty years. The 
tax: structure today bears little resemblance to that prevailing in the mid-1970s. Almost 
all the change has been for the better, judged by the usual standards of economic 
efficiency, equity, built-in-revenue elasticity and transparency. But the work of tax 
reform is never finished (Achariya, Shankar 2005) . 
43 Expenditure Reforms: 
Before independence, the amount and pattern of public expenditure in this 
country were determined by the colonial policy of the British rulers. Changes in the 
ex]3enditure policy of the Government, however, became inevitable after India got 
independence and the process of plaiming began. The nationalist Government laid 
do^vn its own priorities and the volume and pattern of expenditure were determined 
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accordingly. Both intensive and extensive expansion in the activities of the 
Gcivemment during the planning period has resulted in a spectacular rise in the public 
ex]3enditure. 
The role of public expenditure in the fiscal policy goals of growth, equity and 
stability, has varied across different phases of economic development in India. Public 
expenditure in India assumed significance in the context of mixed economy model 
adopted after independence in India whereby the Government assumed the primary 
responsibility of building the capital and infrastructure base to promote economic 
growth. The concerns regarding equity and poverty alleviation after two decades of 
independence i.e. 1970s, added another important dimension to public expenditure in 
terms of redistribution of resources. The inadequate returns on capital outlays and the 
macroeconomic crisis of early 1990s arising out of high fiscal deficit shifted the focus 
of public expenditure to efficiency in its management for facilitating adequate returns 
and restoring macroeconomic stability. While the fiscal policy goal of stability could 
be achieved, the modus operandi of public expenditure management through curtailing 
capital expenditure raised concerns about infrastructure investment and its impact on 
the long-term growth potential. The upward movement in Government's revenue 
exj)enditure was partly responsible for fiscal deterioration which set in during the latter 
half of 1990s. With a renewed commitment towards fiscal consolidation since 2003-
04, re-prioritization of expenditure and emphasis of outcomes rather than outlays are 
the guiding principles of public expenditure management. A series of expenditure 
management measures to check the built-in growth of expenditures as well as to bring 
about a structural change in the expenditure composition were announced in successive 
budgets of the Central Government since the early 1990s. 
A. Need for Prudent Expenditure Management in India: 
Although sharp cuts in expenditure were effected as part of the stabilization 
pac;kage in 1991, attempts to curb expenditure growth in successive Central 
Government budgets in the 1990s were found to be mostly 'sporadic and arbitrary in 
nature'(Premchand,A. & Chattopadhyay,S.,2002) . It is only in the second generation 
of fjconomic reforms that expenditure reform has become an integral part of the overall 
fiscial reform. Expenditure Reforms Commission set up by the Government suggested 
a host of measures to curb built-in-growth in expenditure and to bring about structural 
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changes in the composition of expenditure. Some of these measures have been 
implemented by the Government. These included: 
• Subjecting all ongoing schemes to zero-based budgeting; 
• Assessment of manpower requirements of Government departments through 
reviewing norms for creation of posts and introduction of voluntary retirement 
schemes (VRS) and redeployment of surplus staff; 
• Review of all subsidies with a view to introducing cost-based user charges 
wherever feasible; and 
• Review of budgetary support to autonomous institutions, and encouragement to 
PSUs to maximize generation of internal resources. 
Notwithstanding the wide range of measures, the expenditure compression was 
mainly effected in the capital expenditure. Notably, the capital outlay of the Centre 
declined from 3.0 percent of GDP in 1986-87 to 2.1 percent in 1990-91 and further to 
1.0 percent in 1996-97. Since then, there has been a significant reversal of the trend 
with a renewed focus of expenditure management. A major initiative towards 
institutionalizing an expenditure management system was through constitution of 
Expenditure Reforms Commission (ERC) to look into various areas of expenditure 
correction. These included creation of national food stock along with cost 
minimization of buffer stock operations, rationalization of fertilizer subsidies through 
phased dismantling of controls, imposing a ceiling on Government staff strength 
through a two-year ban on new recruitment. Endeavour was also made to promote 
transparency and curb growth in contingent liabilities by setting up the Guarantee 
Redemption Fund. As a part of these efforts, some major expenditure management 
policies initiated by the Government during the current decade include: 
• Administered Price Mechanism (APM) in the petroleum sector was dismantled 
from April 2002; 
• Restriction on fresh recruitment to 1 percent of the total civilian staff strength 
over the 4 years beginning fiscal 2002-03; and 
• Introduction of a new pension scheme of defined contribution for new recruits 
since January 2004 and introduction of an outcome budget in 2005-06 to 
evaluate the quality of expenditure 
• Avoiding rush of expenditure through releases in a time-sliced manner and 
simplification of procedures (Pattnaik,R.K., Raj,D.S. & Chander,Jai.2009f ^ . 
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Performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C and 
i'^ G) of selected programmes continued to throw up important lessons for expenditure 
management. Further, the C and AG has recently framed and notified Regulations of 
/mdit and Account for the Government departments and other bodies and authorities 
under their control. Notification of the Regulations has brought transparency in 
Government audit and accounting process of C and AG (Kapila, Uma. 2008)''''. 
B. Trend and Composition of Public Expenditure: 
Given consumption and investment spending constitute an important part of 
ajjgregate demand in the economy. It influences growth through several channels. An 
increase in public spending on physical capital could positively influence the long-term 
growth. The impact of such spending in human capital formation could be larger but 
benefits require longer gestation period. So is the case with Government spending on 
research and development (R&D). As such, any programme of stabilization-cum 
adjustment, has to be given considerable attention to the expenditure side of fiscal 
restructuring. It is important to plan expenditure reduction while improving quality of 
public spending to aim simultaneously at supporting growth with equity and improving 
fiscal balances. In India, expenditure/GDP ratio of the Centre had risen from about 
12.3 percent in 1970-71 to around 20 percent in the latter half of the 1980s. This had 
placed a difficult burden on budgetary balances. With a view to narrowing down the 
fiscal gap, particularly by bridging the revenue deficit, a cut in current expenditure was 
T 1 
considered essential (Kapila,Uma, 2003) . 
Fiscal consolidation was an integral part of economic reform introduced in the 
early 1990s. After promising start in the early 1990s, progress in fiscal consolidation 
fakered somewhat from 1997-98. Fiscal deficit of the Central Government after 
declining from 6.6 percent of GDP in 90-91 to 4.1 percent in 1996-97, had risen to 4.8 
percent of GDP in 1997-98 and thereafter maintained a rising trend till 2001-02. In 
order to understand the current fiscal predicament of the Central Government it is 
necessary to examine the pattern of the Central Government expenditure over the 
years. 
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Table-15 
Total Expenditure of Central Government 
Item 
Non-Plan 
Expenditure 
Interest 
Payment 
Defence 
Subsidy 
Plan 
Expenditure 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Total 
Expenditure 
1980-81 
to 
1984-85 
9.86 
2.06 
2.65 
1.33 
6.36 
10.11 
6.12 
16.23 
1985-86 to 
1989-90 
12.62 
3.18 
3.15 
1.83 
6.65 
12.88 
6.38 
19.26 
1990-91 
to 1994-
95 
11.99 
4.13 
2.48 
1.67 
4.88 
12.51 
4.36 
16.87 
1995-96 to 
1999-00 
11.39 
4.40 
2.29 
1.21 
3.90 
12.11 
3.17 
15.29 
2000-01 to 
2004-05 
11.9 
4.54 
2.32 
1.4 
4.28 
13.1 
3.12 
16.2 
(Percentage of GDP) 
2005-06 
10.2 
3.7 
2.25 
1.2 
3.9 
12.3 
1.8 
14.13 
2006-07 
10.0 
3.62 
2.06 
1.3 
4.1 
12.4 
1.7 
14.1 
2 
Source: Central Government Budget Papers, Government of India. 
The fiscal trend of 1970s suggests that this was a period of moderate growth in 
public expenditure in line with revenue flow and that deficit on revenue account 
occurred only in 1979-80. The break came during 1980s, when the total expenditure of 
the Central Government increased from 16.23 percent of GDP in the 1980-85 to 19.26 
percent in 1985-90, then started declining continuously and it reached to the level of 
14.1 percent during 2006-07.Revenue expenditure increased from 10.11 percent of 
GDP in 1980-85 to 12.4 percent of GDP in 2006-07, while capital expenditure as 
percent of GDP decreased from 6.12 percent in 1980-85 to 1.7 percent in 2006-
07(Table-15). It is clear from Table-15 that interest payments have increased during 
the period 1980-85 to 2006-07 from 2.06 percent of GDP to 3.62 percent of GDP , 
subsidies have increased from 1.33 percent of GDP in 1980-85 to 1.67 percent of GDP 
in 1990-95, then it started declining and reached to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2006-07. 
Defence expenditure of Central Government increased from 2.65 percent of GDP in 
the 1980-85 to 3.15 percent of GDP in 1985-90 then it started declining continuously 
and reached to the level of 2.06 percent during 2006-07. This was mainly due to the 
increase in non-plan expenditure, which climbed from 9.86 percent of GDP during 
1980-85 to 12.62 percent during 1985-90. What is more striking about this increase is 
the rise in almost all categories of non- plan expenditure namely interest payment, 
defejnce expenditure, subsidies, loans and grants to States and UTs as also other non-
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plan expenditure. Also, the plan expenditure remained more than 6 percent throughout 
1980s. So was the capital expenditure. And indeed the capital formation increased 
from 6.6 percent of GDP during the first half of 1980s to 7.2 percent during the second 
half of 1980s. Thus, it is clear that 1980s were characterized by a significant increase 
in Government expenditure both plan and non-plan as also revenue and capital 
expenditure. 
C. Trend of Plan and Non-plan Expenditure: 
Given the existing classification of expenditure, plan expenditure and capital 
expenditure are closest approximation to such expenditure. As a proportion of GDP, 
plan expenditure was 7.6 percent in 1985-86. After declining from 5.0 percent in 1990-
91 to 3.8 percent in 1998-99, started rising again to reach 4.6 percent in 2002-03, 
declined to 3.9 percent in 2005-06 but recovered to 4.1 percent in 2006-07. In 2007-08, 
plan expenditure budgeted to reach 4.4 percent of GDP. As proportion of GDP, non-
plan expenditure followed a similar pattern, desirable though, and fell from 12.3 
percent in 1990-91 to reach 10.0 percent in 1996-97. The proportion rose again to 
reach 11.6 percent in 2000-01. With adjustment, the proportion declined to 12.7 
percent and 10 percent in 2003-04 and 2006-07 respectively and is budgeted to 10.1 
percent of GDP in 2007-08 (Table-16).The average plan and non-plan expenditure as a 
percent of GDP is 4.59 and 11.76 percent respectively during 1985-86 to 2007-08. The 
standard deviation of plan and non-plan expenditure is 1.26 and 1.29 respectively, 
meaning thereby deviation in non-plan expenditure is higher than plan expenditure. 
Coefficient of variance of plan expenditure as a percent of GDP is found to be 27.45 
percent which is higher than coefficient of variance of non-plan expenditure which is 
10.97 percent during the same period. The CAGR of plan and non-plan expenditure as 
a percent of GDP is -2.67 and-1.07 percent respectively. 
Table-16 
Plan and Non-plan Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Plan Expenditure 
7.6 
7.8 
7.3 
6.6 
6.0 
5.0 
5.0 
(Percentage of GDP) 
Non-Plan Expenditure 
12.5 
13.7 
13.2 
13.4 
14.3 
12.3 
13.1 
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1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
5.2 
5.4 
4.6 
3.9 
3.9 
3.9 
3.8 
3.9 
4.0 
4.4 
4.6 
4.4 
4.2 
3.9 
4.1 
4.4 
4.59 
1.26 
27.45 
-2.67 
12.2 
12.1 
10.9 
10.3 
10.0 
10.4 
10.8 
11.5 
11.5 
11.4 
12.3 
12.7 
11.6 
10.2 
10.0 
10.1 
11.76 
1.29 
10.97 
-1.07 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Annual growth rate of plan and non-plan expenditure can also be seen in Table-
17. Plan expenditure, after recorded growth of 19.6 percent in 1985-86 started 
declining to 3.0 percent in 1990-91. Negative growth was seen in case of plan 
expenditure in the year 1995-96. In 2001-02, the plan expenditure recorded an increase 
of 22.4 percent and in fact had declined in 2005-06. Such expenditure is proposed to 
increase by 20.7 percent in 2006-07 and 2007-08. Annual growth rate of non-plan 
expenditure was 21.4 percent in 1985-86 and it reached to 23.4 percent in 1989-90, 
after that it started declining. Non-plan expenditure, after recording a year-on-year 
growth of 15.6 percent in each of the two years of 2002-03 and 2003-04, witnessed 
moderation in growth in 2004-05 and in fact had declined in 2005-06. In 2006-07, the 
non-plan expenditure recorded an increase of 13.1 percent and such expenditure is 
proposed to increase by 15 percent in 2007-08 over the 2006-07. During the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08, the statistical analysis shows that the averages of annual growth 
rate of plan and non-plan expenditure are 11.73 and 13.39 percent respectively. The 
S.D of annual growth of plan expenditure is found to be 6.47 which is slightly higher 
than the S.D of annual growth of non-plan expenditure which is 6.04 during the same 
period. The C.V of annual growth of plan and non-plan expenditure is 55.15 and 45.11 
percent respectively, meaning thereby C.V of plan expenditure is higher than the C.V 
of non-plan expenditure during the same period. The averages of plan and non-plan 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure are 29.04 and 70.94 percent 
respectively. The S.D of plan and non-plan expenditure as a percent of total 
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expenditure is 3.53 and 3.52 respectively. While the C.V of plan expenditure is found 
to be 12.15 percent which is higher than the C.V of non-plan expenditure i.e 4.96 
percent. The CAGR of plan and non-plan expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure are -1.07 and 0.49 respectively during 1985-86 to 2007-08. From the 
Table, it is clear that plan expenditure as percent of total expenditure has declining 
trend., while non-plan expenditure as percent of total expenditure has rising trend. This 
confirms the hypothesis that Government by and large is unable to control the fast 
growing non-plan expenditures, particularly interest payment. 
Table-17 
Expenditure of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
TE(Rs. in 
Crores) 
52666 
62916 
68261 
79111 
92908 
105298 
111414 
122618 
141853 
160739 
178275 
201007 
232053 
279340 
298053 
325592 
362310 
413248 
471203 
498252 
506123 
583386 
680521 
262049.87 
186134.55 
71.03 
12.16 
PE(Rs. in 
Crores) 
19854 
22996 
24209 
26151 
27520 
28365 
30961 
36660 
43622 
47378 
46374 
53534 
59077 
66818 
76182 
82669 
101194 
111470 
122280 
132292 
140638 
169860 
205100 
72834.96 
52056.54 
71.47 
11.0 
PE as % 
ofTE 
37.6 
36.5 
35.4 
33.0 
29.6 
26.9 
27.7 
29.8 
30.7 
29.4 
26.0 
26.6 
27,3 
26.1 
25.5 
25.3 
27.9 
27.2 
25.7 
26.6 
27.7 
29.1 
30.3 
29.04 
3.53 
12.15 
-1.07 
%age change 
in the PE 
19.6 
15.8 
5.2 
8.0 
5.2 
3.0 
9.1 
18.4 
19.0 
8.5 
-2.1 
15.4 
10.3 
13.1 
14.9 
8.5 
22.4 
10.1 
9.6 
8.2 
6.3 
20.7 
20.7 
11.73 
6.47 
55.15 
NA 
NPE(Rs. in 
Crores) 
3281 
39920 
44052 
52960 
65388 
69907 
80452 
85958 
98191 
113361 
121911 
136802 
157259 
189521 
221871 
242923 
261116 
301778 
348923 
365960 
365485 
413526 
475421 
186325.91 
135248.98 
72.59 
12.76 
NPEas 
%ofTE 
62.4 
63.5 
64.6 
67.0 
70.4 
73.1 
72.3 
70.2 
69.3 
70.6 
74.0 
73.4 
72.7 
73.9 
74.4 
74.7 
72.1 
72.7 
74.2 
73.4 
72.3 
70.9 
69.6 
70.94 
3.52 
4.96 
0.49 
%age change 
inNPE 
21.4 
21.6 
10.3 
20.2 
23.4 
6.9 
15.0 
6.8 
14.2 
15.4 
7.5 
12.2 
14.9 
20.5 
17.0 
9.4 
7.4 
15.5 
15.6 
4.8 
-.12 
13.1 
14.9 
13.39 
6.04 
45.11 
NA 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Note: TE-Total Expenditure, PE-Plan Expenditure, NPE-Non-Plan Expenditure. 
Bt. Trend and Composition of Revenue Expenditure: 
Revenue expenditure relates to the normal expenditure required for running of 
Government departments and various services, interest charges on debt incurred by the 
Government, and grants given to State Governments and other parties. Broadly 
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speaking, all those expenditure of the Government which does not result in the creation 
of physical or financial assets may be treated as revenue expenditure. 
Budget documents classify revenue expenditure into plan and non-plan revenue 
expenditure. Plan revenue expenditure pertains to Central plan and Central assistance 
for State and Union Territory plans. However, the more important non-plan 
expenditure covers a wide variety of general, social and economic services of the 
Government. The three major items of non-plan revenue expenditures are (a) interest 
payment, (b) defence, and (c) subsidies (Sury, M.M., 2007)^ .^ 
Table-18 
Revenue Expenditure of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08{B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
Total Revenue 
Expenditure(Rs. 
in Crores) 
33924 
40860 
46174 
54106 
64210 
73516 
82292 
92702 
108169 
122112 
139861 
158934 
180350 
216460 
249078 
277838 
301468 
338713 
362074 
384329 
439761 
514608 
557899 
210410.35 
159321.19 
75.72 
Revenue 
Expenditure (as 
% of GDP) 
12.2 
13.1 
13.0 
12.8 
13.2 
12.9 
12.6 
12.4 
12.6 
12.1 
11.8 
11.6 
11.8 
12.4 
12.7 
13.2 
13.2 
13.8 
13.1 
12.2 
12.3 
12.4 
11.9 
12.58 
0.56 
4.45 
Revenue Expenditure 
as percentage of Total 
Expenditure 
64.4 
64.9 
67.6 
68.3 
69.1 
69.8 
73.8 
75.6 
76.2 
75.9 
78.4 
79.0 
77.7 
77.4 
83.5 
85.3 
83.2 
81.9 
76.8 
77.1 
86.8 
88.2 
81.98 
76.65 
6.81 
8.88 
Percentage change in 
Revenue Expenditure 
-
20.44 
13.00 
17.17 
18.67 
14.49 
11.93 
12.65 
16.68 
12.89 
14.53 
13.63 
13.47 
20.02 
15.06 
11.54 
8.50 
12.35 
6.8 
6.14 
14.4 
17.0 
8.41 
13.63 
3.89 
28.52 
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CAGR 13.50 -0.08 1.19 NA 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
From Table-18 it is clear that revenue expenditure has increased during the 
period 1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 33924 crores to maximum of Rs. 
557899 crores. The average of revenue expenditure is Rs. 210410.35 crores in the 
given periods. The standard deviation and coefficient of variance of revenue 
expenditure are 159321.19 and 75.72 percent respectively. The CAGR is 13.500 
percent during the same periods. Over the period of study, annual growth of revenue 
expenditure shows declining trend. Table-18 shows that growth rate of revenue 
expenditure was highest in years 1986-87(20.44 percent) and 1998-99(20.02 percent) 
but it had lowest growth in the year 2004-05(6.14 percent).During 1985-86 to 2007-08 
the average, S.D and C.V of percentage change in revenue expenditure are 13.63, 3.89 
and 28.52 percent respectively. From Table-18, it is evident that revenue expenditure 
as a percentage of total expenditure has a rising trend. In 2006-07 it reached to 88.2 
percent and is budgeted at 81.98 percent in 2007-08. During the period 1985-86 to 
2007-08 the statistical analysis shows that the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of 
revenue expenditure as a percent of total expenditure are 76.65, 6.81, 8.88 and 1.19 
percent respectively. Revenue expenditure as a proportion of GDP declined from 12.2 
percent in 1985-86 to 11.8 percent in 1995-96, but increased to 13.8 percent in 2002-
03 and again it declined to 12.4 percent in 2006-07. It is budgeted to decline flirther to 
11.9 percent in 2007-08.The major contributing factor for such fluctuations in revenue 
expenditures relates to items of committed expenditure, of which, interest payments 
and expenditures on wages and salaries are prominent. Interest payment as a ratio to 
GDP increased from 3.8 percent in 1990-91 to 4.7 percent in 2001-02 for the Central 
Government. During the phase of fiscal consolidation, even though the debt to GDP 
ratio for the Central Government fell from 55.22 percent in 1990-91 to 49.01 percent 
in 1996-97, the rise in the weighted average interest rate on Central Government's 
market borrowings, following the progressive alignment of coupon rates with market 
interest rates, led to the rise in the interest payments .On the other hand, in the latter 
half of the 1990s, though the cost of borrowings declined consistently due to fall in 
market interest rates, interest payments continued to rise unabated. This essentially 
refl(jcts the impact of sizeable outstanding liabilities contracted at higher interest rates 
during the first half of the 1990s ,and also the return to rising deficit, and consequent, 
increase in public debt to GDP ratio to 59.96 percent in 2001-02 and further to 61.33 
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percent in 2007-08. During the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, the average, S.D,C.V and 
CAGfR of revenue expenditure as a percent of GDP are 12.58, 0.56, 4.45 and -0.08 
percent respectively. 
/. Trend of Interest Payments: 
Interest payments constitute the single largest component of non-plan revenue 
expenditure. It is in nature of committed expenditure arising out of past profligacy. 
From Table-19 it is clear that interest payments has increased during the period 1985-
86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 7512 crores to maximum of Rs. 158995 crores. 
The average of interest payments is Rs. 68730.52 crores in the given periods. The 
standard deviation and coefficient of variance of interest payments are 49715.60 and 
72.33 respectively. The CAGR is 14.91 percent during the same periods. 
Over the period of study, annual growth rate of interest payment shows the 
declining growth. Table-19 shows that the maximtmi rate of growth of interest 
payment was in the year 1988-89 i.e., 26.9 percent. In the year 1990-91 growth was 21 
percent, it increased in the subsequent period. Other period shows marked level of 
fluctuations in the interest payments. During the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, the 
average, S.D and C.V of percentage change in interest payments are 15.10, 7.18 and 
47.58 percent respectively. Interest payments as a percent of revenue expenditure is 
continuously increasing. In 1985-86 it was 22.1 percent, and continuously increased 
upto 1994-95. In 1995-96 there was marginal decline, but it hovered around 36 to 33 
percent of revenue expenditure. In 2007-08 it is budgeted to 28.4 percent of revenue 
expenditure. The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of interest payments as a percent of 
revenue expenditure are 31.75, 4.69, 14.78, and 1.25 percent respectively during 1985-
86 to 2007-08. 
Table-19 
Interest Payment of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
Interest 
Payment 
(Rs. in 
Crores) 
7512 
9246 
11251 
14278 
17757 
Annual 
Growth Rates 
(%) 
-
23.0 
21.6 
26.9 
24.3 
LPs as % of 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
22.1 
22.6 
24.3 
26.3 
27.6 
Ratio of Interest 
Payments to 
Revenue Receipts 
26.7 
27.9 
38.3 
32.7 
33.9 
LPs as % of 
GDP 
2.9 
3.2 
3.4 
3.6 
4.0 
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1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
C A G R 
21498 
26596 
31075 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
117804 
124088 
126934 
132630 
150272 
158995 
68730.52 
49715.60 
72.33 
14.91 
21.0 
23.7 
16.8 
18.2 
19.9 
13.5 
18.8 
10.3 
18.6 
15.8 
10.8 
8.2 
9.6 
5.3 
2.29 
4.48 
13.3 
5.8 
15.10 
7.18 
47.58 
NA 
29.2 
32.3 
33.5 
33.9 
36.0 
35.7 
37.4 
36.3 
35.9 
36.2 
35.7 
35.6 
34.7 
34.2 
33.0 
30.1 
29.2 
28.4 
31.75 
4.69 
14.78 
1.25 
39.1 
40.2 
41.9 
48.9 
48.3 
45.4 
47.1 
49.0 
52.1 
49.7 
51.5 
53.4 
51.0 
47.0 
41.5 
38.2 
34.6 
32.7 
42.22 
8.05 
19.06 
1.26 
3.8 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.3 
4.2 
4.4 
4.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.8 
4.7 
4.8 
4.5 
4.0 
3.7 
3.6 
3,4 
4.08 
0.54 
13.23 
0.77 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Note: I.Ps-Interest Payments. 
The increased reliance on borrowings has directly multiplied the debt servicing 
liabilities of the Government. Fiscal experts have warned against an internal debt trap, 
a situation in which borrowings have to be resorted to just to keep up with debt 
servicings. Interest payments as a proportion to revenue receipt increased from 27 
percent in 1985-86 to 52.1 percent in 1998-99. Thereafter interest payments declined 
from a high of 53.4 percent in 2001-02 to 34.6 percent in 2006-07 and further to 32.7 
percent in 2007-08.During 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of 
ratio of interest payments to revenue receipts are 42.22, 8.05, 19.06 and 1.26 percent 
respectively. Interest payment as percent of GDP increased from 2.9 percent in 1985-
86 to 4.4 percent in 1998-99.It after remained at a high level of 4.7 percent to 4.8 
percent in the four-years period from 1999-2000 to 2002-03, started declining to reach 
3.6 percent in 2006-07.It is budgeted to decline further to 3.4 percent of GDP in 2007-
08 (Table-19). The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of interest payments as a percent of 
GDP are 4.08, 0.54,13.23 and 0.76 percent respectively during the given period. These 
declining trends, as proportion of both GDP and revenue receipts, were partly on 
account of the softening of interest rates which resulted in progressive reduction in the 
average cost of borrowings and slower growth of debt. 
Reduction in interest rates is one alternative to arrest the rising debt servicing 
obligations of the Government. However, cuts in interest rates will provide only short-
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lived relief. For a long-term solution of the problem, the borrowed funds must be used 
for productive purposes and for projects which ensure reasonable rate of return. This is 
also the underlying philosophy of public debt. 
//. Trend of Expenditure on Subsidies: 
The word subsidy is derived from the Latin word subsiduim meaning troops 
stationed in reserve, and essentially implies 'coming to assistance from behind'. A 
subsidy is grant of money from an outside third party to either the buyer or the seller of 
a commodity. Subsidies allow a buyer to procure a commodity/service at a lower price 
than would otherwise have been necessary. Similarly, a business firm will not stay in 
operation unless revenue is sufficient enough to cover cost plus some return on 
investment. If revenue from buyers is insufficient, a subsidy from an outside agency 
may keep the firm in operation. The effect of a subsidy is opposite of the effect of a 
tax. A cash subsidy is opposite of a direct tax while a subsidized commodity is the 
opposite of a taxed commodity. Hence, subsidies are sometimes called negative 
taxation. Subsidies are generally classified as implicit or explicit. Implicit subsidies are 
targeted (or administered) indirectly and also referred to as hidden subsidies. These 
arise out of below cost provision of goods and services produced in the public sector. 
Explicit or direct subsidies refer to income supplements or to transfers and payments at 
a predetermined rate (of production or consumption). 
Budget subsidies in India are large, mostly implicit and input based, and 
generally regressive. These subsidies obscure and promote inefficiencies. The 
Government of India, in its Discussion Paper on Government subsidies in India states 
its desire to curb subsidies. There is evidence, however, that Central subsidies may 
actually have risen sharply in the late 1990s. Both Central and State Governments 
continue to provide many subsidies for goods and services where there are no clear 
externalities. At the same time, critical areas like health and education have suffered, 
as per capita expenditure have remained low although the degree of subsidization has 
been high. 
Subsidies are often justified on the grounds that they serve distributional 
objectives or as protection for infant industries. Distributional motives are behind food 
subsidies for below poverty line (BPL) populations and support prices for farming 
outputs. In practice, however, subsidies have historically been extended to all 
households and the distributional objective has rarely been served. Further, subsidies 
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may not always be the best means of achieving the distributional objectives. The infant 
industry argument has also been made to advocate subsidies for exports or small-scale 
industries, but the validity of this argument is doubtful from an efficiency viewpoint. 
At any rate, these subsidies could only be valid for temporary periods. 
Table-20 
Major Subsidies of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Subsidie$(Rs. in 
Crores) 
4796 
5451 
5980 
7732 
10474 
12158 
12253 
10824 
11605 
11854 
12666 
15499 
18540 
23593 
24487 
26838 
31210 
43533 
44323 
45957 
47522 
57125 
54330 
23423.91 
17014.23 
72.64 
11.83 
Annual 
Growth Rates 
(%) 
13.65 
9.70 
29.29 
35.46 
16.07 
0.78 
-11.66 
7.21 
2.14 
6.85 
22.36 
19.62 
27.25 
3.78 
9.60 
16.2 
39.5 
1.8 
3.6 
3.4 
20.2 
-4.8 
12.36 
13 
105.17 
N.A 
Subsidies as % 
of RE 
14.13 
13.34 
12.95 
14.29 
16.31 
16.53 
14.88 
11.67 
10.72 
9.70 
0.05 
9.75 
10.28 
10.89 
9.83 
9.65 
10.34 
12.8 
12.2 
11.9 
10.8 
11.1 
9.7 
11.47 
3.26 
28.42 
-0.98 
Subsidies as % of 
GDP 
1.7 
1.8 
1.7 
1.8 
2.2 
2.1 
1.9 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.4 
1.8 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1.38 
1.15 
1.52 
0.31 
20.39 
-1.58 
Source: Central Government Budget Documents and Reserve Bank Records and Indiabudget.nic.in. 
From Table-20 it is clear that major subsidies has increased during the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 4796 crores to maximum of Rs.54330 
crores. The average of major subsidies is Rs. 23423.91 crores in the given periods. The 
standard deviation and coefficient of variance of subsidies are 17014.23 and 72.63 
respectively. The CAGR is 11.83 percent during the same periods. Growth in major 
subsidies can be explained very well by its annual percentage variation (Table-20). 
About 14 percent increase in subsidies was witnessed in 1986-87. There was a sharp 
increase in subsidies growth in the period 1988-89. This increase remained in the 
subsequent period. In 1990-91, annual growth had declined and it was 16 percent. 
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Percentage variation shows a negative growth in 1992-93 which implies that subsidies 
had declined over its previous period. Since Government of India started economic 
reforms in 1990-91, so that between the periods 1990-91 to 1992-93 there was no 
growth in subsidies due to fiscal consolidation programmes. Thereafter, in 1993-94 
there was sharp jump in subsidies allocation. The periods 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-
99 show high armual growth rates in subsidies. After that it started declining. The 
average, S.D and C.V of percentage change in major subsidies are 12.36, 13.0 and 
105.17 percent respectively during 1985-86 to 2007-08. 
Downward rigidity has been discernible in expenditure on subsidies, which is 
another major constituent of the revenue expenditure. Subsidies are an important 
policy instrument. Apart from impacting the expenditure side of the fisc, these affect 
domestic resource allocation, income distribution and expenditure efficiency. 
Subsidies can also affect international competitiveness by introducing distortions in 
international trade. Apart from providing implicit subsidies through under-pricing of 
public goods and services. Governments also extend subsidies explicitly on items such 
as export, interest on loans, food and fertilizers. 
From the above Table it is clear that approximately 14 percent of revenue was 
consumed as subsidies in 1985-86. There was a marginal decrease in subsequent 
period. More or less same trend was followed upto 1993-94. From 1994-95 to 2000-
01, approximately 9 percent of revenue was consumed as subsidies. We can say that 
subsidies expenditure varies between 9 percent to 11 percent of revenue expenditure. 
The average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of subsidies as a percent of revenue expenditure are 
11.47, 3.26, 28.42 and -0.98 percent respectively during 1985-86 to 2007-08. 
Performance of subsidies is observed by calculating it as percent of GDP from 
Table-20, shows that in 1985-86 it was 1.7 percent of GDP which increased to 2.2 
percent in 1989-90. Owing to the conscious efforts made by the Government, total 
explicit subsidies of the Central Government, which constituted 2.14 percent of GDP 
in 1990-91, were reduced to nearly 1 percent by 1995-96. During the second half of the 
1990s, the size of subsidies again started rising and increased to 1.4 percent of GDP by 
2001-02. Subsidies fell from 1.8 percent in 2002-03 to 1.3 percent in 2006-07 and 1.1 
percent in 2007-08. During the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, the average, S.D and C.V 
of subsidies as a percent of GDP are 1.52, 0.31 and 20.39 percent respectively. The 
CAGR of major subsidies as a percent of GDP is -1.58 percent. 
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///. Trend of Expenditure on Defence: 
Defence expenditure, chiefly determined by geo-political situation, is almost a 
committed expenditure. Defence expenditure is a sacred cow in India and any 
suggestion to control or reduce it is construed as almost unpatriotic. However, 
restraining defence expenditure should not be understood in terms of weakening 
defence preparedness. It simply means exploring the possibilities of achieving the 
existing level of defence preparedness at reduced costs. As a result of the 
implementation of the recommendations of various pay commissions, the wage 
component of the defence budget has increased disproportionately (Sury, M.M., 
2003) . From Table-21 it is clear that defence expenditure has increased during the 
period 1985-86 to 2007-08, from minimum of Rs. 7021 crores to maximum of Rs. 
54078 crores. The average of defence expenditure is Rs. 26033.6 crores in the given 
periods. The standard deviation and coefficient of variance of defence expenditure (Rs. 
crores) are 15846.3 and 60.87 respectively. The CAGR is 10.36 percent during the 
same periods. 
Among the other Government expenditure, it is also noteworthy that defence 
expenditure has increased substantially in the late 1980s, rising from about 2.8 percent 
of GDP in the early 1980s to about 3.4 percent in the late 1980s. Defence expenditure 
is characterized into two parts, defence expenditure, on revenue account and defence 
expenditure on capital account. From the Table it is clear that defence expenditure 
started increasing during late 1980s. In 1986-87, it was 3.4 percent of GDP. After 
1987-88 it has a declining trend during rest of the period. During the period 1985-86 
to 2007-08, the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of defence expenditure as a percent of 
GDP are 1.9, 0.6, 31.8 and -3.72 respectively. 
Table-21 
Defence Expenditure of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
Defence (Rs. in 
Crores) 
7021 
9179 
8861 
9558 ^ 
10194 
10874 
11442 
12109 
Defence 
Expenditure as % 
of RE 
20.6 
22.4 
19.1 
17.6 
15.8 
14.7 
13.9 
13.0 
Defence 
Expenditure as % 
of GDP 
2.9 
3.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
2.0 
1.9 
1.7 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
30.73 
-3.46 
7.86 
6.65 
6.67 
5.22 
5.82 
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1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
14978 
16426 
18841 
20997 
26174 
29861 
35216 
37238 
38059 
40709 
43203 
43862 
48211 
51681 
54078 
26033.6 
15846.3 
60.87 
10.36 
13.8 
13.4 
13.4 
13.2 
14.5 
13.7 
14.1 
13.4 
12.6 
12.0 
11.9 
11.4 
10.9 
10.0 
9.7 
14.13 
3.17 
22.41 
-2.75 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
1.6 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
1.92 
0.61 
31.8 
-3.72 
23.69 
9.66 
14.70 
11.44 
24.65 
14.08 
17.93 
5.74 
2.20 
6.69 
6.12 
1.52 
9.91 
7.19 
4.63 
9.98 
8.16 
81.76 
NA 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI. 
In the Table it is clearly shown that defence expenditure on the revenue 
accounts as a percent of revenue expenditure has a declining trend over the period of 
study. It was 21 percent of revenue expenditure in 1985-86 which has declined and 
reached to 10.0 percent in 2006-07 and is budgeted at 9.7 percent in 2007-08. The 
average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of defence expenditure as a percentage of revenue 
expenditure are 14.13, 3.17, 22.41 and -2.75 percent respectively during 1985-86 to 
2007-08.Table-21 shows that the highest growth in defence was seen in 1986-87 
(30.73 percent) but it had negative growth in the year 1987-88 (-3.46 percent) and is 
estimated at 4.63 percent in 2007-08. During the period 1985-86 to 2007-08, the 
average, S.D and C.V of percentage change in defence expenditure are 9.9, 8.15 and 
81.71 percent respectively. 
E. Trend and Composition of Centre's Capital Expenditure: 
Those expenditure of the Government which leads to the creation of physical or 
financial assets or reduction in recurring financial liabilities fall under the category of 
capital expenditure. Such expenditures pertain to payments on acquisition of assets like 
land, buildings, machinery, equipment, as also investments in shares, and loans and 
advances given to State Governments, public sector enterprises and other parties. 
Capital disbursements are of two kinds: those spent directly (capital outlays) and those 
spent indirectly by extending loans and advances (Sury, M.M., 2003)^ '*. From Table-22 
it is clear that capital expenditure has increased during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08 
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from minimum of Rs. 18742 crores to maximum of Rs. 122622 crores. The average of 
capital expenditure during the same period is Rs. 51640.13 crores. The S.D and C.V of 
capital expenditure are 29915.48 and 57.93 percent respectively. The CAGR is 7.85 
percent in the given period. 
Table-22 
Capital Expenditure of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
CE(Rs. in 
Crores) 
18742 
22056 
22087 
25005 
28698 
31782 
29122 
29916 
33684 
38627 
38414 
42074 
51718 
62879 
48975 
47753 
60842 
74535* 
109129* 
113923* 
66362 
68778 
122622 
51640.13 
29915.48 
57.93 
7.85 
CEas 
%ofTE 
35.5 
35.0 
32.3 
31.6 
30.8 
30.1 
26.1 
24.3 
23.7 
24.0 
21.5 
20.9 
22.2 
22.5 
16.4 
14.6 
16.8 
18.0 
23.1 
22.8 
13.1 
11.7 
18.0 
23.260 
6.81 
29.26 
-4.0 
CE as % of 
GDP 
6.7 
7.1 
6.2 
5.9 
5.9 
5.6 
4.5 
4.0 
3.9 
3.8 
3.2 
3.1 
3.4 
3.6 
2.5 
2.3 
2.7 
3.0 
4.0 
3.6 
1.9 
1.7 
2.6 
3.97 
1.56 
39.29 
-5.001 
Percentage change 
-
17.6 
0.1 
13.2 
14.7 
10.7 
17.6 
2.7 
12.5 
14.6 
-0.5 
9.5 
22.9 
21.5 
-22.1 
-2.4 
27.4 
22.5 
46.4 
4.4 
-41.7 
3.6 
78.2 
12.43 
22.86 
183.93 
NA 
Source: Economic Survey, various issues, Government of India. 
Note: * Includes repayment to National Small Savings Funds 
CE-Capital Expenditure, TE-Total Expenditure 
From the above Table-22, it is clear that percentage change in capital 
expenditure over the period of study is very erratic. The average and S.D of percentage 
change in capital expenditure during the period 1985-86 to 2007-08 are 12.42 and 
22.85 percent respectively. While the coefficient of variance of percentage change in 
capital expenditure is 183.92 during the same period. If we observe capital 
expenditure as percent of GDP, it has a declining trend. This shows that, in the name of 
fiscal adjustment programmes, Government has suppressed the growth of capital 
expenditure just to show that in aggregate Government expenditure has declined. 
During 1986-87, percentage change in capital expenditure was 17.6 percent which 
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reached to near zero in the next period, there was no increase in capital expenditure in 
that period. From 1988-89 to 1990-91, there was a positive change in the capital 
expenditure. If the capital expenditure is visualized as a proportion of GDP, it has a 
declining trend. In 1985-86 capital expenditure was 7.2 percent of GDP which reached 
to 4.4 percent of GDP in 1990-91. In the period 1991-92 there was reduction in capital 
expenditure in absolute terms equal to -8.3 percent. During this period, Government's 
emphasis was to reduce fiscal deficit in the name of fiscal adjustment programmes. 
The axe of cutting expenditure fell on capital expenditure since it was an easy option to 
the Government as compared to revenue expenditure. From 1992-93 to 1994-95, there 
was positive increase in capital expenditure. Further in 1995-96, there was reduction in 
capital expenditure in absolute term. In two consecutive period 1999-2000 and 2000-
01, there was no increase in capital expenditure in absolute term. In terms of 
percentage of GDP, the capital expenditure has a declining trend. During the period 
1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of capital expenditure as a 
percent of GDP are 3.96, 1.55, 39.29 and -5.001 percent respectively. From the Table 
it is clear that capital expenditure as percent of total expenditure on an average has 
declining trend. In 1985-86 it was 35.5 percent, while in 1990-91 it was 25.2 percent. 
It further declined from 18.0 percent in 2002-03 to 11.7 percent in 2006-07. This trend 
substantiates the argument that fiscal adjustment programme of the Government of 
India is based on the reduction of capital expenditure instead of revenue expenditure. 
During 1985-86 to 2007-08 the average, S.D, C.V and CAGR of capital expenditure as 
a percent of total expenditure are 23.26, 6.81,29.26 and -4.0 percent respectively. 
Table-23 
Composition of Capital Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Loan and 
Advances (Rs. 
in Crores) 
11087 
12797 
12793 
14750 
16890 
19652 
17723 
16297 
20454 
23736 
24316 
Percentage 
change of 
Loans and 
Advances 
-
15.4 
-0.03 
15.2 
14.5 
16.3 
-9.8 
-8.04 
25.5 
16.0 
2.4 
Capital Outlay(Rs. 
in Crores) 
7655 
9259 
9294 
10255 
11808 
12130 
11399 
13619 
13230 
14891 
14099 
Percentage 
change in Capital 
Outlay 
-
20.9 
0.3 
10.3 
15.1 
2.7 
-6.0 
19.4 
-2.8 
12.5 
-5.3 
180 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08(B.E) 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
C A G R 
27878 
34193 
44037 
24938 
23008 
34284 
29101 
34150 
52338 
55025 
60250 
115123 
31513.9 
22889 
72.63 
8.08 
14.6 
22.6 
28.7 
-43.3 
-7.7 
49.0 
-15.1 
17.3 
53.2 
5.1 
9.4 
6.5 
10.35 
20.77 
200.67 
NA 
14196 
17525 
18842 
24037 
24745 
26558 
44834 
74979 
61585 
11337 
8528 
7499 
20100.2 
17428.1 
86.71 
4.54 
-0.02 
23.4 
7.5 
27.5 
2.9 
7.3 
68.8 
67.2 
-21.7 
-81.5 
-24.7 
-12.1 
5.99 
30.19 
504.33 
NA 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
Table-23 shows that loan and advances have increased during the period 1985-
86 to 2007-08 from minimum of Rs. 11087 crores to maximum of Rs. 115123 crores. 
While during the same period capital outlay has decreased from maximum of Rs. 7655 
crores to minimum of Rs. 7499 crores. The averages of loan and advances and of 
capital outlay are Rs. 31513.9 and Rs. 20100.2 crores respectively during 1985-86 to 
2007-08. The S.D of loan and advances (Rs. in cores) is found to be Rs. 22889 crores 
which is higher than the S.D of capital outlay (Rs. in crores) i.e Rs. 17428.1 crores. 
The coefficient of variance of capital outlay is 86.70 percent which is higher than the 
coefficient of variance of loan and advances i.e 72.63 percent. While the CAGR of 
loan and advances and capital outlay is 8.07 and 4.54 percent respectively, meaning 
thereby CAGR of loan and advances is higher than that of capital outlay .Percentage 
change in loans and advances and capital outlay is very erratic (Table-23). The average 
of percentage change in loan and advances is 10.35 percent which is found to be higher 
than the average of capital outlay. The standard deviation of percentage change in loan 
and advances and of capital outlay is 20.77 and 30.19 respectively, meaning thereby 
the S.D of percentage change in capital outlay is higher than S.D of percentage change 
in loan and advances. The coefficient of variance of capital outlay is higher than that of 
percentage change in loan and advances (i.e 504.32 and 200.67 respectively). 
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CHAPTER-5 
PERFORMANCE OF 
FISCAL REFORMS IN 
INDIA 
PERFORMANCE OF FISCAL REFORMS IN INDIA 
5.1 Fiscal Reforms and India's Economic Crisis: 
Fiscal reforms have been in the forefront of India's economic reforms 
programme initiated in 1991. The fiscal situation prevailing at the end of the 1980s 
was marked by large and persistent deficits in the Government budgets, hence needed 
strong corrective action was recognized on all hands well before the onset of the 
balance of payments crisis that compelled the country to seek the assistance of the IMF 
and the World Bank to keep the economy going. The Prime Minister's Economic 
Advisory Council chaired by the late Sukhamoy Chakravarty had in their report of 
December 1989 drawn pointed attention to the uncertainties posed by the twin 
imbalances that had been plaguing the Indian economy at the time despite notable 
acceleration in output growth during the decade, one on the fiscal side and other in 
external trade(Govemment of India ,1989)'.While the reform launched to combat the 
cirisis that came to a head in 1991 sought to correct the imbalances through measures 
mounted on several fronts, the focus was on fiscal reform as the key to stabilization 
and growth on a sustainable basis. The deficits in the Government budget were seen as 
a prime source of imbalance on the external front too as they were thought to spill into 
the balance of payments and raise questions about the country's solvency at home and 
abroad( Bagchi, Amaresh ,1998) .^ 
The gross fiscal deficit (GFD) of the Centre witnessed a decline during the first 
half of the 1990s. Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP fell during this period as a 
result of restructuring of tax system with focus on simplification and rationalization of 
bo th direct and indirect taxes, drawing mainly from the recommendations of the Tax 
Reforms Committee, 1991. The fiscal correction strategy focused on the expenditure 
front, whereby corrective measures initiated at the beginning of the 1990s, mostly in 
the terms of curtailment of expenditure growth, yielded some promising results. In 
fact, the reduction in revenue receipts brought about by the decline in tax/GDP ratio 
was: more than offset by the reduction in revenue expenditure, resulting in a marginal 
reduction in the ratio of revenue deficit to GDP during this period. However, the fiscal 
consolidation even during the first half of he 1990s was brought about primarily 
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through curtailment in capital outlay and net lending. Consequently, the gross fiscal 
deficit, on an average, declined by 0.49 percent of GDP per annum during the period 
1991-92 to 1996-97 (Table-1) 
TabIe-1 
Key Fiscal Variables of Central Government 
Item 
1. Revenue Deficit(B-A) 
A Revenue Receipt (i +ii) 
i) Tax Revenue(net 
ii)Non-Tax Revenue of which 
a)Interest Receipts 
b)Dividend and profits 
B. Revenue Expenditures Of which 
i) Interest payments 
ii) Subsidies 
iii) Grants 
iv) Defence 
2. Gross Fiscal Deficit(l+3+4+5-6) 
3. Non-defence Capital outlay 
4.DefenceCapital expenditure 
5, Net Lending 
6. Disinvestment 
7, Gross Primary Deficit(2-Bii) 
Source: Ranjit K.Pattnaik, Deepa S.P 
1991-92 to 1996-97 
(average) 
-0.14 
-0.07 
-0.12 
0.05 
0.01 
0 
-0.22 
0.09 
-0.17 
-0.69 
-0.06 
-0.49 
-0.15 
-0.03 
-0.16 
0.01 
-0.58 
.ai and Jai Chander (200( 
1997-98 to 2001-
02 (average) 
0.41 
-0.06 
-0.18 
0.12 
-0.01 
0.15 
0.35 
0.08 
0.05 
-0.64 
0.03 
0.27 
0.01 
0.02 
-0.14 
0.03 
0.19 
(PercentofGDP) 
2002-03 to 2006-07 
(average) 
-0.45 
0.28 
0.48 
-0.21 
-0.21 
-0.01 
-0.17 
-0.23 
-0.04 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.48 
0.06 
0.05 
-0.15 
-0.01 
-0.25 
5), "Fiscal Policy Indicators in a Rule-
Based Framework: An Indian Experience". 
The key policies that induced these favourable fiscal developments varied 
across the two Central levels, the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Act in 2003-04 capped several years of technocratic and 
political efforts and gave a significant stimulus to the cause of fiscal consolidation. The 
FRBM Act targeted elimination of the Centre's revenue deficit by 2008-09 and a 
reduction of the fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP. It also specified minimum 
improvement towards these targets each year. The fiscal deficit target had been preety 
much achieved by 2007-08, with relatively modest recourse to creative accounting, 
such as incurring of off-budget liabilities. (The year 2008-09, will be a wholly different 
matter, thanks to huge implicit and explicit subsidies for fliel, fertilizers and food as 
well as the effects of the Sixth Pay Commission and the loan waiver for farmers 
announced in 2008-09 budget). 
The second major policy initiative at the Central level was a concerted and 
sustained programme to raise the tax-GDP ratio through better application of 
information technology and other means to strengthen tax administration(Chakravarty, 
10^ 
Shomit,2004)^ Coupled with the remarkable acceleration in economic growth 
(especially of industry and services) after 2002-03, this helped to lift the Centre's tax-
GDP ratio (net of devolution to States) from 5.9 percent of GDP in 2001-02 to 9.2 in 
2007-08 (Table-2). Revenue receipts was 9.66 percent in 1990-91.From 1990-91 
onwards revenue receipts has not grown much. It is more or less stagnant. Non-tax 
revenue as proportion of GDP recorded an improvement from 2.67 percent in 1992-93 
to 2.97 percent in 2001-02.After that it had a declining trend from 2.79 percent in 
2003-04 to 2.01 percent in 2006-07. Total expenditure as percent of GDP declined 
from 18.5 percent in 1990-91 to 14.1 percent in 2006-07. The revenue expenditure was 
almost smoothly declining right from 12.6 percent of GDP in 1991-92 to 11.7 percent 
in 1996-97. And after that it recorded a sudden increasing trend. Capital expenditure 
slumped to 1.7 percent in 2006-07 as compared to 5.6 percent in 1990-91. Revenue 
deficit shot up to 3.26 percent in 1990-91. It fluctuated between 3.82 percent in 1998-
99 to 4.40 percent in 2002-03. After that it shows a declining trend. Gross fiscal deficit 
was 7.7 percent in 1990-91. After 1990-91, it was brought down but its downward 
movement in the 1990s does not suggest a stable trend. It came down in the first two 
years of reforms but sharply rose to 6.96 percent in 1993-94 and then continued to 
fluctuate in the band of 4.84 percent in 1996-97 to 6.47 percent in 1998-99. In 2002-03 
it was 5.91 percent and declined to 3.5 percent in 2006-07 (Table-2). 
Table-2 
Centre's Fiscal Position-A Summary Review 
(Percent of GDP) 
Year RR TR NTR Exp RE CE RB FB 
1990-91 9.66 7.6 2.10 18.5 12.9 5.6 3.26 -7.7 
1991-92 10.11 7.7 2.6 17.1 12.6 4.5 2.48 -5.55 
1992-93 9.91 7.2 2.67 16.4 12.4 4.0 2.47 -5.34 
1993-94 .86 6.3 2.7 16.5 12.6 3.9 3.78 -6.96 
1994-95 8.99 6.7 2.3 15.9 12.1 3.8 3.05 -5.68 
1995-96 9.27 6.9 2.3 15.0 11.8 3.3 2.49 -5.05 
1996-97 9.23 2.3 14.7 11.7 3.1 2.37 -4.84 
1997-98 8.79 6.3 2.5 15.2 11.8 2.4 3.04 -5.82 
1998-99 8.59 6.0 2.6 16.0 12.4 2.2 3.82 -6.47 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
9.37 6.6 2.8 15.2 12.9 2.3 
9.15 6.5 2.7 15.4 13.2 2.7 
8.87 5.9 2.97 15.9 13.2 3.0 
9.4 6.5 2.9 16.9 13.8 2.7 
9.6 6.8 2.79 17.] 13.1 4.0 
9.7 7.1 2.6 15.8 12.3 3.6 
9.7 7.5 2.2 14. 12.3 
9.5 8.5 2.01 14.1 12.4 1.7 
Source: 
Note; 
Economic Survey-Various issues and Budget Paper. 
RR-Revenue Receipts, TR-Tax Revenue (Net to Centre), NTR-Non Tax Revenue, RE-
Expenditure, CE-Capital Expenditure, RB-Revenue Balance, FB-Fiscal Balance. ' 
3.46 
4.05 
4.40 
4.40 
3.57 
2.49 
2.58 
1.94 
Revenue 
-5.36 
-5.65 
-6.19 
-5.91 
-4.48 
-3.99 
-4.09 
-3.50 
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5.2 Measurement of Fiscal Gap: 
A. Meaningof Fiscal Gap: 
The term fiscal gap is normally used to indicate the overall resources gap in 
countries finances which might include various kinds of deficits including fiscal 
deficits. But, Mihir Rakshit (2000)'' used this term to indicate a particular type of 
defcit. He defined 'Fiscal Gap' as ".... Is nothing but the Governments incremental 
financial liability (IFL) less monetized deficit. Fiscal gap thus represents the yearly 
increase in Government debt to the rest of the economy plus reduction in its financial 
assets, and hence constitute, better measure than fiscal deficit of the Governments 
incremental debt burden due to current budgetary measures". He defines incremental 
financial liability (IFL) to be equivalent to capital disbursement plus revenue deficit 
plus non-debt capital receipt (NDCCR).Capital disbursement plus revenue deficit is 
noihing but fiscal deficit, the additional factor therefore is NDCCR. Rakshit's 
argument is that NDCCR is significant as different kinds of receipts should be treated 
sej)arately on the basis of their implications for future earning in terms of which all 
NDCCR may not be put on the same footing. For example, disinvestment in PSUs 
cannot be treated on the same footing as the tax collection because although both are 
non-debt creating receipts, disinvestment proceeds reduce future earnings of the 
Government by way of interest and dividends. "From view point of budgetary viability 
there can thus be little doubt that reduction of fiscal deficit through disinvestment 
cannot but be worse than tax financing"(Rakshit,Mihir, 2000)^ 
Rakshit (2000)^  is of the view that the fiscal deficit as is commonly defined is 
not appropriate for judging the sustainability of debt financing or the efficacy of 
Governments budgetary operations in pursuing the objectives of fiscal policy. But 
limitafions of convenfional measures of fiscal deficit are well recognized. ".... There is 
no such thing as the fiscal deficit, but rather a series of alternative measures each with 
advantages and disadvantages" (Blejer,Mario & Cheasty,Adrienne ,1993)^ Thus, there 
could be number of measures appropriateness of their use depends upon the purpose 
for which they are being used like which set of macroeconomic consequences of fiscal 
policy is intended to be assessed. So Rakshits concept of fiscal gap may prove to be 
usefiil in evaluating the budgetary policy of the country. 
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It appears from the discussion on various deficit concepts that fiscal deficit 
alone may not be of much use if not supported by other informations. Fiscal deficit, as 
discussed, indicates the public sectors borrowing requirement which may arise on 
account of Governments spending in excess of its receipts. But overspending itself 
may not be good or bad for its own sake. Other informations which are required to 
make use of the concept of fiscal deficit would be whether the overspending is because 
of Goverrmients capital investment or simply the revenue expenditure, and secondly 
the rate of return expected on the investment. If the investment is in the form of 
creating infrastructure which does not add to the Governments revenue directly but it 
surely increases the Governments tax receipts (as the infrastructure would result in 
enhanced output). If the increase in Governments receipts in the form of tax or non-tax 
revenue is of greater magnitude than the cost of borrowings debt financed investment 
is alright otherwise it would require a review of the investment decision of the 
Government. 
If the said borrowings requirement is on account of financing the consumption 
expenditure then situation would be termed as alarming. But even then it would be still 
open to judgement if the revenue deficit is properly measured. It is said there are 
number of expenditures that, in normal budgetary accounting, have the effects of 
investments, for example, the expenditure on education since large part of the 
education goes towards the salaries of the teachers it is put into the category of revenue 
expenditure in most of the countries including India. But such expenditure is basically 
an investment in human capital which in the time to come will surely contribute to the 
productivity enhancement. It can, therefore, be said different types of Government 
expenditures like public consumption, investment and transfers have different 
implications for future receipts of the Government. Thus, for examining the 
sustainability of fiscal stance or evaluating the macroeconomic consequences of it, the 
composition of Government expenditure, not simply its aggregates, has to be taken 
into consideration. 
Debt crisis in many countries during 1980s had brought the focus on fiscal 
policy with fiscal deficit as key element. Fiscal imbalances were then considered (and 
continued to be considered) as the principal cause for various macro-economic 
problem like inflation, balance of payments disequilibrium, investment crowding-out 
and as a result slowing down of economic growth. These problems, in turn, were 
supposed to be responsible for low revenue collection which means fiirther deficit and 
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hence the perpetuity of the crises. The correction of such imbalances began to be 
£iccord(2d top priority among all other measures to bring about macroeconomic 
corrections. 
But the question is, whether such effects of fiscal imbalances are real or 
illusionary. Another important question that arises, which measure of deficit as fiscal 
deficit itself can be measured variously; besides, there are other deficit concept also 
like 'revenue deficit' and monetized deficit etc. which have the potentiality of 
influencing with varying degree, above mentioned macro variables. Answer to such 
c[uestions lies on the purpose for which the fiscal deficit is being measured. "Although 
the deficit measure is relevant primarily as an indicator of the macroeconomic 
c;onsequences of fiscal policy, the set of consequences that policy makers desire to 
£issess may itself determine the correct deficit measures"(Blejer, Mario & 
Cheasty,Adreienne 1993)^ 
Since selection of appropriate measure itself is so important for any analytical 
study of the influence of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables, measurement of 
deficit as also its determinants assume significance. Though the discussion is general 
in nature, references here are mostly cited from the studies on Indian economy. This 
may not be out of time in view of the following observations. "Although country 
circumstances vary greatly, fundamental principles of fiscal management apply 
everywhere" (Development Report, 1998)^ . 
The above mentioned World Development Report was probably the first 
document that initiated a debate on the measurement aspect of the deficit. There is near 
unanimity on the point that the deficit per se may not be of any analytical value. To 
Avhat extent it is distortionary, can be judged from the various items of expenditure and 
revenue as also from the way it is financed. "Deficits in themselves do not 
ELUtomatically imply macroeconomic problems. If the use of public resources is 
sufficiently productive, future income can be generated to cover the servicing cost of 
£iny debt incurred" (Ibid)'°. 
It appears from the above observation that the prime concern about fiscal 
deficit seems to be for its contribution to public debt and its sustainability. Therefore, 
the api)ropriate measures has been found to be the one which measures the public 
sectors borrowing requirements (PSBR) as it represents the total excess of expenditure 
c»ver revenue which has to be financed through borrowings. This measure has been 
termed as 'fiscal deficit' and is considered to be the most appropriate for measuring the 
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net claim on resources by public sector which may turn out to be the explanatory 
variabl'e for various macro imbalances. 
If so defined fiscal deficit is compared with the conventionally measured 
iDudgetary deficit in India's context, it is found that later does not completely serve the 
jpurpose. The fiscal gap up to the mid-1980s was measured in terms of 'budgetary 
deficit' which referred mainly to the changes in the amount of ad hoc Treasury Bills 
and other 91-day Treasury Bills outstanding and the changes in the Central 
Governments deposit balances with the Reserve Bank and its other cash balances. In 
fact, until the beginning of the 1990s, there was no unique concept of budget deficit 
I'elevant to all purposes and occasions. Depending on the nature of the quest, the 
relevant budget deficit concept could have seen the Government revenue deficit, the 
capital deficit, or overall deficit (Gill, K.S., 1991)". While the budget deficit, as was 
defined at that time, severely understated the monetary impact of fiscal operations 
since it did not include Reserve Banks investment in dated securities, there was also 
some over statement of the monetary impact to the extent that the Treasury Bills were 
held by the banks. Thus, its argument is that 'An unambiguous and economically 
meaningful measure of the monetary impact of fiscal operations is provided by the 
(change; in Reserve Bank credit to Government. In view of this, the Chakravarty 
(Committee emphasized the need to have a measure for the full extent of Governments 
reliance on Reserve Bank so as to quantify the monetary impact of fiscal operations, 
iiince a sizeable part of the new issues of Government securities was taken up by the 
Reserve Bank in the absence of adequate response from the market and subscriptions 
to dated securities had a much effect on the reserve money growth as purchase of 
Treasury Bills, the Committee recommended that the net changes in the Reserve Banks 
holding of dated securities and Treasury Bills after adjusting the Government deposit 
Avith the Reserve Bank i.e., the net RBI credit to the Government, may be taken to 
measure the extent of monetization of Government deficit. The Committee also 
recommended that the fiscal gap be measured in terms of fiscal deficit which would 
measure the net borrowing requirement of the Government. 
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B. Measurement of Fiscal Deficit: 
Though appropriate measure of deficit as has been mentioned earUer would 
depend upon the purpose for which it is to be used, the measure that gauge the public 
sectors; claim on resources of the economy has been considered to be the best among 
all and that is 'fiscal deficit'. Since it measures the public sector's borrowing 
]:equirement, it is supposed that it reflects the expansionary impact of the budget. 
]l^ owe^ 'er, it remains to be seen as to what extent this perception is correct. The 
measures based on above requirement are following: 
(1) Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD) = (Revenue expenditure+ capital 
expenditure+ net domestic lending) _ (Revenue receipts+ grants) 
Shortcomings of the traditional measure of budget deficit are evident when it is 
(compared with GFD. While the gross fiscal deficit captures the entire shortfall in 
<3oveniments fiscal operations (domestic and foreign) and/or running down on its cash 
holdinjjs, the traditional measure is confined, besides the depletion of liquidity 
holdings, only to one particular form of domestic borrowings, i.e., 91-day Treasury 
bills, Ihus ignoring other domestic borrowings, i.e., such as current loans, small 
savings, provident funds, etc., as well as foreign borrowings (Rangarajan,C ,2004) . 
Since in most of the developing countries Government used to act like financial 
intermediary by re-lending the borrowed amount to other sectors like State and local 
(jovemment, public enterprises etc. This means such lending does not result in 
(jovemment acquiring profitable financial asset. This however is done in order to 
i\ilfill the capital requirements of these sectors. But for the purpose of measurement it 
v^ill be proper that this amount may be netted out from the gross fiscal deficit 
otherwise figure for the consolidated fiscal deficit will be overstated on account of 
double counting. Therefore, the net fiscal deficit is more relevant and has following 
identity. 
(ii) Net Fiscal Deficit= Gross fiscal deficit _ net domestic lendings= 
(Revenue expenditure + capital expenditure) - (Revenue receipts + 
grants) 
Traditional budgetary deficit has been found to be inadequate in capturing the 
full impact of fiscal expansion because they have at least three limitations 
(Tanzi,Vito.,1993)^^ 
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i. Different taxes and expenditure affect demand differently, so that for a given 
deficit the composition of the budget is important, 
ii. Tax revenue is not a completely independent policy variable but is subject to 
feedback from the rest of the economy, 
iii. Excess demand stemming from the deficit depends not only on the size of the 
deficit but also on the manner in which it is financed. 
Thus, fiscal deficit which measures the public sectors borrowing requirement is 
(considered to be the appropriate measure as it does not go into the details of the causes 
of this requirement i.e whether need for borrowing arises on account of deficit in 
revenue account or capital account. But a careful scrutiny of fiscal deficit suggests that 
it too is incapable of reflecting monetary expansion accurately because part of deficit is 
financed by borrowings and part by creating new money. If Government is able to sell 
its securities to the public independent of its central bank's support, then borrowing 
represents only the resource transfer. 
Secondly, the definition of revenue receipts and revenue expenditure is also 
important from the view point of the effectiveness of fiscal deficit measure. Normally 
all receipts that do not increase the financial liabilities of the Government are included 
in the revenue receipts whether it is tax receipt or non-tax receipt. But how are we to 
treat the proceeds from disinvestment or from the sale of assets? Is it revenue receipt or 
not? This question assumes significance if the appropriateness of fiscal deficit measure 
is under consideration. It depends upon the purpose for which the deficit measure is to 
be used. As Chelliah puts it "If the short-term impact of the budget on aggregate 
demand through net borrowings is to be judged, the sale proceeds could be netted out 
Eigainst capital formation expenditure" (Chelliah, R.J.,1996)''*.Thus, it is apparent that 
fiscal deficit has to be supplemented by some other informations in order to make it 
e:ffecti\'e even for the very purpose for which it has been discovered i.e impact of 
monetary expansion. 
Tanzi (1993)'^ also criticised the current account deficit measure. He finds it 
useless on account of (a) the futility of classifying the expenditure into current revenue 
and im^estments, and (b) false and arbitrary demarcation between capital and current 
expenditure. He finds such classification futile because expenditure's short term 
impact on balance of payments disequilibrium will not only be the same but the 
investment spending may have larger negative impact and for (b) above, he argues that 
it is not possible to classify the expenditure into current and investment because there 
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are number of expenditure that can be put in either of the category depending upon the 
argum(jnt. For example, there is strong case for some current spending on education 
jind heahh to be placed along investment expenditure because of their long-run effects 
on growth. Secondly, investment could be bad enough which instead of augmenting 
jiuture income may just be a source of complete waste. Thus he says "...., I am 
skeptical that current account budgetary deficit may tell us much, although investment 
v^ould certainly be concerned about a country that is running a fiscal deficit even when 
investment expenditure, however defined, is netted out. For sure the current account 
deficit will tell us nothing about the impact of fiscal policy on the balance of payments 
and perhaps not much about the impact of fiscal policy on growth"(Tanzi,Vito,1993)'^ . 
Thus, Tanzi does not find out utility of revenue deficit. But the counter 
cirgument is that perhaps Tanzi has misplaced his focus as impact on balance of 
payments is not the purpose of revenue deficit measure rather it is used to find whether 
the expenditure on current consumption is fully met by current revenue because 
otherwise a country would be working against the well accepted principle of public 
finance that society as a whole should bear the cost of the goods and services that it 
collectively consumes regardless of the preference of the individual members of the 
society. Further, revenue account deficit/surplus is the measure of Governments 
contribution to dissaving/saving which is very important variable from the view point 
of economic growth, though savings automatically do not lead to growth. 
(iii) Revenue Deficit = Total revenue expenditure - Total revenue receipts. 
Revenue account balance is also a very useful indicator especially for the 
economies which are running into huge revenue account deficit. As fiscal deficit only 
tell us the overall borrowing requirement, it is revenue account that tell us the overall 
borrowing goes into financing consumption expenditure. Thus, the fact that revenue 
deficit measure suffers from various limitations does not prove its futility. Revenue 
deficit measure along with other concept of deficits are employed to gauge the fiscal 
health of the economy and that all such measures are supplementary rather than 
subsfitutes for the fiscal deficit measure because fiscal deficit measure itself is subject 
t(3 various limitation. 
One important limitation of the fiscal deficit is that they do not necessarily 
refiect the extent to which the current discretionary fiscal actions improve or worsen 
the Government's net indebtedness. In particular, interest payments in the current 
period are obligatory, but reflect past budgets. In such situation if interest payments are 
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excluded it yield the figure known as primary deficit. It is primary deficit that 
determine whether current fiscal measures are improving the situation or worsening it. 
It is primary deficit that is responsible for the growth of public debt as it has to be 
ilnanced through borrowings. If borrowing increases faster than GDP, debt-GDP ratio 
^vill rise. Thus, primary deficit measure will have to be employed to supplement fiscal 
deficit in order to gauge the contribution of fiscal deficit to public debt. Corresponding 
to the two concepts of fiscal deficit, i.e., gross and net, two measures of primary deficit 
could be constructed thus : 
(iv) Gross Primary Deficit= (Gross fiscal deficit) _ (interest payments -
interest earnings) = (Revenue expenditure+ capital expenditure + net 
domestic lendings) - (Revenue receipts+ grants) -(interest payments -
interest earnings) = (Non-interest revenue expenditure+ capital 
expenditure+ net domestic lendings) -(Non-interest revenue receipts+ 
grants). 
(v) Net primary Deficit = (Non-interest revenue expenditure+ capital 
expenditure) - (Non- interest revenue receipts+ grants) 
Primary deficit concepts, thus defined, indicate the precise extent to which 
current fiscal actions affect the indebtedness of the Central Government and is, 
therefore, most suitable for the present study(Rangarajan,C.,2004)'^. 
Yet another controversial issue that has to be settled is how to treat arrears. 
Payment of arrears are on account of past commitments therefore to that extent the rise 
in expenditure may be temporary and may not be reflective of Governments current 
piolicy stance. Similarly, some payments that might become due but may be deffered 
i, e. unpaid interest on debt. This becomes possible if debts are rescheduled which is 
normal practice in case of external debt. In such situation it has to be specified in a 
measure of fiscal deficit whether unpaid interest on external debt are being registered 
or not. 
Still another area which has been debated in the literature on fiscal deficit is the 
r(jceipts acquired through diluting the assets or which the reduction in receipt is on 
account of tax amnesty, (which may be introduced as once and for all measure) or the 
fi'eeze in wages below their long-term economic equilibrium. These measures are said 
to affect the fiscal deficit in the short-run, permanent effect on fiscal deficit may not be 
expected. Thus, Tanzi remarks "for this reason, (short-term adjustment measures) in 
some cases it would be desirable to present a measure of the fiscal deficit that would 
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n;move the impact of such short term measures. This adjustment would give an 
underlying or core deficit that would better reflect the fiscal situation of the country 
over the long run. Such correction would be desirable, although in many cases it might 
be difficult to do in practice" (Tanzi,Vito.,1993)'l 
The inability of fiscal deficit measure and other relevant indicators discussed 
above to capture the full view of unhealthy trend in Indian economy has been 
mentioned by Rakshit. He suggested it appears from the usual indicators movements 
that there is no deterioration in the fiscal health of the economy during 1990s (Rakshit, 
Mihir, 2000)'^ 
Following factor may be mentioned:-
a) Public debt-GDP ratio did not show any rising trend, except during the later 
part of the period. 
b) Fiscal deficit as a ratio of GDP also registered a declining trend in the earlier 
period, but rose in the later period. 
c) Growth rate of the economy exceeded the interest rate on Government 
borrowing (a crucial condition for debt sustainability). 
The disturbing trend is the slippage in the later part of the period but that may 
be attributed to the transitory rise in expenditure on account of the payments of arrears 
on the award of fifth pay commission. A greater disturbing trend that could not be 
noticed is the rise in non-RBI held public debt (RBI's holding of public debt is of no 
significance in Rakshit's Scheme). Therefore, the deteriorating fiscal health cannot be 
measured through fiscal deficit. It is for this reason that he emphasized the measure he 
called "fiscal gap" which measures the yearly increase in Government debt to the rest 
of the economy plus reduction in its financial assets. Fiscal gap can be measured as 
under; 
(vi) Fiscal Gap= Incremental financial liability (IFL) - monetized deficit. 
(Where IFL is equal to capital disbursement + revenue deficit). 
One weakness that appears in this measure is that it presumes the deficit on 
njvenue account. Though identity of IFL appears to be no different from that of fiscal 
deficit but Rakshit further qualifies it by following statement. 
"IFL is nothing but fiscal deficit plus non-debt creating capital receipf. But 
even this clarification may not be sufficient as foreign grants may not be sufficient as 
foreign grants may also be non-debt creating capital receipt while Rakshit seeks to 
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include; such receipts which are responsible for reduction in further income which 
basically means receipts through sale of assets. 
Thus, it is clear from the above discussions that there is no unique measure of 
deficit satisfactory to everybody and for every purpose. Each could be justified for 
some use and none is useful for all uses. 
f).3 Performance Evaluation of Fiscal Reforms: 
Fiscal policy has been playing important role in stimulating the rate of growth 
cif the Indian economy. Clearly the appropriate design of fiscal policy is important 
since fiscal policy could act both as a stimulant as well as an obstacle for rapid 
economic growth. If tax and expenditure policies are geared towards encouraging 
savings and investment and the efficient use of capital fiscal policy can help stimulate 
economic growth. However, fiscal policy can hurt prospects for economic growth if, 
for example, profligate Government machinery runs up successively high budget 
deficits and crowds out productive private investment(Jha,Raghbendra.,2004) . 
India has been among the fastest growing economies of the world in the last 
two decades. According to the World Bank, during the 1980s India's GDP growth rate 
accelerated to an average of 5.8 percent per year, a rate that was exceeded by only 9 
out of 123 countries. GDP growth resumed after 1991-92, the year of stabilization, and 
has averaged at 6.1 percent per year in the 1990s. Again, this growth rate was 
exceeded in relatively few, viz. 19 out of 137 countries. The average annual growth 
rate of real GDP in the Sixth and Seventh plans which covered the 1980s was 5.4 
percent and 5.8 percent respectively, much higher than Hindu rate of growth of 3.5 
percent of the earlier three decades. A distinct acceleration in GDP growth has 
occurred between the Ninth and Tenth plan periods that reversed the deceleration 
observed between the Eight and Ninth plans. The annual growth rate averaged 6.5 
percent during the Eight plan periods (1992-97), slipped to 5.5 percent during the 
Ninth plan (1997-2002), but accelerated to 7.6 percent during the Tenth plan period 
(2002-07).The growth performance in recent years is even more impressive. The 
growth rate rose to 9.4 percent in 2005-06, 9.6 percent in 2006-07. 
The rapid deterioration in the Government finances during the late 1980s 
caused by a faster rise in expenditure growth relative to revenue growth resulted in a 
steep rise in the Central Government fiscal deficit to GDP ratio which culminated in a 
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balance of payments crisis. The macroeconomic crisis of 1991 created an exigency and 
led to the chartering of a strong reversal of hitherto followed policies. The biggest 
challenge facing the conduct of fiscal policy in India is to continue the accelerated 
growth process while maintaining price and financial stability. The conduct of fiscal 
policy since the early 1990s has broadly succeeded in setting the economy on a higher 
growth path. Far reaching fiscal reforms have been undertaken during this period, 
which are finally bearing fruit through increased revenue mobilization, some 
compression in expenditure, and consequent reduction in the fiscal deficit, leading to 
the beginning of some reduction in the debt-GDP ratio through revenue enhancement 
and cur1;ailment in current expenditure grov^h while enlarging spending on investment 
and infrastructure so as to provide momentum to the growth process. Measures were 
undertaken to curb the pre-emption of institutional resources by the Government and 
simultaneously to provide a level-playing field to the private investors. 
Corrective measures on the fiscal front initiated at the beginning of the 1990s 
produced some promising results during the first half of the decade. Expenditure 
gi-owth could be curtailed leading to a decline in the fiscal deficit and outstanding 
liabilifies of the Government to GDP ratio. During 1990-91 to 1996-97(excluding 
1993-94), the reduction in total expenditure to GDP ratio by more than 3.5 percentage 
points narrowed the fiscal gap by 3 percentage points and reduced the debt-GDP ratio 
by over 5 percentage points. However, the fiscal consolidation even during the first 
half of the 1990s was brought about primarily through curtailment in capital 
ejcpenditure. Decline in consumption expenditure was relatively small. From 1997-98, 
ocpenditure started rising once again, and by the year 2001-02, all the major fiscal 
parameters, viz, revenue deficit, fiscal deficit, and public debt rose to levels higher 
than those prevalent at the beginning of the reform process. And some improvement 
again being witnessed since 2002-03 which was accelerated by the enactment of the 
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 2003. 
The strategy for restoring fiscal balance comprised tax and non-tax reforms, 
ocpenditure management and institutional reforms. Restructuring public sector mainly 
involved divestment of Goveniment ownership which was inhiated in 1991-92. Fiscal-
monetary coordination was sought to be improved through deregulation of financial 
sj'stem, elimination of automatic monetization to reduce the size of monetized deficit, 
and reduction in pre-emption of institutional resources by the Government (Pattnaik, 
R.K., Raj, D.S. & Chander, Jai,2006)^'. 
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In. order to evaluate the performance of the fiscal reforms in India initiated 
during 1991 and onwards, following parameters have been selected. On the basis of 
these parameters we can judge the effectiveness of fiscal measures in correcting the 
fiscial imbalances of our country. 
(I) Total Receipts and Expenditure 
(II) Real GDP Growth 
(III) Tax-GDP Ratio 
(IV) Expenditure-GDP Ratio 
(V) Debt-GDP Ratio 
(VI) Deficit Indicators 
(VII) BOPs Indicators 
(VIII) Inflation 
For dealing with these issues the study has been divided into three sub-
periods namely: 
• First phase (PI) - 1980-81 to 1990-91 (Prior reform period) 
• Second phase (P2) -1991-92 to 1999-2000 (First generation reform period) 
• Third phase (P3) -2000-01 to 2007-08 (Second generation reform period) 
(I) Total Receipts and Expenditure: 
Table-3 clearly reveals that during 1990-91 to 2007-08, the average, SD,CV 
and CAGR of revenue receipts (Rs. crores) are 195874, 127811.6, 65.3 and 13.08 
percent respectively. During the same period the average, SD, CV and CAGR of tax 
revenue (Rs. crores) are 146616, 104750.6, 71.4 and 13.26 percent respectively which 
is found to be higher than that of average, SD, CV and CAGR of non-tax revenues (Rs. 
crores) i.e 49314.9, 25859.5, 52.4 and 12.21 percent respectively. The average, SD, 
and CAGR of tax revenue as a percent of revenue receipts are 73.6, 4.4 and 0.16 
percent respectively which is higher than the average, SD and CAGR of non-tax 
revenue as percent of revenue receipts i.e 26.4, 4.3 and -0.78 percent respectively, but 
CV of non-tax revenue as percent of revenue receipts (16.3 percent) is higher than the 
CV of tax revenue as a percent of revenue receipts (5.9 percent).During 1990-91 to 
2007-08 the average, SD, CV and CAGR of capital receipts (Rs. crores) are 117453, 
61853.3, 52.6 and 11.6 percent respectively which is found to be lesser than that of 
revenue receipts as shown in Table-3. 
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In Table-3 the statistical analysis shows that the average, SD and CAGR of 
market borrowings are 56946.9, 39033.2, 18.78 percent respectively which is highest 
among recovery of loan (15924.2, 18972.8, 6.99) and other receipts (mainly PSUs 
disinvestment) (4884.2, 8712.9, 14.28 percent respectively). But CV of other receipts 
(mainly PSUs disinvestment) is 178.4 percent which is found to be higher than that of 
recovery of loan (119.1 percent) and market borrowings (68.5 percent). Similarly, 
during the same period of time the average, SD and CAGR of market borrowings as 
percent of capital receipt (44.0, 18.2, 6.54 percent respectively) are highest among 
recovery of loan as percent of capital receipts (12.8, 8.0, -4.04 percent respectively) 
and other receipts (mainly PSUs disinvestment) (3.9, 4.9, 2.58 percent respectively). 
The average, SD, CV and CAGR of total receipts (Rs. crores) are 313327, 182080.1, 
58.1 and 12.61 percent. And the average, SD, CV and CAGR of total receipts as 
percent of GDP during the period 1990-91 to 2007-08 are 15.4, 0.9, 5.8, and -0.12 
percent respectively. 
Table-4 shows that during 1990-91 to 2007-08, the average, SD, CV and 
CAGR of revenue expenditure (Rs. crores) are 255565, 151280.2, 59.2 and 12.8 
percent respectively. During the same period the average, SD, CV and CAGR of 
interest payments (Rs. crores) are 84486.6, 44559.4, 52.7 and 12.3 percent respectively 
which is found to be higher than the average, SD, CV and CAGR of subsidies 
(28017.6, 16450.6, 58.7, 11.8 percent respectively) and defence (30775.5, 14666.4, 
47.6 and 10.7 percent respectively). The average and SD of interest payments as 
percent of revenue expenditure are 33.7 and 2.8 respectively which is higher than that 
of subsidies as percent of revenue expenditure (11.2 and 1.9) and that of defence as 
percent of revenue expenditure (12.8 and 1.5) but CV of subsidies as percent of 
re '^enue expenditure is highest i.e 16.9 percent, while defence (11.7 percent) and 
interest payments (8.3 percent). The CAGR of interest payments, subsidies and 
defence are -0.5, -0.9 and -1.91 percent respectively. 
During 1990-91 to 2007-08, the average, SD, CV and CAGR of capital 
expenditure (Rs. crores) are 59507.5, 29213.0,49.1 and 8 percent respectively which is 
lesser than the average, SD, CV and CAGR of revenue expenditure (Table-4). During 
th(2 same period the average, SD and CAGR of loan and advances (Rs. crores) are 
36472.4, 23602.6 and 8.4 percent respectively which is found to be higher than the 
average, SD and CAGR of capital outlay i.e 23001.8, 18748.8 and 3 percent 
respectively. But CV of capital outlay is 81.5 percent which is higher than the CV of 
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loan a.nd advances i.e 64.7 percent. During the given period of time average and 
CAGR of loan and advances as percent of capital expenditure are 61.2 and 0.4 percent 
respectively which is higher than the average and CAGR of capital outlay i.e 38.2 and 
-4.6 percent respectively. SD of both capital outlay and loan and advances is come out 
to be same i.e 15.9 percent. But CV of capital outlay is 40.97 percent which is higher 
than the CV of loan and advances i.e 25.9 percent. The average, SD, CV and CAGR of 
total expenditure (Rs. crores) are 315071, 176316, 55.9 and 11.8 percent respectively. 
And the average, SD, CV and CAGR of total expenditure as percent of GDP are 15.8, 
1.2, 7.6 and -0.8 percent respectively. 
Moreover, we find that both total receipts and total expenditure of the Central 
Gov€;rnment show the fluctuating trend during the reform period. Total receipts as a 
percentage of GDP varies between 13.75 to 17.25 percent during 1990-91 to 2007-08, 
while total expenditure as a percentage of GDP varies between 14.1 to 18.5 percent of 
GDP during the same period. However, the CAGR of total receipts is -0.12 while that 
of total expenditure is -0.8 which is higher than total receipts during the same period. 
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(II) Real GDP Growth: 
During 1980-81 to 2007-08, the average, SD, CV, and CAGR of real GDP 
growth are 6.01, 2.20, 36.59 and 1.88 percent respectively (Table-5). So far as period 
of refDrm is concerned, it is found that during P3 real GDP growth is 7.25 percent 
which is higher than that of P2 i.e 5.73 percent and P2 is higher than PI i.e 5.6 percent 
implying continuous increase in real GDP growth over the given periods. Figure-1 
shows the nature of real-GDP growth during the given periods. Thus, the study shows 
that there has been effective and impressive influence of fiscal reforms on real GDP 
grow1:h in India. 
Table-5 
Real GDP Growth 
(Percent) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Average 
S.D 
Real GDP Growth 
7.6 
5.6 
2.9 
7.9 
4 
4.2 
4.3 
3.5 
10.2 
6.1 
5.3 
1.4 
5.4 
5.7 
6.4 
7.3 
8 
4.3 
6.7 
6.4 
4.4 
5.8 
3.8 
8.5 
7.5 
9.4 
9.6 
9 
6.01 
2.20 
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c.v 
CAGR 
36.59 
1.88 
Sources: Economic Survey, Various issues; RBI and CSO. 
Figure-1 
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(III) Tax-GDP Ratio; 
Despite the initiation of tax reforms in the early Nineties, in the Indian context, 
the typical "Laffer Curve Effect" did not fructify and expected increase in tax 
buoyancies did not occur. Since the onset of tax reforms, the tax-GDP ratio of the 
Central Government has suffered a persistent decline. This has been a major drag on 
the reform process. The tax-GDP ratio declined from an average of 9.9 percent during 
the 1980s to 9.7 percent in the first half of the 1990s, 9.0 percent in the second half of 
the 1990s, and further to 8.2 percent in 2001-02(Table-6 & Figure-2). The reduction in 
tax-GDP ratio could, inter alia, be attributed to the initial effects of the reduction in tax 
rates. 
Table-6 
Tax-GDP Ratio 
(Percent of GDP) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
Direct Tax 
2.00 
2.08 
2.03 
1.9 
Indirect Tax 
7.05 
7.18 
7.22 
7.36 
Total Tax 
9.05 
9.26 
9.24 
9.30 
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1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
1.86 
1.98 
1.97 
1.87 
2.07 
2.04 
1.9 
2.3 
2.4 
2.4 
2.7 
2.8 
2.8 
3.2 
2.7 
3.0 
3.2 
3.0 
3.4 
3.8 
4.2 
4,6 
5.6 
6.61 
7.54 
8.20 
8.45 
8.64 
8.40 
8.54 
8.2 
8.0 
7.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.6 
6.0 
5.6 
5.8 
5.7 
5.2 
5.4 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.8 
5.9 
9.40 
10.18 
10.42 
10.51 
10.46 
10.58 
10.1 
10.3 
10.0 
8.8 
9.1 
9.4 
9.4 
9.1 
8.3 
8.8 
9.0 
8,2 
8.8 
9.2 
9.8 
10.3 
11.5 
12.6 
Source: Economic Survey, Various issues, Government of India. 
First of all we analyze direct tax as percent of GDP. It is assumed that, in null 
hypothesis, there is no significant difference between direct taxes over the three 
periods. And in alternative hypothesis there is significant difference in direct tax over 
the three periods. Since;? value (0.0000006) is less than a (0.05), therefore, alternative 
hypothesis is accepted (Table-1(a) in appendix). So far as period of reforms is 
concerned, it is found that during 2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) direct tax is 4.3 percent 
which is higher than that of period P2 and PI i.e 2.7 percent and 1.97636 percent 
respectively. It is meant that direct tax as percent of GDP after reform was higher in 
comparison to PI and P2. 
Likewise, Table-1(b) (in appendix), shows that there is significant difference 
between indirect tax as percent of GDP over the three periods. The calculated resuh 
reveals that P value (0.00000004) is less than a (0.05), therefore alternative hypothesis 
is accepted. So far as period of reforms is concerned, it is found that during 2000-01 to 
2007-08(P3) indirect taxes as percent of GDP is 5.5625 percent which is less than that 
of period P2 i.e 6.55556 percent and P2 is less than that of PI i.e 7.88909 percent. It is 
meant that indirect tax as percent of GDP before reform was higher in comparison to f 
and If^ reform periods. 
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But there is no significant difference between total taxes as percent of GDP 
over the three periods (Table-l(c) in appendix).Since/; value (0.25508) is higher than 
a (0.05), therefore, null hypothesis is accepted. Total taxes as percent of GDP before 
reform was 9.86364 percent (PI) which is higher than 9.24444(P2) but P2 is less than 
that of P3 i.e 9.9 percent, indicating slow rate of change over the given periods 
Figure- 2 
Tax-GDP Ratio 
-Direct 
Tax 
- Indirect 
Tax 
Total 
Tax 
Years 
Source: Table -6 
As a part of tax reforms indirect taxes_ excise duties as well as custom duties_ 
were reduced substantially from their existing levels and this had an adverse impact on 
indirect tax collection. Revenue from custom duties as a ratio of imports witnessed 
almost a secular decline from the high level of 47.8 percent in 1990-91 to 10.0 percent 
in 2006-07. Similarly, revenue from Union excise duties as a ratio to value of 
industrial output declined from 22.1 percent to 15.2 percent over the same period 
(Table-7). 
Table-? 
Custom and Union Excise Duties 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Customs Revenue/Value 
of Imports 
47.8 
46.5 
37.5 
30.4 
29.8 
29. 
(Percent) 
Excise Duties/Value of 
Industrial Output 
22.1 
23.1 
21.6 
19. 
18.4 
16.2 
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1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
30.8 
26.1 
22.8 
22,5 
20.6 
16.4 
15.1 
13.5 
11.5 
9.9 
10.0 
16.1 
16.0 
16.0 
17.7 
17.5 
17.7 
17.8 
17.8 
16.6 
16.4 
15.2 
Source: 1. Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2006-07, RBI. 
2. Budget Documents of the Union Government, Various years. 
The distorting impact of high and varied indirect taxes on overall resource 
allocation has therefore been reduced considerably. Rationalization of the direct tax 
structure also did not lead to any positive impact on revenue collections until 2001-02. 
While compliance response to lower taxes took some time, lower economic growth 
also contributed to lack of growth in direct taxes over this period. The tax-GDP ratio, 
however, has moved up significantly in recent years reflecting beneficial impact of the 
rationalization of the direct tax structure on the revenues. The tax-GDP ratio for 2006-
07 is 11.5 percent (Table-6) and is estimated higher at 12.6 percent in 2007-08 .The 
share of direct tax in total gross tax revenue of the Centre crossed 50 percent in 2006-
07. Improved corporate results during the last 4-5 years have led to significant rise in 
collection of corporate income tax. Thus, growth provides the base for rise in tax-GDP 
ratio of the country. These data demonstrate the efficacy of the Indian tax reform 
programme undertaken since the early 1990s: direct taxes are increasing in its 
importance and the tax-GDP ratio is rising. The Indian experience also shows how 
long it takes for fiscal reform to be effective, hence the importance of consistent policy 
over a long period. 
A key objective of the reform process was the augmentation of non-tax revenue 
by way of enhancement of user charges and returns on Government investments 
through restructuring of PSUs. The intention of restructuring PSUs was to improve 
their efficiency and thereby enhance the capacity to generate returns on Government 
investments. Non-tax revenue slightly rose to 2.5 percent in 1990s from 2.4 percent in 
1980s. It recorded an improvement at 3 percent in 2001-02. It fell during 2002-03 to 
2006-07. 
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(IV) Expenditure-GDP Ratio: 
Examining after decomposing the total expenditure into revenue and capital 
expenditure, it presents a disturbing trend. The average revenue expenditure rose to 
12.3 percent of GDP in the 1990s from 11.7 percent in the 1980s while capital 
expenditure slumped to 3.5 percent in the 1990s as compared to 6.2 percent in the 
1980s_ a fall of 44 percent. Interestingly, the revenue expenditure shows smooth 
decline from 1990-91 to 1996-97. However, upto 2002-03 for seven years it steadily 
increased and stood at 13.8 percent in 2002-03. Therefore, as far as revenue 
expenditure-GDP ratio is concerned, by the end of the 1990s the Government was 
exactly where it was in 1990-91. In this decade, the interest payments-GDP ratio 
steadily rose from 3.8 percent in 1990-91 to 4.8 percent in 2002-03. Therefore, ratio of 
net revenue expenditure (that is RE-IP) to GDP declined only to the extent the interest 
payments-GDP ratio rose during the 1990s. The reduction in capital expenditure-GDP 
ratio however is strikingly large in the period. The capital expenditure-GDP ratio was 
5.6 percent in 1990-91. It declined steadily throughout thereafter and stood at only 1.7 
percent in 2006-07(Table-8 & Figure-3). It is thus clear that the burden of fiscal 
imbalance correction during the period of economic reforms has been primarily on 
capital expenditure and social sector expenditure. This approach of the Central 
Government is questionable. Reducing expenditure on transport and infrastructure 
development both in urban and rural areas has disputed the growth process. Reduced 
capital expenditure in real terms over the years has become such a constraint that it 
unreservedly dampens investment activity in the private sector. This has caused a set 
back to overall growth process particularly at a time when the State has dramatically 
withdrawn from directly productive activity. 
TabIe-8 
Expenditure-GDP Ratio 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
TE 
15.7 
14.8 
16.1 
15.9 
17.5 
18.7 
19.9 
19.07 
18.6 
19.05 
18.5 
RE 
9.91 
9.02 
9.8 
10.00 
11.11 
12.06 
12.98 
12.90 
12.74 
13.17 
12.9 
IP 
1.79 
1.87 
2.06 
2.16 
2.40 
2.67 
2.94 
3.14 
3.36 
3.64 
3.8 
CE 
5.75 
5.77 
6.31 
5.97 
6.40 
6.66 
7.01 
6.17 
5.89 
5.88 
5.6 
(Percent) 
Net RE/GDP 
8.12 
7.15 
7,75 
7.84 
8.71 
9.39 
10.04 
9.76 
9.38 
9.53 
9.2 
209 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
17.1 
16.4 
16.5 
15.9 
15.0 
14.7 
15.2 
16.0 
15.2 
15.4 
15.9 
16.9 
17.1 
15.8 
14.1 
14.1 
12.6 
12.4 
12.6 
12.1 
11.8 
11.7 
11.8 
12.4 
12.9 
13.2 
13.2 
13.8 
13.1 
12.3 
12.3 
12.4 
15.09 12.58 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
4.2 
4,4 
4.3 
4.5 
4.7 
4.7 
4.7 
4.8 
4.5 
4.1 
3.7 
3.6 
3.62 
4.5 
4.0 
3.9 
3.8 
3.3 
3.1 
2.4 
2.2 
2.3 
2.7 
3.0 
2.7 
4.0 
3.6 
1.8 
1.7 
2.5 
8.5 
8.3 
8.3 
7.7 
7.6 
7.3 
7.5 
7.9 
8.2 
8.5 
8.5 
9.0 
8.6 
8.2 
8.6 
8.8 
8.96 
Source: RBI Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Various issues and Government of 
Economic Survey, Various issues. 
Note: TE-Total Expenditure, RF>Revenue Expenditure, CE-Capital Expenditure, IP-Interest Payment, Net RE=RE-IP. 
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In this Study, it is assumed that, in null hypothesis, there is no significant 
difference between expenditure-GDP ratio over the three periods. And in alternative 
hypothesis there is significant difference in expenditure-GDP ratio over the three 
periods. Since p value (0.00297) is less than a (0.05), therefore, alternative hypothesis 
is accepted (Table-2 in appendix). So far as period of reforms is concerned, it is found 
that during 2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) expenditure-GDP ratio is 15.55 percent which is 
less than that of period P2 i.e 15.77778 percent and P2 is less than that of PI i.e 17.62 
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percent. It is meant that expenditure-GDP ratio before reform was higher in 
comparison to I^ ' and II" reform periods. 
(V) Debt-GDP Ratio: 
The objective of fiscal reforms to prevent further accumulation of public debt is 
intimately linked to the objective of reining in the fiscal deficit. Since the public debt 
of the Government is broadly the accumulation of liabilities created by the 
Government to finance its deficit over the years, debt parameters in general move in 
tandem with the trends in fiscal deficit. Thus, reflecting the downward rigidhy in the 
fiscal deficit, the objective to curtail growth of public debt was also not achieved, 
particularly since the mid 1990s. Outstanding liabilities of the Central Government, 
after declining from 55.22 percent of GDP in 1990-91 to 50.93 percent in 1998-99, 
have risen continuously till 2002-03 at 63.52 percent. Following the impact of fiscal 
responsibility legislation, the debt-GDP ratio has come dovm in recent years to 61.33 
percent in 2007-08(TabIe 9 & Figure-4). Contingent liabilities in the form of 
outstanding guarantees by the Government have also witnessed some decline in the 
recent years. Under the FRBM Act, the annual increase in the stock of contingent 
liabilities of the Central Government is limited to a ceiling of 0.5 percent of GDP. 
For evaluating debt-GDP ratio it is assumed that there is no significant 
difference between debt as percent of GDP before and after reforms (null hypothesis) 
and in alternative hypothesis there is significant difference between debt as percent of 
GDP before and after reforms. It is found that P value (3.02E-06) is less than a (0.05), 
therefore alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-3 in appendix). There has been 
continuous increase in the debt-GDP ratio over all the three periods. It has increased 
from 48.59 percent during PI to 52.21 percent during P2, and further to 61.4 percent 
during P3. 
Table-9 
Debt-GDP Ratio 
(Percent of GDP) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
Total Debt 
41.1 
39.92 
44.42 
42.82 
45.51 
48.87 
52.90 
54.65 
54.12 
Internal Debt 
33.33 
32.70 
37.26 
36.02 
38.84 
42.42 
46.45 
48.16 
48.06 
External Debt 
7.77 
7.22 
7.16 
6.80 
6.67 
6.45 
6.45 
6.49 
6.06 
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1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
54.99 
55.22 
54.17 
53.41 
55.21 
53.03 
50.87 
49.01 
50.96 
50.93 
52.31 
55.58 
59.96 
63.52 
63.05 
63.33 
63.01 
61.48 
61.33 
49.18 
49.69 
48.53 
47.79 
49.74 
48.01 
46.57 
45.08 
47.34 
47.66 
49.31 
52.45 
56.82 
61.09 
61.37 
61.39 
60.39 
58.99 
58.95 
5.81 
5.53 
5.64 
5.62 
5.47 
5.01 
4.30 
3.93 
3.62 
3.27 
2.99 
3.14 
3.14 
2.43 
1.67 
1.93 
2.63 
2.49 
2.39 
Source: RBI Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Various issues and Government of 
India, Economic Survey, Various issues. 
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(VI) Deficit Indicators: 
The fiscal reforms that the Union Government initiated since July 1991 have 
had the expected affect on its fiscal balance. The fiscal balance of the Central 
Government sharply worsened since 1983-84. Infact, there was not a single year since 
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1984-85 that witnessed a fiscal deficit less than 7 percent in the entire decade of 1980s 
and the peak of 8.4 percent that it reached in 1986-87 was far higher than the level in 
1990-91 that alarmed the policy makers. The progress in fiscal correction was mixed 
during the 1990s at the Central level. While there was some reduction in fiscal deficit 
in the first half of the 1990s, progress was reversed in the late 1990s mainly due to the 
impact of implementation of Fifth Pay Commission's awards. The fiscal deficit of the 
Centre reached at 6.2 percent of GDP in 2001-02. However, fiscal correction has been 
continuous from 2004-05 with the Centre operating under a rule based fiscal 
framework. The fiscal deficit reached 3.5 percent in 2006-07 (Table-10 & Figure-5). If 
we compare the progress of fiscal deficit for both State and Central levels then 
incidentally we find that the fiscal correction process has been faster that of the Centre. 
Their consolidated revenue balance is to be in surplus during 2006-07. 
Table-10 
Deficit Indicators 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
Revenue Deficit 
1.40 
0.23 
0.68 
1.14 
1.69 
2.09 
2.47 
2.55 
2.48 
2.44 
3.26 
2.48 
2.47 
3.78 
3.05 
2.49 
2.37 
3.04 
3.82 
3.46 
4.05 
Fiscal Deficit 
5.71 
5.07 
5.56 
5.86 
6.99 
7.77 
8.37 
7.56 
7.28 
7.31 
7.7 
5.55 
5.34 
6.96 
5.68 
5.05 
4.84 
5.82 
6.47 
5.36 
5.65 
(Percent of GDP) 
Primary Deficit 
3.8 
0.23 
0.7 
1.2 
1.7 
5.5 
5.8 
4.7 
4.2 
3.9 
2.8 
0.7 
0.6 
2.2 
0.4 
0.02 
0.24 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.9 
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2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
4.40 
4.40 
3.57 
2.49 
2.58 
1.94 
l.ll 
6.19 
5.91 
4.48 
3.99 
4.09 
3.50 
2.69 
1.4 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
-0.2 
-0.2 
Sources: Economic Survey, Various issues; RBI and CSO. 
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Apart from the quantitative improvement, a salient feature of the fiscal 
consolidation underway has been some qualitative progress, as reflected in the 
reduction in the proportion of revenue deficit to gross fiscal deficit. 
The fiscal deficit of both the Centre and the State is basically financed through 
domestic sources over 90 percent of GFD. Within domestic sources, market 
borrow i^ngs have emerged as the most important instrument for the Central 
Government accounting for about three-fourth of financing with the rest contributed by 
others, such as small savings, provident funds and reserve funds deposits and 
advances. This is in contrast to the scenario before 1997-98, when the fiscal deficit was 
also financed through monetization. This development has contributed to the overall 
market determination of interest rates in the economy, and hence to the relevance and 
effectiveness of monetary policy (Mohan, Rakesh., 2008)^ .^ 
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A high level of fiscal deficit impacts the practice of monetary policy and trends 
to have a negative impact on real GDP growth through 'crowding out' effects and/or 
rise in interest rates in the economy. Table-11 presents the movements of GDP growth 
and GFD-GDP ratio. The high level of fiscal deficit between 1997-98 and 2002-03 was 
associated with relatively low GDP growth. The reduction in fiscal deficit since 2003-
04 has been associated with a phase of high GDP growth. Thus, fiscal correction and 
consolidation, which is major ingredient of macroeconomic stability, provide a 
conducive environment for propelling growth of the economy. Low fiscal deficits also 
enable more effective monetary policy (Mohan, Rakesh., 2008)^ -^ . 
Table-U 
Growth of GDP and GFD-GDP Ratio 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Real GDP Growth 
5.3 
1.4 
5.4 
5.7 
6.4 
7.3 
8.0 
4.3 
6.7 
6.4 
4.4 
5.8 
3.8 
8.5 
7.5 
9.4 
9.6 
(Percent) 
GFD-GDP 
7.7 
5.55 
5.34 
6.96 
5.68 
5.05 
4.84 
5.82 
6.47 
5.36 
5.65 
6.19 
5.91 
4.48 
3.99 
4.09 
3.50 
Sources: Economic Survey, Various issues; RBI and CSO. 
First of all we analyze gross fiscal deficit. It is assumed that, in null 
hypothesis, there is no significant difference between gross fiscal deficits over the 
three periods. And in alternative hypothesis there is significant difference in gross 
fiscal deficit over the three periods. Since p value (0.00027) is less than a (0.05), 
therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-4(a) in appendix). So far as period 
of reforms is concerned, it is found that during 2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) gross fiscal 
deficits is 4.56 percent which is less than that of period P2 i.e 5.67 percent and P2 is 
less than that of PI i.e 6.83 percent. It is meant that gross fiscal deficit before reform 
was higher in comparison to f and II"'* reform periods, and has been continuously 
declining. 
215 
Likewise, in null hypothesis it is assumed that there is no significant difference 
between revenue deficit over the three periods. And in alternative hypothesis there is 
significant difference between revenue deficit over the three periods. The calculated 
result reveals that P value (0.007661) is less than a (0.05), therefore alternative 
hypothesis is accepted. During pre-reform period, PI was 1.8 percent, while it was 
2.99 percent during P2 and 3.06 percent during P3. Hence, it has been continuously 
increasing over the period of time (Table-4(b) in appendix). 
There is also a significant difference between primary deficit over the three 
periods (Table-4(c) in appendix).Since p value (0.00011) is less than a (0.05), 
therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted. Primary deficit before reform was 
3.13909 percent (PI) which is higher than 0.66222(P2) and 0.3875(P3). Hence, there 
has been continuous decline in the primary deficit over the given periods. 
A comparative analysis of fiscal deficit-GDP ratio and debt-GDP ratio of few 
emerging Asian countries indicates that India's fiscal position is still relatively stressed 
notwithstanding the improvement in recent years (Table-12) 
Table-12 
Fiscal Indicators-Select Countries 
(Percent of GDP) 
Country 
China 
Republic of Korea 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Fiscal Deficit 
2003 
2.2 
-0.1 
4.5 
1.7 
5.3 
-0.5 
2004 
1.3 
0.5 
4.0 
1.0 
4.3 
-0.3 
2005 
1.2 
1.0 
4.1 
1.0 
3.8 
-0.2 
2006P 
0.5 
1.3 
3.5 
1.0 
2.6 
-0.1 
Public Debt 
2003 
19.2 
21.9 
63.0 
58.3 
68.8 
50.7 
2004 
18.5 
25.2 
63.3 
55.7 
66.7 
49.5 
2005 
17.9 
29.5 
63.1 
46.5 
62.5 
47.4 
2006P 
17.3 
32.2 
61.2 
40.9 
56.5 
42.3 
Source: Asian Economic Monitor and Union Budget Documents of Government of India. 
(VII) Balance of Payments Indicators: 
Usually, the current account balance is the single most widely monitored 
indicator of a nation's external balance position. For examining current account 
balance it is assumed that, in null hypothesis, there is no significant difference between 
current account balance over the three periods PI, P2, and P3. And in alternative 
hypothesis there is significant difference between current account balances over the 
three periods. Since p value (0.00028) is less than a (0.05), therefore alternative 
hypothesis is accepted (Table-5 in appendix). So far as period of reforms is concerned 
it is found that during 1991-92 to 1999-2000(P2) and 2000-01 to 2007-08 (P3) the 
current account balance was -1.07778 and -0.0625 respectively which is lower than 
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during the period 1980-81 to 1990-91(P1) i.e -1.95455. It is meant that current account 
deficit before reform was higher in comparison to f and II" generation refarm 
periods. This implies that the fiscal reforms have helped in correcting the deficit in the 
BOPs. The BOPs condition has been improved over the given periods. 
Table-13 
Balance of Payments Indicators 
(Percent of GDP) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Source: Handbo 
Export 
4.6 
4.5 
4.8 
4.6 
4.8 
4.1 
4.2 
4.6 
4.9 
5.8 
5.8 
6.9 
7.3 
8.3 
8.3 
9.1 
8.9 
8.7 
8.2 
8.3 
9.9 
9.4 
10.6 
11.1 
12.2 
13 
14 
13.5 
7.9 
3.1 
38.8 
4.7 
ak of Statistics on Inc 
Import 
8.9 
8.3 
8.3 
7.7 
7.5 
7.5 
7.2 
7.2 
8.1 
8.3 
8.8 
7.9 
9.6 
9.8 
11.1 
12.3 
12.7 
12.5 
11.4 
12.3 
12.6 
11.8 
12.7 
13.3 
17 
19.4 
20.9 
21.2 
11.3 
4.1 
35.9 
3.6 
ian Economy 
Trade 
Balance 
-2.2 
-3.8 
-3.5 
-3.1 
-2.7 
-3.4 
-3.0 
-2.6 
-3.2 
-2.5 
-3 
-1 
-2.3 
-1.5 
-2.8 
-3.2 
-3.9 
-3.8 
-3.2 
-4 
-2.7 
-2.4 
-2.1 
-2.3 
-4.8 
-6.4 
-6.9 
-7.7 
-3.4 
1.5 
-44.9 
NA 
and RBI Bulletins 
Invisible 
2.8 
2.1 
1.8 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1.1 
0.8 
0.5 
0.2 
-0.1 
0.7 
0.6 
1.1 
1.8 
1.6 
2.7 
2.4 
2.2 
2.9 
2.1 
3.1 
3.4 
4.6 
4.5 
5.2 
5.8 
6.2 
2.30 
1.7 
73.0 
NA 
Current Account 
Balance 
-1.5 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.5 
-1.2 
-2.1 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-2.7 
-2.3 
-3.1 
-0.3 
-1.7 
-0.4 
-1 
-1.7 
-1.2 
-1.4 
-1 
-1 
-0.6 
0.7 
1.3 
2.3 
-0.4 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1.5 
-1.1 
1.1 
-100 
NA 
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Flgure-6 
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Table-13 and Figure-6 clearly reveals that net invisibles to GDP increased after 
reforms in India. During the prior reform phase, it was 2.8 percent in 1980-81 and it 
declined to -0.1 percent in 1990-91. It increased to 2.7 percent in 1996-97 and further 
to 6.2 percent in 2007-08. It was this robust growth in invisible earnings which took 
the current account balance into unfamiliar positive territory for three successive years, 
2001-2 to 2003-04. The average, S.D, and C.V of net invisibles to GDP are 2.3, 1.7 
and 73 percent respectively. The average and SD of import are 11.3 and 4.1 
respectively which is found to be higher than that of export i.e 7.9 and 3.1 respectively. 
But C.V and CAGR of export is 38.8 and 4.7 percent which is found to be higher than 
that of import i.e 35.9 and 3.6 percent respectively. Between 1980-81 to 2007-08 
India's merchandise trade deficit to GDP ratio rose steeply from 4.3 to 7.7 percent. 
And this happened despite strong growth of exports. 
(VIII) Inflation: 
The analysis shows that there has been continuous decline in the rate of 
inflation over the given periods. It has declined from 8.2 percent during PI to 7.9 
percent during P2 and further to 5.13 percent during P3. Thus, fiscal reforms have 
helped the country in reducing the rate of inflation. However, the average, SD, CV, 
and CAGR of inflation during 1980-81 to 2007-08 are 7.23, 3.39, 46.88 and -2.51 
percent respectively (Table-14). 
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Table-14 
Rate of Inflation 
(Percent) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Average 
S.D 
C.V 
CAGR 
Inflation 
18.2 
9.3 
4.9 
7.5 
6.5 
4.4 
5.8 
8.1 
7.5 
7.5 
10.5 
13.8 
10.1 
8.4 
12.5 
8.1 
4.6 
4.4 
5.9 
3.3 
7.0 
3.9 
3.46 
5.5 
6.5 
4.4 
5.7 
4.6 
7.23 
3.39 
46.88 
-2.51 
Source: RBI and Ministry of Finance. 
5.4 Problems and Challenges of Fiscal Reforms: 
1. The detailed analysis of the fiscal performance during the reform period drew 
attention to the downward rigidity in current expenditure. In the face of sluggish 
revenue growth, this results in a persistent increase in revenue deficit. This has been a 
critical factor in the resurgence of fiscal deficit during the latter half of the 1990s. 
Although the tax reform measures initiated have imparted rationality to the tax 
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structure, the revenue buoyancy expected through a Laffer-curve effect has not come 
through. This is because cuts in indirect tax rates were not accompanied by removal of 
concessions and exemptions. Therefore, there has been neither significant increase in 
the tax base nor has tax compliance improved. With the result, the improvement in 
direct tax collection on account of an expansion of tax base and perhaps better 
compliance was not adequate to compensate the drop in customs and excise duty 
collections. Eventually, the tax-GDP ratio suffered deterioration during the reform 
period. The non-tax revenue of the Centre as a proportion to GDP recorded some rise. 
Poor cost recovery for the services provided by the Government has been responsible 
for this trend. Inadequate progress in public sector restructuring specifically reflected 
in the inability to raise user charges and continued low returns on investments, have 
also resulted in stagnation in non-tax revenue at Centre Government level. Thus, on the 
whole, reform did not result in adequate pick up in revenue growth in relation to 
growing expenditure requirement during the 1990s. 
The faster growth in committed expenditure like interest payments, wages and 
s;alaries and subsidies has imparted downward inflexibility in revenue expenditure. 
More importantly, expenditure on interest payments continued to grow unabated, 
reflecting the impact of sizeable outstanding liabilities contracted at higher interest 
rates in the first half of the 1990s. 
2. Progress towards better fiscal-monetary coordination during the reform period 
v/as an important achievement. The major policy initiative in this direction was the 
elimination of automatic monetization of the Central Government fiscal deficit. This, 
together with structural and institutional reforms undertaken by the Reserve Bank in 
the 1990s, has strengthened the public debt management process enabling wider 
market participation in the Government securities market and significant reduction in 
the pre-emption of institutional resources by the Government to finance fiscal gap. The 
Government borrowings at market related rates have intended to provide level-playing 
fi(;ld for the private investor. It was also expected to induce fiscal discipline. The 
o\'erall reform experience has been that, while the public debt management has been 
made market-based, fiscal deficits remain unrestrained. Market based regime with 
unrestrained fiscal deficit could worsen the fiscal situation. The above development 
unfolds certain important issues for the Indian fiscal system. 
The underlying objective of improving monetary-fiscal co-ordination by 
eliminating automatic monetization and reducing pre-emption of institutional resources 
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was to contain crowding-out arising from pre-emption of funds by the Government 
and, thus, allow level-playing field to the private investor. Although the Government at 
present borrows from the market on equal term with private borrowers, the crowding-
out effect of Goveniment borrowings still remains a critical issue in view of the high 
fiscal defich(Kapila,Uma.,2003)^\The moot question, however, is whether more 
coordination is necessarily better. If the Central bank and the Government agree on 
what needs to be done, but a coordinated approach cannot be put in effect because of 
errant behaviour by one of the two authorities, then coordination must improve things 
whereby the sensible policy maker must dominate the perverse one. In reality, 
however, fiscal and monetary policies are often poorly coordinated. If both authorities 
take consistent and credible actions, then the lack of coordination can stem from one of 
three causes: 
a) The fiscal and monetary authorities might have different objectives, i.e, 
different conceptions of what is best for society; 
b) The two authorities might have different opinions about the likely effects of 
fiscal and/or monetary policy actions on the economy, i.e, they might adhere to 
different economic theories; and 
c) The two authorities might make different forecasts of the likely state of the 
economy in the absence of policy intervention. 
The coordination problem can be solved by vesting the powers of decision 
making in the hands of the authority with the proper objective or correct theory or 
accurate forecast, if it is known which of the two authorities is correct. In reality, this is 
rarely Icnown in advance. The best strategy, therefore, is to give some ability to cancel 
cut the actions of the other, although this may result in a conflict of interest in the 
v/orst case or, more often, end in a deadlock. In the context of role of fiscal policy in 
r(jinvigorating growth, it needs to be recognized that the fiscal stance affects output 
itself as well as the variability of output. Imbalances between aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply feed back into the realized fiscal deficit. Given this simultaneity, an 
important question is to examine the design of fiscal policy to see whether fiscal policy 
automatically smoothens the business cycle or discretionary interventions are required. 
This aspect is usually examined by looking at built-in automatic stabilizers and by 
decomposing the actual fiscal deficit into a structural component (unresponsive to 
cycles in the economy) and a cyclical component (responsive to cycles). Previous 
research has shown that fiscal deficits in India have been predominantly structural with 
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cyclical component almost negligible. This suggests that discretionary policy had an 
important role to play in counter-cyclical measures in the Indian context. 
3. The analysis shows that the level of fiscal deficit relative to GDP in India at 
2001-02 was higher than not only that of most internationally comparable benchmark 
levels (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty requires fiscal deficit to be 3.0 percent of GDP) but 
also the levels recommended by the Eleventh Finance Commission(4.5 percent for 
Central Government). Further fiscal deficit in 2001-02 had also exceeded the levels 
witnessed on the eve of the 1991 crisis. Notwithstanding these developments, most 
other macroeconomic parameters have been sustainable. As a result, the higher fiscal 
deficit has not spilled over to the external sector. In this setting, questions have been 
raised whether the high fiscal deficit should be a matter of much concern. 
4. Another issue which emerges in the context of downward rigidity exhibited by 
the fiscal deficit is the rise in debt-GDP ratio. It needs to be reviewed whether the 
fiscal stance and the debt accumulation process is sustainable or not. The progressive 
lowering of the fiscal deficit has been one of the touchstones for the reform process. 
When reform began, fiscal policy was conditioned by what might be called 'deficit 
pessimism', the notion that high levels of fiscal deficits were unsustainable. They 
would lead to higher interest rates, a worsening balance of payments and a rising 
public debt to GDP ratio. On the first two counts, such pessimism has turned out to be 
unfounded. Interest rates have declined, although rates on commercial loans have not 
declined as much as those on Government securities. Huge inflows of remittances have 
negated the malign effects on the balance of payments associated with large deficits. It 
is the rise in the public debt to GDP ratio since 1997-98_ in the earlier post- reform 
period that has caused the fiscal deficit ratio to look unsustainable. The key issue, 
therefore, is whether any worsening of the public debt to GDP ratio can be checked 
(Mohan, T.T.,2003)^^ 
High levels of debt-GDP ratio result in high interest payments relative to 
revenue receipts. Since interest payments are committed expenditures, revenue deficits 
ar(2 bound to increase when revenue receipts to GDP ratios remain sluggish. This has 
th(; effect of lowering the saving rate on the one hand and increasing the fiscal deficit 
on the other to maintain primary expenditures. Eventually, these changes have the 
potential of developing into a spiral of rising fiscal deficits, debt, interest payments, 
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revenue deficit and back to a higher fiscal deficit. This gives rise to the issue of 
26 sustainability of debt (Srivastava, D.K.2005) 
5. On the expenditure side, containing the subsidy burden has proved difficult, 
although its increase as a proportion of GDP has been contained. The current world 
environment of elevated oil, food and fertilizer prices is not conducive to the 
expectation of significant reduction in these subsidies in the near future. The prognosis 
on international prices of energy and food is not encouraging in the medium term as of 
now. So public policy in these areas has to be taken into account expectations over the 
medium term: if elevated prices are deemed to be temporary, smoothening of prices of 
such important items of common consumption can be justified. Funding such subsidies 
over an extended period of time is likely to become unsustainable; hence directly 
addressing the needs of those less well-off and who are less capable of coping with 
these price increases may be more desirable, rather than suppressing prices overall. If 
the need for these subsidies persists, the recent practice of issuing bonds to fund these 
subsidies is also not sustainable. The second issue on the expenditure side relates to the 
funding of public investment, particularly related to infrastructure. Public investment 
has been reduced over the past decade or so. Whereas private investment has clearly 
substituted or complemented public investment successfully in areas such as telecom, 
ports and airports, and particularly in roads and power, total investment in 
infrastructure is clearly inadequate, in overall economic growth. With increasing 
urbanization there is need for accelerated public investment in infrastructure. While 
ftrocesses for inducing private investment need continuous improvement, there is need 
hr a reassessment of desirable, expected and feasible public investment requirements, 
^^ ?hich are likely to be higher than what is currently envisaged. Third, the Government 
is already engaged in expanding programmes and spending for human development. 
Funding for these needs will continue to require enhancement (Mohan, 
Rakesh.,2008)^^ 
6. The issues like rigidities in bringing expenditure to a lower level or in 
channelising it toward productive lines apart from sustainability of public debt, which 
continue to pose problems for the on-going process of fiscal consolidation could have 
been addressed adequately. Fiscal consolidation requires altering the pattern of 
expenditure. The level of expenditure of the Central Government is heavily loaded in 
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favour of obligatory constituents- interest payments, defence, and statutory grants to 
States_ reducing thereby, strategy of fiscal policy. Capital expenditure, which adds to 
the productive capacity in the economy, is being progressively pre-empted by growth 
in revenue expenditure. Ahhough explicit subsidies provided by the Central 
Government have declined, there is a wide range of hidden subsidies which need to be 
contained. Proper targeting of subsidies is needed to reduce leakages and 
misappropriation. In this regard, the dismantling of the administered price mechanism 
in the petroleum sector has been a welcome step as it would not only bring 
transparency to the fiscal operations, but would also improve the productivity, 
efficiency and international competitiveness of the domestic petroleum industry. In this 
regai-d, formulating a long-term energy policy, taking into accotmt the future of public 
sector oil companies, is necessary to exploit the strong forward and backward linkages 
of the energy sector with other sector of the economy. 
7. The Government has drawn up plans for undertaking effective and efficient 
economic and social expenditures, the potential risk to the fiscal stability arise on the 
likely increase in interest payments due to projected significant rise in its market 
borro^ving programme. This may jeopardize the Governments plans to phase out 
revenue deficit by 2008-09. The Kelkar Task Force's strategy of reaching this FRBM 
target is contingent on freezing of stock of debt at the level that existed at the 
beginning of the FRBM implementation and softer interest rate conditions which 
would enable the Government to replace old securities as and when they mature with 
new securities issued al lower interest rates. The substantial increase in market 
borrowings of the Centre budgeted for the year 2005-06 and firming up of interest rate 
conditions and consequent possibility of rising Governments interest expenditure 
would pose a potential source of risk for reaching the FRBM target of phasing out 
revenue deficits by 2008-09. 
If the committed expenses in the form of interest expenditure mount, this 
would, perforce, make the Government to compromise on other productive 
expenditures. Specifically, the Kelkar Task Force had projected a growth of 12.8 
pei-cent per annum in plan expenditure of the Centre and that capital expenditure at 
least maintains its ratio to total expenditure at 2003-04 level in the base line scenario 
(or a steady increase in capital expenditure to reach about 0.5 percent of GDP higher 
than the baseline projection by 2008-09). Therefore, the Government would be facing 
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£i dilemma of whether to stick to its stated outlays so as to pursue its social and 
economic expenditure goals or compromise on them so as to be on track of achieving 
FRBM targets by 2008-09(Pattnaik,R.K.,Bose,D.,Bhattacharyya,I &,Chander,Jai,2005)^^ 
8. In case of direct taxes, personal income tax reform should involve further 
simplification of the tax system by withdrawing tax exemptions and concessions on 
income from specified activities. It is also necessary to abolish the surcharge and to 
further simplify the tax by reducing the number of tax brackets. Infact, there is 
considerable virtue in having a single tax rate with an exemption limit, as many of the 
transitional economies have found. Moving towards a single tax rate may not 
politically feasible at this juncture, however, but it may be possible to reduce the 
number of tax rates to two, with a small reduction in the marginal tax rate. On the 
corporate tax, it is necessary to broaden the tax base by getting rid of the tax 
concessions and preferences. In particular, the exemption for profits from exports, free 
trade zones, and Technology Park, as well as exemptions for area-based development 
and for infrastructure should be phased out. Similarly, the current depreciation 
allowance, even after the proposed reduction in 2005-06 is quite generous, and there is 
a case for reducing it to more realistic levels while at the same time reducing the tax 
rate to align it with the marginal tax rate on personal income tax. It is most important, 
however, to avoid flip-flop in tax policy. 
9. The other important issue involving the corporate income tax is the differential 
between the rates applicable to domestic and foreign companies. Part of the rationale 
for a differential involves the dividend tax, which is payable by domestic companies 
alone. The rationalization of these two aspects therefore needs to go together. 
With regard to import duties, reform should move in the direction of fiirther 
reduction and unification of the rates. As most non-agricultural tariffs fall between 0 
and 15 percent, a uniform tariff of 10 percent would considerably simplify and 
rationalize the system (Panagariya, Arvind 2005) . Equally important is the need to 
get rid of an excessive amount of exemptions and concessional treatment for various 
categories including imports for special projects. 
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10. Wide ranging exemptions are also a problem with excise duties. Therefore, one 
of the most important base-broadening measures should be to reduce the exemptions. 
The rate structure should be rationalized by converting the remaining items subject to 
specific duties to ad valorem and by unifying the rates toward a single CenVAT rate. 
With the reduction in import duties, almost all imports have been made subject 
to counters^ ailing duty and the countervailing duty in turn has been made eligible for 
MOD VAT credit like the excise duty. There have also been several improvements and 
subj(ict to certain limitations the invoice has been made the basis of tax assessment. 
Some attempt has also been made to broaden the base through the removal of 
exemptions, although here the fear of political opposition and the strong pressures 
exerted by the affected groups have prevented the inclusion of many commodities 
within the tax net whose exemptions are clearly unjustified. But there is no denying the 
fact that the excise tax system is a much more rational and simpler system today than it 
was in 1991. 
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CHAPTER-6 
CONCLUSION AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
CONCLUSION 
The fiscal trend of 1970s suggests that this was a period of moderate growth in 
public expenditure in line with revenue flow and deficit on revenue account occurred 
only in 1979-80. The break came during 1980s, when the total expenditure of the 
Central Government increased. This was mainly due to the increase in non-plan 
expenditure. What is more striking about this increase is the rise in almost all 
categories of non-plan expenditures namely interest payment, defence, subsidies, loan 
and grants to States and UTs as also other non-plan expenditures. Plan expenditure 
also remained upward throughout 1980s. So was the capital expenditure. Capital 
formation indeed increased from 6.6 percent of GDP during the first half of 1980s to 
7.2 percent during the second half of 1980s. Thus, 1980s were characterized by a 
significant increase in Government expenditure, both plan and non-plan as also 
revenue and capital expenditures. 
Similarly, during 1980s, the revenue receipts of the Central Government has 
also moved up. A major problem with tax system was that the share of direct taxes had 
virtually stagnated during 1980s. The buoyancy in tax revenue was experienced mainly 
due to an increase in indirect taxes. Here also, the increase mainly came for custom 
duty. This happened both due to an increase in the level of custom duty and increase in 
imports. Thus, the second half of 1980s witnessed a rather disturbing trend on the 
external front. The foregoing analysis has shown that the public debt to GDP ratio 
increased throughout the 1980s, going up to almost 59 percent at the end of the decade. 
What is worth noting for the decade of 1980s is that both the revenue and 
expenditure of the Government grew substantially but the growth in revenue could not 
keep pace with the growth in expenditure. This not only widened the resources gap but 
also resulted in growing public debt and a higher fiscal deficit. A closer analysis of the 
Central finances reveals that a widening of about two percentage points of gross fiscal 
deficit come from the revenue deficit which widened from 1.4 percent of GDP in 
1980-81 to 3.3 percent in 1990-91. Increase in interest payments was the key factor 
behind the worsening of revenue and fiscal deficit because it has registered a rise of 
almost two percentage points of GDP over the same period. All the indicators of fiscal 
imbalances were on rise throughout the 1980s. The fiscal imbalance, fuelled by the 
revenue and budget deficit and financed by the borrowings and decumulation of 
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reserves, was accompanied by accelerated inflation to double digit levels. Such a fiscal 
situation had become unsustainable. 
To remove the deficit and bring stability, fiscal stabilization measures were 
introduced in 1991. The essential features of the Central Government's overall fiscal 
strategy for controlling the budgetary deficit comprises expenditure compression, 
completion of tax reforms, institutional reforms, disinvestment of Government 
own(;rship, deregulation of financial system, elimination of automatic monetization, 
and j'eduction in pre-emption of institutional resources by the Government. 
The strategy of fiscal consolidation initiated in the early 1990s was a mix of 
measures towards revenue augmentation through tax reforms and expenditure 
compression. Given the limited improvement in revenue mobilization, the fiscal 
consolidation during the first half of the 1990s was essentially achieved through 
exp(;nditure containment. The sharp cuts in expenditure were effected as part of the 
stabilization package in 1991, attempts to curb expenditure growth in successive 
Central Government budgets in the 1990s were found to be mostly irregular and 
illogical in nature. It is only in the second generation of economic reforms that 
expenditure reform has become an integral part of the overall fiscal reform. 
Expenditure Reform Commission set up by the Government suggested a host of 
measures to curb built-in growth in expenditure and to bring about structural changes 
in the composition of expenditure. Some of these measures have been implemented by 
the Government. Despite, the wide range of measures, the expenditure compression 
was mainly effected in the capital expenditure. A major initiative towards 
institutionalizing an expenditure management system was through constitution of 
E>cpenditure Reform Commission to look into various areas of expenditure correction. 
These included creation of national food stock along with cost minimization of buffer 
stock operations, rationalization of fertilizer subsidies through phased dismantling of 
controls, imposing a ceiling on Government staff strength through a two-year ban on 
new recruitment. With a view to promoting transparency and curbing the growth of 
contingent Government liabilities, a Guarantee Redemption Fimd has been set up as a 
part of expenditure management strategy. 
Systematic and comprehensive efforts to reform the tax system in India started 
only after market based economic reforms were initiated in 1991. Government 
proposed to implement various suggestions made by the Chelliah Committee on tax 
reforms. Tax Reform Committee recommended moderate direct tax rates with reduced 
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tax deduction and exemptions, ways of improving compliance of direct taxes and 
strengthening enforcement, revamping of tax administration and computerization, 
simplification and rationalization of customs tariffs with a view to reducing the 
multiplicity and dispersion of rates and to eliminate exemptions which have become 
unnec(jssary, reducing the level of tariff rates and simplification and rationalization of 
the structure of excise duties for better tax compliance and administration, the scope of 
extending the MOD VAT Scheme. 
With double digit inflation, fiscal deficit, the precarious foreign exchange, and 
current account position in 1990-91, the fiscal stabilization programme was directed 
inter alia at drastically cutting the budget deficit and tightening monetary policy with 
the objective of reducing inflation and achieving external sector viability. Reforms in 
the public sector enterprises have also been introduced in the form of disinvestment 
and autonomy etc. Priorities in reforms include raising return on investments in PSUs 
and infusing professionalisation in management. Reform of PSUs including 
privatization and phasing out of unviable units have not gathered as much momentum 
as had been hoped for. Disinvestment has been piecemeal and the funds so raised are 
beir.g used to reduce budget deficits, rather than strengthen the PSUs. 
India has adopted a rule-based fiscal framework with the enactment of the 
FRJ3M Act, 2003 by the Central Government and the framing of FRBM Rules, 2004, 
thereby marking a new beginning in the fiscal consolidation process. Under the FRBM 
Act, 2003 the Central Government is committed to eliminate revenue deficit and 
reduce fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP by end-March 2009. 
It is found from the foregoing analysis that revenue receipts as percent of GDP 
was 10.08 percent in 1985-86 which reached to 10.28 percent in 1989-90. From 1990-
91 onwards revenue receipts as percent of GDP has not grown much. It is more or less 
stagnant. In 2007-08 it is budgeted at 10.4 percent of GDP. The 1990s have witnessed 
a fall in the collection of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP. Between 1990-91 and 
1999-2000, when there were substantial tax rates reductions the ratio of gross tax 
revenue to GDP declined from 10.1 percent to 8.9 percent. However, as a result of tax 
reforms introduced since then, it became as low as 8.2 percent in 2001-02. Of late, 
recovery is noticeable in the tax-GDP ratio i.e 11.4 percent in 2006-07 and it was 
budgeted at 11.7 percent in 2007-08. A remarkable feature of the Centre's revenue 
trends in the reform years reflect that there is the jump in the share of direct taxes of 
total tax revenue from 19.2 percent in 1990-91 (pre-reform period) to 34.7 percent in 
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1997-98. The figure stood at 48.8 percent in the 2006-07 budgets. In case of 
corporation tax, the relative contribution was 10 percent in 1985-86, while in 1990-91 
it was 9.28 percent. In the intervening period, however, moderate changes are 
noticeable in the proportionate share of corporation tax. It has increased sharply during 
the post-1991 period. In 2006-07 it was 30.6 percent and was budgeted at 30.7 percent 
in 2007-08. While personal income tax has also shown greater buoyancy in the reform 
period, from 8.8 percent of the total revenue in 1985-86 it rose to around 10 percent in 
1991-92. After the tax reforms initiated since early 1990s, the share of personal income 
tax in gross tax revenues of the Central Government increased sharply and reached at 
18.1 percent in 2006-07 and was budgeted at 18 percent in 2007-08. The leap in 
revenue from direct taxes, however, has not been able to neutralize the decline that has 
taken place in the indirect taxes. The share of customs revenue in total tax collection 
shov/s upward trend from 33.27 percent in 1985-86 to 35.89 percent in 1990-91. This 
upward was attributable to a changed emphasis from physical to fiscal controls to 
regulate imports, a policy reiterated in the Long-Term Fiscal Policy, 1985. However, 
during the post-liberalization period, a sharp fall is noticeable in the relative share of 
custom duties in gross tax revenues of the Central Government. This is due to drastic 
reductions in the tariff rates across the rate categories including the peak rate in the 
wake of WTO commitments and to become globally competitive. In 2006-07 the share 
of customs revenue was 18.3 percent and was budgeted at 18 percent in 2007-08. The 
proportionate share of excise revenue declined from 45.25 percent in 1985-86 to 41.79 
percent in 1990-91. In 2006-07 it was 24.94 percent and was budgeted at 23.75 percent 
in 2007-08. Revenue from indirect taxes has been decelerating even before the reforms 
but the decline has been sharper in the reform period. There has been a noticeable shift 
in the tax structure at the Centre. The two key aims of the reforms, viz, lessening the 
weight of foreign trade taxes and increasing that of direct taxes, are evidently 
materializing. The rise in the share of income tax has, however, not sufficient to make-
up fully for the loss from the tariff reforms. In sum, reforms so far have succeeded in 
m,aking a small dent on India's tax structure by reducing the weight of custom and 
excise duties and raising that of direct taxes. The shift away from foreign trade taxes 
and excise duties appears to have taken place at the cost of overall revenue growth. 
The rise in the relative share of direct taxes has resulted partly from the decline in the 
revenue from customs and excise duties. The non-tax revenue of the Centre as a 
proportion to GDP recorded some rise, poor cost recovery for the services provided by 
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the Government have been responsible for this trend. As proportion of GDP non-tax 
revenue recorded an improvement from 2.45 percent in 1985-86 to 2.67 percent in 
1992-93 and broadly at 2.97 percent in 2001-02. After that it had a declining trend 
from 2.79 percent in 2003-04 to 2.01 percent in 2006-07, and is estimated at 1.8 
percent ofGDP in 2007-08. 
Moreover, the foregoing analysis also indicates the failure on the part of 
expenditure reduction. There has been a sharp rise in interest payment. Throughout the 
1990s, while capital expenditure as proportion of GDP have fallen sharply, the revenue 
expenditure net of interest payments have stagnated. It is evident in the analysis that 
the latio of capital expenditure to GDP has fallen about 6 percent in 1990-91 to 2.6 
percent in 1999-2000 and further declined to 1.7 percent in 2006-07. Though, the ratio 
of net revenue expenditure which fell sharply between 1990-91 and 1996-97, has risen 
in recent times, but well below to its 1989-90 figures. 
In the foregoing analysis we also show the trends in various indicators of fiscal 
imbalances since 1980-81. It is evident that between 1980-81 and 1990-91 the revenue 
def .cit of the Central Government rose substantially. This fact suggests that the fiscal 
situation had been under mounting pressure throughout the decade. In this period the 
gross fiscal deficit of the Central Government rose alarmingly, from 5.71 percent of 
GDP from 1980-81 to 7.7 percent in 1990-91. However, primary deficit which was 3.8 
percent in 1980-81 declined to 2.8 percent in 1990-91. The gross fiscal deficit of the 
Centre declined from 5.55 percent in 1991-92 to 4.84 percent in 1996-97, it again 
started rising from 1997-98 to reach at the level of 6.19 percent of GDP in 2001-02. 
Thereafter it again indicated a falling trend till 2003-04 to reach a level of 4.48 percent 
of GDP. A similar trend is observed in respect of revenue deficit of the Centre, which 
after declining in 1996-97 rose steadily to 4.4 percent in 2001-02 .While the primary 
deficit declined from 2.8 percent in 1990-91 to 0.24 percent in 1996-97, it also again 
started rising from 1997-98 to reach at the level of 1.4 percent of GDP in 2001-02. 
Although there was decline in fiscal deficit and primary deficit to 5.91 percent and 0.2 
p(;rcent of GDP in 2002-03 respectively, the revenue deficit continued almost at the 
same level as 2001-02. There was, however, improvement in 2003-04 when both fiscal 
deficit and revenue deficit declined to 4.48 percent and 3.6 percent of GDP 
njspectively. In 2004-05, revenue deficit and fiscal deficit as proportion of GDP were 
2.5 percent and 3.99 percent respectively. Primary deficit, as a proportion of GDP 
remained unchanged. The fiscal deficit declined from 4.09 percent in 2005-06 to 3.1 
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percent in 2007-08. A similar trend is observed in respect of revenue deficit, which 
declined from 2.58 percent in 2005-06 to 1.5 percent in 2007-08. 
For evaluating the performance of fiscal reforms the parameters such as total 
receipts and expenditure, real GDP growth, tax-GDP ratio, total expenditure as percent 
of GDP, debt-GDP ratio, deficit indicators, BOPs indicators, inflation have been 
undertaken. For this purpose the study has been divided into three sub-periods: 
• First phase (PI) - 1980-81 to 1990-91 (Prior reform period) 
• Second phase (P2) - 1991-92 to 1999-2000 (First generation reform period) 
• Third phase (P3) - 2000-01 to 2007-08 (Second generation reform period) 
The study shows that during 1990-91 to 2007-08, the average, SD, CV and 
CAGR of revenue receipts (Rs. crores) are 195874, 127811.6, 65.3 and 13.08 percent 
respecti\'ely. During the same period the average, SD, CV and CAGR of tax revenue 
(Rs. crores) are 146616, 104750.6, 71.4 and 13.26 percent which is found to be higher 
than that of non-tax revenues (Rs. crores) 49314.9, 25859.5, 52.4 and 12.21 percent 
respectively. The average, SD, and CAGR of tax revenue as a percent of revenue 
receipts are 73.6, 4.4 and 0.16 percent respectively which is higher than the non-tax 
revenue as percent of revenue receipts i.e 26.4, 4.3 and -0.78 percent respectively, but 
CV of non-tax revenue as percent of revenue receipt (16.3 percent) is higher than that 
of tax revenue (5.9 percent).During 1990-91 to 2007-08 the average, SD, CV and 
CAGR of capital receipts (Rs. crores) are 117453, 61853.3, 52.6 and 11.6 percent 
respectively which is found to be lesser than that of revenue receipts. 
In case of total expenditure the average, SD, CV and CAGR (Rs. crores) are 
315071, 176316, 55.9 and 11.8 percent respectively. And the average, SD, CV and 
CAGR of total expenditure as percent of GDP are 15.8, 1.2, 7.6 and -0.8 percent 
respectively. During 1990-91 to 2007-08, the average, SD, CV and CAGR of revenue 
expenditure (Rs. crores) are 255565, 151280.2, 59.2 and 12.8 percent respectively. 
During the same period the average, SD, CV and CAGR of interest payments (Rs. 
crores) are 84486.6, 44559.4, 52.7 and 12.3 percent respectively which is found to be 
higher than that of subsidies (28017.6, 16450.6, 58.7, 11.8 percent respectively), and 
defence (30775.5,14666.4,47.6 and 10.7 percent respectively). The average and SD of 
interest payments as percent of revenue expenditure are 33.7 and 2.8 which is higher 
than that of subsidies (11.2 and 1.9) and that of defence (12.8 and 1.5) but CV of 
subsidies as percent of revenue expenditure is highest i.e 16.9 percent among defence 
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(11.7 percent) and interest payment (8.3 percent). The CAGR of interest payment, 
subsidies and defence are -0.5, -0.9 and -1.91 percent respectively. During 1990-91 to 
2007-08, the average, SD, CV and CAGR of capital expenditure (Rs. crores) are 
59507.5, 29213.0, 49.1 and 8 percent which is lesser than revenue expenditure. During 
the same period the average, SD and CAGR of loan and advances (Rs. crores) are 
36472.4, 23602.6 and 8.4 percent respectively which is found to be higher than capital 
outlay i.e 23001.8, 18748.8 and 3 percent respectively. But CV of capital outlay is 81.5 
percent which is higher than the CV of loan and advances i.e 64.7 percent. Average 
and CAGR of loan and advances as percent of capital expenditure are 61.2 and 0.4 
percent respectively which is higher than the average and CAGR of capital outlay i.e 
38.2 and -4.6 percent respectively. SD of both capital outlay and loan and advances is 
come out to be same i.e 15.9 percent. But CV of capital outlay is 40.97 percent which 
is higher than the CV of loan and advances i.e 25.9 percent. 
In case of real GDP growth it is found that during 1980-81 to 2007-08, the 
average, S.D, CV, and CAGR of real GDP growth are 6.01, 2.20, 36.59 and 1.88 
percent respectively. So far as period of reforms is concerned, it is found that during 
2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) real GDP growth is 7.2 percent which is higher than that of 
period P2 i.e 5.7 percent and P2 is higher than that of PI i.e 5.6 percent. It is meant 
that real GDP growth after reforms (first and second generation reforms) is higher than 
that of prior- reform period. 
The analysis of direct tax as a percent of GDP shows that there is significant 
difference in direct tax over the three periods. It is assumed that, in alternative 
hypothesis, there is significant difference in direct tax as a percent of GDP over the 
thiree periods .Since P value (0.0000006) is less than a (0.05), therefore, alternative 
hypothesis is accepted. So far as period of reforms is concerned, it is found that during 
2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) direct tax is 4.3 percent which is higher than that of period P2 
(1991-92 to 1999-2000) , and PI (1980-81 to 1990-91) i.e 2.7 percent and 1.97636 
percent respectively. It is meant that direct tax as percent of GDP after reform was 
higher in comparison to PI and P2.This shows that there has been a continuous 
increase in direct tax as a percent of GDP. The direct tax to GDP ratio has seen an 
uptrend because of the reforms in income and corporate taxes that simplified the tax 
system, reduced exemptions and tax rates, thus providing an incentive for better 
compliance. Likewise, in case of indirect tax as percent of GDP, there is significant 
difference between indirect tax as percent of GDP over the three periods. It is assumed 
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that, in alternative hypothesis, there is significant difference in indirect tax as a percent 
of CJDP over the three periods .The calculated result reveals that P value (0.00000004) 
is l<jss than a (0.05), therefore alternative hypothesis is accepted. So far as period of 
reftirms is concerned, it is found that during 2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) indirect taxes as 
percent of GDP was 5.5625 percent which is less than that of period P2(199I-92 to 
1999-2000) i.e 6.55556 percent and P2 is less than that of PI (1980-81 to 1990-91)i.e 
7.88909 percent. It is meant that indirect tax as percent of GDP before reform was 
higher in comparison to f' and II" reform periods. But there is no significant 
difference between total taxes as percent of GDP over the three periods. Since P value 
(0.25508) is not less than a (0.05), therefore, null hypothesis is accepted. Total taxes as 
peicent of GDP before reform was 9.86364 percent (PI) which is higher than 
9.24444(P2) but P2 is less than that of P3 i.e 9.9 percent. 
Further, it is assumed that, in alternative hypothesis, there is significant 
difference in expenditure-GDP ratio over the three periods. Since P value (0.00297) is 
lesis than a (0.05), therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted. So far as period of 
reforms is concerned, it is found that during 2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) expenditure-GDP 
ratio was 15.55 percent which is less than that of period P2 i.e 15.77778 percent and 
P2 is less than that of PI i.e 17.62 percent. It is meant that expenditure-GDP ratio 
before reform was higher in comparison to f' and II" reform periods. 
In case of debt as percent of GDP, it is assumed that, in alternative hypothesis, 
there is significant difference in debt-GDP ratio over the three periods._The analysis 
shows that P value (3.02E-06) is less than a (0.05), therefore alternative hypothesis is 
accepted. There has been continuous increase in the debt-GDP ratio over all the three 
periods. It has increased from 48.59 percent during PI to 52.21 percent during P2, and 
further to 61.4 percent during P3. 
For deficit indicators, we first analyze gross fiscal deficit. It is assumed that, in 
alternative hypothesis, there is significant difference in gross fiscal deficit over the 
tliree periods . Since P value (0.00027) is less than a (0.05), therefore, alternative 
hypothesis is accepted. So far as period of reforms is concerned, it is found that during 
2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) gross fiscal deficit was 4.56 percent which is less than that of 
period P2 i.e 5.67 percent and P2 is less than that of PI i.e 6.83 percent. It is meant that 
gross fiscal deficit before reform was higher in comparison to I^ ' and II" reform 
periods. Likewise, there is significant difference between revenue deficit over the three 
periods. The calculated resuh reveals that P value (0.007661) is less than a (0.05), 
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thersfore alternative hypothesis is accepted. During pre-reform period, PI, it was 1.8 
perc;ent, while it was 2.99 percent during P2 and 3.06 percent during P3. Hence, it has 
been continuously increasing over the period of time. There is also a significant 
difference between primary deficit over the three periods. Since P value (0.00011) is 
less than a (0.05), therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted. Primary deficit before 
reform was 3.13909 percent (PI) which is higher than 0.66222(P2) and 0.3875(P3). 
The current account balance shows significant difference over the three 
periods. Since P value (0.00028) is less than a (0.05), therefore alternative hypothesis 
is accepted. So far as period of reforms is concerned it is found that during 1991-92 to 
1999-2000(P2) and 2000-01 to 2007-08(P3) the current account balance was -1.07778 
and -0.0625 respectively which is lower than during the period 1980-81 to 1990-
91(P1) i.e -1.95455. It is meant that current account balance before reform was higher 
in comparison to f' and II"'' generation reform periods. The BOPs condition has been 
improved over the given periods. The average, S.D, and C.V of net invisibles to GDP 
are 2.3, 1.7 and 73 percent respectively. The average and SD of import are 11.3 and 
4.1 which is found to be higher than that of export i.e 7.9 and 3.1 respectively. But C.V 
and CAGR of export are 38.8 and 4.7 percent which is found to be higher than that of 
import i.e 35.9 and 3.6 percent. Between 1980-81 to 2007-08 India's merchandise 
trade deficit to GDP ratio rose steeply from 4.3 to 7.7 percent. And this happened 
despite strong growth of exports. 
The analysis of rate of inflation shows that there has been continuous decline 
o^ 'er the given periods. It has declined from 8.2 percent during PI to 7.9 percent during 
P2, and further to 5.13 percent during P3. However, the average, S.D, C.V, and CAGR 
of inflation during 1980-81 to 2007-08 are 7.23, 3.39, 46.88 and -2.51 percent 
respectively. 
However, in the light of the study few important points may be mentioned so as 
to make fiscal stability a long-lasting feature. Undertaking fiscal adjustment often 
requires difficult decisions involving increasing Government revenue and reducing 
s]3ending. This can be achieved by a progressive reduction in public debt and through 
higher revenues. The possibility of achieving higher revenues through increased rate of 
taxes is both undesirable and non-feasible. Higher tax revenues can be achieved only 
tlirough buoyancy and expansion of the tax base. It must be emphasized, however, that 
improvements in tax policy are more likely to be successful when they are 
accompanied by measures to strengthen tax administration. An explicit and sustained 
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political commitment, a team of capable officials dedicated to tax administration 
reform, rele '^ant training for staffs, additional resources for the tax administration, 
changes in incentives for both tax payers and tax administrators are the essential 
elements required for successful tax administration reform. It is important to remember 
that "tax administration is tax policy". Making the transition to information-based tax 
administration, online filing of tax returns, and compiling and matching information 
are key to administration reform. Tax administrators should also assist tax payers in a 
timely fashion and help them to reduce their compliance cost. 
Thus, a tax system becomes desirable which should be responsive to GDP 
growth and its revenue generating capacity should be high, from the point of view of 
its efficiency, thus leaving the allocation of resources essentially undisturbed, taxes 
should be levied in a fair and equitable maimer, a simple transparent tax system is 
relatively easy to administer and promotes compliance, and the ratio of tax revenue to 
GDP should increase at appropriate level. 
Following taxes may be helpful in raising revenues of the Central Government: 
i. The personal income tax can be increased at least by broadening the base and 
strengthening the administration while at the same time ensuring that the main 
aim of the administration would be to collect increasing revenues without 
harassment that the exacting illegal payments will be drastically cut down. The 
base of income tax can be widened by: 
a) Removing many exemptions that are unjustified and reducing the magnitude of 
some of the concession; 
b) Bringing into the tax net a large number of income earners who are evading 
tax; 
c) Introducing such acceptable simplified procedures as the estimated income 
scheme; and 
d) Introducing a minimum profits tax on all business income other than income of 
professionals. 
ii. On the corporation tax, base broadening involves getting rid of the tax 
concessions and preferences. In particular, the exemption for profits from 
exports, free trade zones, and technology parks, as well as exemptions for area-
based development and for infrastructure should be phased out. 
iii. Sales taxA/'AT should be broadly based tax on final domestic consumption that 
does not tax intermediated consumption or export, and one that does not 
238 
differentiate by source of production (foreign and domestic). Because of its 
efficiency and revenue security the ideal instrument to achieve this objective is 
a VAT at a single rate, with crediting provisions and zero rating of exports, 
iv. Wide-ranging exemptions is the bid problem with excise duties. Therefore, one 
of the most important base-broadening measures should be to reduce the 
exemptions. In particular, the exemptions given to small scale industry have not 
only eroded the tax base but have inhibited the growth of firms into an 
economically efficient size. Similarly, various exemptions given to project 
imports have significantly eroded the tax base. This has infused the tax system 
with selectivity and discretion. The rate structure should be rationalized by 
converting the remaining items subject to specific duties to ad valorem and by 
unifying the rates towards a single CenVAT. 
V. If a moderate level of protection is thought desirable to encourage local 
industry, a low uniform custom duty, when properly coordinated with a VAT 
and excises, is the preferred instrument. Duty drawback or suspension schemes 
are needed to relieve exporters of the anti-export bias caused by custom duties 
on inputs. Exemptions from customs duties should be limited and clearly 
defined to avoid abuse. With the rates of custom duties coming down, it would 
be necessary to subject at most all imports to some import duty. That would 
also be economically a rational policy. 
Likewise, expenditure reduction measures have to be pragmatic, adequate to 
achieve the intended stabilization, but nonetheless economically, politically, and 
socially feasible. Several types of expenditure measures can be adopted quickly to 
contain a deteriorating fiscal situation. Sustainable expenditure reform, however, 
requires a review of underlying Government policies, the composifion of spending, the 
coverage of activities by the public sector, and the modes of delivery of public 
services. Similar to the importance of tax administration in tax reform, efficient 
spending reduction usually requires improvements in systems of budget design, 
preparation and execution. There are no hard and fast rules about how public 
expenditure should be cut. This will depend partly on the factors driving the growth in 
spending, as well as on the social and political constraints facing policymakers. 
However, some guidelines may be suggested: 
i. Avoid across-the broad cuts. Across-the-board cuts often seem attractive, this 
approach allows each individual operating ministry to decide how to cut its 
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budget- whether to delay the purchase of goods and services, run down stocks, 
cut back on temporary staff, etc. and it appears to imply equal hardship for all 
and is thus seen as equitable, 
ii. It is essential to identify specific programs for reductions. Some programmes 
should be dropped, pruned or consolidated, as economic development is there 
such as subsidies etc. 
iii. Wage restraint in the public sector can be a major source of savings. But there 
is limit for wage freezing. Cutbacks in civil services numbers are more 
appropriate since it has expanded more to absorb a growing labour force. 
iv. Target social programmes narrowly. 
V. By raising fees and charges. 
vi. Public enterprises should, in general, not be a drain on the budget. If they are in 
deficit, pricing structures should be adjusted, the scope of activities redefined, 
their employment policy reassessed, and their capital programme rationalized. 
Preferably, they should be privatized and fully exposed to a competitive market 
environment, 
vii. Expenditure restructuring relating to both its size and sectoral allocations aimed 
at removing inefficiencies arising from misallocation, design and 
implementation of scheme, and delivery of services, 
viii. Rationalizing subsidies by reducing their overall volume, increasing their 
transparency by making them explicit, and improving their targeting. 
Following measures may be suggested to eliminate wasteful expenditure: 
i. The elimination of unproductive or very low-priority services, 
ii. Privatization of activities that can and should be carried out in the private 
sector, 
iii. The introduction of a mere commercial approach to public activities, including 
competitive tendering, the contracting out of some services to the private 
sector, and the use of commercial accounting techniques to set the basis for full 
cost recovery, 
iv. The wider use of balance sheets to improve the analysis of the long-term 
implications of existing and new expenditure. 
V. The stimulation of market discipline, including separate assessment of its 
application to the Government's role as purchaser and provider of services for 
example, in health care. 
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vi. For those sei-vices that are to remain in the public sector, measures designed to 
improve managerial performance, efficiency and effectiveness, including 
establishing cost centres_ which combine under a unified management, the 
costing interlinked activities, setting objectives, output requirements, and inputs 
for each centre, more developed managerial authority for the centres, and the 
linking of manager's salaries to performance. 
It may be concluded that viable and effective fiscal adjustment may be 
rest'Dted, if the above suggestions are taken into consideration and implementation in 
an earnest and proper manner. 
The major findings of the study can be summarized as follows: 
1. The study reveals that during 1990-91 to 2007-08 the compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) of revenue receipts (13.08 percent) is higher than that of capital 
receipts (11.6 percent). Likewise, the CAGR of tax revenue (13.26 percent) is 
also higher than non-tax revenue (12.21 percent). However, the coefficient of 
variation (C.V) of non-tax revenue (16.3 percent) is larger than tax revenue (5.9 
percent) during the same period reflecting greater variability of non-tax 
revenue. 
2. The CAGR of total expenditure during 1990-91 to 2007-08 is found to be 11.8 
percent, but the CAGR of total expenditure as percent of GDP is -0.8 percent 
showing decline in total expenditure over the given period. However, the 
CAGR of revenue expenditure (12.8 percent) is higher than capital expenditure 
(8 percent) during the same period. Likewise, the CAGR of interest payments 
(12.3 percent) is higher than the expenditure on subsidies (11.8 percent) and 
defence expenditure (10.7 percent). However, the CV of subsidies as percent of 
revenue expenditure (16.9 percent) is larger than defence expenditure (11.7 
percent) and interest payments (8.3 percent) during the same period. 
3. There has been continuous increase in the real GDP growth of the country 
during the reforms period. It has increased from 5.6 percent during PI (1980-81 
to 1990-91) to 5.73 percent during P2 (1991-92 to 1999-2000), and further to 
7.25 percent during P3 (2000-01 to 2007-08). 
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4. The study shows that direct tax-GDP ratio during P3 is 4.3 percent which is 
higher than P2 i.e 2.7 percent and PI i.e 1.97 percent. But indirect tax-GDP 
ratio is found to be 5.56 percent during P3 which is less than P2 i.e 6.55 percent 
and PI i.e 7.88 percent. This implies that indirect tax as percent of GDP before 
refonns was higher in comparison to f' and II"'' reform periods, while direct tax 
reveals continuous increase over the given periods. But tax-GDP ratio does not 
reflect any significant difference over the given periods i.e PI (9.86 percent), 
P2 (9.24 Percent), and P3 (9.9 percent). 
5. The expenditure-GDP ratio reflects that during P3, it was 15.55 percent which 
is less than P2 i.e 15.77 percent and P2 is less than PI i.e 17.62 percent. This 
implies continuous decline in expenditure-GDP ratio over the given periods. 
6. The debt-GDP ratio shows continuous increase over all the three periods. It has 
increased from 48.59 percent during PI to 52.21 percent during P2, and further 
to 61.4 percent during P3. 
7. Fiscal deficit shows continuous decline over the given periods. It has declined 
from 6.83 percent during PI to 5.67 percent during P2, and further to 4.56 
percent during PI. But revenue deficit shows rising trend over the given 
periods. It has increased from 1.8 percent during PI to 2.99 percent during P2, 
and further to 3.06 percent during P3, which is not desirable for the country. 
However, the primary deficit reflects decline from 3.13 percent during PI to 
0.66 percent during P2, and fiirther to 0.38 percent during P3. 
8. The study of current account balance shows that there has been continuous 
decline in the current account deficits. It has declined from 1.95 percent during 
P3 to 1.07 percent during P2, and further to 0.06 percent during P3.This reflects 
marked improvement in the BOPs conditions of the country. However, during 
1980-81 to 2007-08 India's merchandise trade deficit rose steeply from 4.3 
percent to 7.7 percent of GDP implying the net contribufion of invisibles. 
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9. The analysis of rate of inflation shows that there has been continuous decline 
over the given periods. It has declined from 8.2 percent during PI to 7.9 
percent during P2, and further to 5.13 percent during P3. The average, SD, CV, 
and CAGR of inflation are 7.23, 3.39, 46.88 and -2.51 percent respectively. 
10. Finally, fiscal measures have been successful in correcting the problem of 
fiscal imbalances and accelerating the growth performance of the country. 
However, further there is the need of effective and prudent fiscal measures to 
achieve the basic objective of growth with economic stability. 
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APPENDIX 
Table-l (a) 
Direct Tax-GDP Ratio 
(Percent) 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Direct Tax 
2.00 
2.08 
2.03 
1.9 
1.86 
1.98 
1.97 
1.87 
2.07 
2.04 
1.9 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Direct Tax 
2.3 
2.4 
2.4 
2.7 
2.8 
2.8 
3.2 
2.7 
3.0 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Direct Tax 
3.2 
3.0 
3.4 
3.8 
4.2 
4.6 
5.6 
6.61 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Betwe;en 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
25.40352 
11.79905 
37.20257 
Sum 
21.74 
24.3 
34.4 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
1.97636 
2.7 
4.3 
MS 
12.70176 
0.47196 
Variance 
0.00591 
0.0875 
1.57714 
F 
26.91266 
P-value 
0.0000006 
F crit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between direct tax as percent 
GDP over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between direct tax as 
percent of GDP over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-l(b) 
Indirect Tax-GDP Ratio 
(Percent) 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Indirect Tax 
7.05 
7.18 
7.22 
7.36 
7.54 
8.20 
8.45 
8.64 
8.40 
8.54 
8.2 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Indirect 
Tax 
8.0 
7.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.6 
6.0 
5.6 
5.8 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Indirect Tax 
5.7 
5.2 
5.4 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.8 
5.9 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVi\ 
Source of 
Variation 
Betv/een 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
25.83582 
8.97386 
34.80969 
Sum 
86.78 
59 
44.5 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
7.88909 
6.55556 
5.5625 
MS 
12.91791 
0.35895 
Variance 
0.38129 
0.59778 
0.05411 
F 
35.98760 
P-value 
0.00000004 
F crit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between indirect tax as 
percent of GDP over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between indirect tax as 
percent of GDP over the three periods. 
Alternative; Hypothesis is accepted. 
HI 
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TabIe-1 (c) 
Tax-GDP 
(Percent) 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Total 
Taxes 
9.05 
9.26 
9.24 
9.30 
9.40 
10.18 
10.42 
10.51 
10.46 
10.58 
10.1 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Total 
Taxes 
10.3 
10.0 
8.8 
9.1 
9.4 
9.4 
9.1 
8.3 
8.8 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Total 
Taxes 
9.0 
8.2 
8.8 
9.2 
9.8 
10.3 
11.5 
12.6 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
P1 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Betwesen 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
2.46482 
21.34228 
23.8071 
Sum 
108.5 
83.2 
79.2 
Df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
9.86364 
9.24444 
9.9 
MS 
1.23241 
0.85369 
Variance 
0.37001 
0.38278 
2.08286 
F 
1.44363 
P-value 
0.25508 
F crit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between total taxes as percent 
of GDP over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is significant difference between total taxes as 
percent of GDP over the three periods. 
Null Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-2 
Expenditure-GDP Ratio 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Total 
Expenditure 
(%ofGDP) 
15.7 
14.8 
16.1 
15.9 
17.5 
18.7 
19.9 
19.07 
18.6 
19.05 
18.5 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Total 
Expenditure 
(%ofGDP) 
17.1 
16.4 
16.5 
15.9 
15.0 
14.7 
15.2 
16.0 
15.2 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
200203 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
(Percent) 
Total 
Expenditure 
(VoofGDP) 
15.4 
15.9 
16.9 
17.1 
15.8 
14.1 
14.1 
15.1 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
P1 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
HO: Null Hypoth 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
25.59969 
43.16456 
68.76424 
esis; there ] 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
Sum 
193.82 
142 
124.4 
df 
2 
25 
27 
s no signi 
Average 
17.62 
15.77778 
15.55 
MS 
12.79984 
1.72658 
leant differei 
Variance 
2.9169 
0.64444 
1.26286 
F 
7.41340 
ice between ( 
P-value 
0.00297 
jxpenditur e-C 
F crit 
3.385189962 
rDP 
ratio over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between expenditure-
GDP ratio over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-3 
Debt-GDP 
(Percent) 
' Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
41.1 
39.92 
44.42 
42.82 
45.51 
48.87 
52.9 
54.65 
54.12 
54.99 
55.22 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
54.17 
53.41 
55.21 
53.03 
50.87 
49.01 
50.96 
50.93 
52.31 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
200405 
2005-06 
200607 
2007-08 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
55.58 
59.96 
63.52 
63.05 
63.33 
63.01 
61.48 
61.33 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
P1 
p2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
779.8819144 
442.0042571 
1221.886171 
Sum 
534.52 
469.9 
491.26 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
48,59272727 
52.21111111 
61,4075 
MS 
389.9409572 
17.68017028 
Variance 
36.23130182 
3.775061111 
7.070107143 
F 
22.05527158 
P-value 
3.01958E-06 
F crit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between debt as percent of 
GDP over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between debt as a 
percent of GDP over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-4(a) 
Gross Fiscal Deficit 
(Percent of GDP) 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
GFD 
5.71 
5,07 
5.56 
5.86 
6.99 
7.77 
8.37 
7.56 
7.28 
7.31 
7.7 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
GFD 
5.55 
5.34 
6.96 
5.68 
5.05 
4.84 
5.82 
6.47 
5.36 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
GFD 
5.65 
6.19 
5.91 
4.48 
3.99 
4.09 
3.5 
2.69 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
P1 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
23.15188898 
24.98008245 
48.13197143 
Sum 
75.18 
51.07 
Df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
6.834545455 
5.674444444 
4.5625 
MS 
11.57594449 
0.999203298 
Variance 
1.190907273 
0.452402778 
1.548592857 
F 
11.58517442 
P-value 
0.000275108 
F crit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between gross fiscal deficit 
over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between gross fiscal 
deficit over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-4(b) 
Revenue Deficit 
(Percent of GDP) 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Revenue 
Deficit 
1.4 
0.23 
0.68 
1.14 
1.69 
2.09 
2.47 
2.55 
2.48 
2.44 
3.26 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Revenue 
Deficit 
2.48 
2.47 
3.78 
3.05 
2.49 
2.37 
3.04 
3.82 
3.46 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Revenue 
Deficit 
4.05 
4.4 
4.4 
3.57 
2.49 
2.58 
1.94 
1.11 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANON/A 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
9.600143525 
20.1440279 
29.74417143 
Sum 
20.43 
26.96 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
1.857272727 
2.995555556 
3.0675 
MS 
4.800071762 
0.805761116 
Variance 
0.839001818 
0.338077778 
1.491878571 
F 
5.957189626 
P-value 
0.007661353 
Fcrit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between revenue deficit over 
the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between revenue deficit 
over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-4(c) 
Primary Deficit 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Primary 
Deficit 
3.8 
0.23 
0.7 
1.2 
1.7 
5.5 
5.8 
4.7 
4.2 
3.9 
2.8 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Primary 
Deficit 
0.7 
0.6 
2.2 
0.4 
0.02 
0.24 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
(Percent of GDP) 
Primary 
Deficit 
0.9 
1.4 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
-0.2 
-0.2 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
P1 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
HO: Null Hypot 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
45.68061 
42.68000 
88.36061 
lesis; there is 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
Sum 
34.53 
5.96 
3.1 
df 
2 
25 
27 
> no signiJ 
Average 
3.13909 
0.66222 
0.3875 
MS 
22.84031 
1.70720 
leant differen 
Variance 
3.75901 
0.38264 
0.28982 
F 
13.37881 
ce between pri 
P-value 
0.00011 
mary deficit o 
Fcrit 
3.385189962 
ver 
the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between primary deficit 
over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-5 
Current Account Balance 
(Percent) 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
-1.5 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.5 
-1.2 
-2.1 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-2.7 
-2.3 
-3.1 
Year 
P2 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
-0.3 
-1.7 
-0.4 
-1 
-1.7 
-1.2 
-1.4 
-1 
-1 
Year 
P3 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
-0.6 
0.7 
1.3 
2.3 
-0.4 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1.5 
ANOVA: SINGLE FACTOR 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Count 
11 
9 
8 
SS 
16.61949315 
17.98157828 
34.60107143 
Sum 
-21.5 
-9.7 
-0.5 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
-1.95454545 
-1.07777778 
-0.0625 
MS 
8.309746573 
0,719263131 
Variance 
0.314727273 
0.246944444 
1.836964286 
F 
11.5531385 
P-value 
0.000279723 
F crit 
3.385189962 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between current account 
balance over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between current account 
balance over the three periods. 
Alternative Hypothesis is accepted. 
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